

LEADING AIRMEN:
TAKING LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT SERIOUSLY

BY

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APPROVAL

The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

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ABSTRACT

Leadership development is critical during the most formative years of an officer's career. Unfortunately, leadership is not often understood among junior to mid-grade officers in the military. Many officers, for instance, do not understand the distinctions between leader, manager, and commander, even if they devote time to think about the subject. The fault of this lack of understanding lies not with the officers but rather the services, whose responsibility it is to prepare their future leaders. If leadership development continues to be taken for granted, the Air Force, and the military as a whole, face tremendous challenges in 15-20 years as these same officers become the senior leaders of their service.

The strategy each service uses to develop their leaders reveals something about the institution as a whole. It indicates where leadership falls in relation to its many other priorities, and how it views its future of the organization. Some services take leadership development seriously, while others take for granted the natural leaders in its midst. However, with the decreasing availability of recruits fit for military service, this is a dangerous strategy. Hope that the right person at the right place and time will take the organization to the next level is not prudent. The old adage that "hope is not a strategy" is as relevant to developing leaders as it is for preparing for war. Instead, a systematic approach that includes all elements of leadership development is critical to creating, sharpening, and polishing the leadership abilities of the military's future leaders.

This paper investigates the different approaches for leadership development by examining one particular feature: service culture. The study uses several lenses of organizational theorists, educational experts, and history to analyze each services doctrine, and developmental resources to understand the organization's commitment to developing military leaders. These lenses help identify the strengths and weaknesses of the approach each service uses. Compared against one another, the thesis evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the Navy's, Army's, and Air Force's leadership development programs and synthesizes the best practice of each. The conclusions suggest that each service should create a single, robust, and comprehensive approach to leadership development. Combined in a systematic manner, this approach is capable of preparing today's junior officers for leadership into 2030 and beyond. Leadership is crucial to the success of any organization and the Air Force is no exception. The Air Force must continue to strive to be the best air force in the world, and this includes preparing its young officers for future leadership of the service.

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
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INTRODUCTION

In 2006 and 2007, the Navy achieved a significant milestone that signified a major shift in US Naval culture and leadership. The Navy garnered several firsts as it added US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), US Central Command (CENTCOM), and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to its repertoire of unified commands under the influence of naval leadership. Admiral James Stavridis led this charge by taking command of US Southern Command, a command previously dominated by the Army. From 1947 to 2006, SOUTHCOM enjoyed the leadership of 24 Army and 2 Marine Corps generals. Shortly after the SOUTHCOM announcement, Admiral William Fallon became the first naval officer to take command of US Central Command. CENTCOM was a unified command usually divided between the ground components, at a ratio of 6 to 3, Army and Marine, since its inception in 1983. Finally, Admiral Eric Olson took the helm of Special Operations Command, another unified command dominated by the Army. Until 2007, SOCOM was led by 1 Air Force and 6 Army officers. In addition to Pacific Command (PACOM) - which has known nothing but naval leadership since its inception in 1946 - this placed four unified commands under the direct influence of naval leaders. This does not account for the selection of Admiral Michael Mullen as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during this same period.

Retired Navy Captain Roger Barnett asserts these events are a testament to the strategic thinking inculcated in navy culture. According to Barnett, President George Bush needed strategic thinkers in these key

positions at this critical time. He needed individuals who could think conceptually on a global scale, not individuals stuck in tactical scenarios bound by checklist-like doctrine. According to Barnett, the Navy provided exactly what the President needed by virtue of a culture that valued leaders who think strategically.¹

As these events transpired, I was getting my first taste of headquarters life as an officer in the U.S. Air Force. Cutting my teeth on various projects as a new major in the Air Force component to SOUTHCOM, the Navy's achievements rippled across the military and across the staff. To the Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) staff, Admiral Stavridis' appointment as commander was big news. It motivated individuals on the staff to discuss the existing Combatant Command (COCOM) paradigms associated with SOUTHCOM, and renewed hope for change.

These paradigms ranged from organizational structures to component leads for Security Cooperation Activities. Shortly after Admiral Stavridis' appointment, SOUTHCOM did away with the standard J-series structure (i.e. J1 is personnel, J2 is intelligence, etc.). Departments were reorganized and renamed to assist the COCOM in communicating with its interagency partners and to disrupt traditional military parochial thinking. Another was a shift in the priorities placed on Army South's (ARSOUTH) missions. These did not take away any of the missions ARSOUTH conducted, but instead raised the importance of the missions from the other components. Due in part to the leadership at SOUTHCOM and new leadership at AFSOUTH, my headquarters

¹ Roger W. Barnett, *Navy Strategic Culture: Why the Navy Thinks Differently* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 1-21.

began to see an increase in the security cooperation activities the Air Force conducted. These missions included medical readiness training exercises, multilateral interoperability exercises similar to the ones conducted at Red Flag (except on foreign soil,) and military training teams for instruction in anything from basic maintenance procedures to close air support tactics. Overall, it brought innovative ideas to one of the oldest unified commands in the US.

Almost all on the staff agreed, it seemed the president was sending a signal to the others services. But, what was the signal? Was it to shake up the existing paradigms within each unified command and to introduce fresh ideas from the top? Was it, as Barnett asserts, that strategic thinking is vital and the remaining services need to step up? Or, was it something else entirely?

As I struggled to answer this question I wondered if a unified command needed to change its culture, then any other service could do. The Air Force could provide just as good an answer as the Navy at breaking old, ground-centric paradigms. Unconstrained by traditional ground warfare, airmen's unique perspective can change biases, values, or beliefs cemented in the organizations. So, why were naval officers chosen? More importantly, why did the ground components enjoy such a long reign?

As I looked at the other COCOMs, I noticed that, with three exceptions, Army officers led the vast majority. Air Force officers led Strategic Command and Transportation Command, while Naval Officers have always commanded Pacific Command. Outside of these, the rest were predominately led by ground warfare officers with the Army dominating the percentages. To be fair, I looked at the percentages of COCOM commanders who led various unified commands after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Anything before Goldwater-Nichols would be skewed, so the construction of joint officers and congressional

direction to cooperate should yield something. I did some quick number crunching and discovered that between Goldwater-Nichols and the Navy's milestone of 2006, Army officers accounted for over 41% of all the unified commanders, while the Navy, Marines, and Air Force represent 22%, 10%, and 26%, respectively. Looked at from a service department perspective, it appears a little more even at 41%, 33%, and 26% for the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively. From the perspective of domains, ground warfare officers dominated at 52%. No matter how you look at it, the Air Force lags the other services for the topmost position of unified commands. What causes this difference?

If it is strategic thought, as Barnett suggests, then the Air Force *should* be on par with the Navy. Airpower is strategic in nature. Through the ability to transverse traditional lines of battle, airpower can provide strategic effects by bringing conflict to the heart of the enemy. Unlike the ground components, the Air Force and Navy can break off an engagement to return when conditions are more favorable. Like the Navy, the Air Force's scope of operations dictates a global focus; one beyond theater specific needs. Occasionally flying from friendly nations hundreds or thousands of miles to do their job requires an understanding of political sensitivities around the world, akin to the Navy's. Whether for over flight permission or basing, coordination among our nation's allies and those nations sympathetic to the cause is vital. Negotiating these permissions may place additional politically motivated restrictions on the service, such as national caveats on the way airmen do their job. Logistically, the Air Force is a vital resource provider of timely and flexible services. As such, it must think holistically to meet the needs of the warfighter. Thus, the Air Force produces strategic thinkers as well. So, why did the President choose naval officers over airmen?

A personal experience with a caustic leader motivated me to investigate the issue of leadership as a possible answer. How do bad bosses get there in the first place? What process allowed them to achieve such authority, and why can they not realize the impact they have on the organization's environment? I could not put my finger on why Air Force leaders were different. My staff job enabled me to interact with officers from all the services and repeatedly, the Air Force officers seemed to lead differently. The differences did not appear solely at the most senior levels; they seemed to originate at the lower ranks. Although, the Air Force mid-level officers knew their jobs/specialties well, Army and Marine officers tended to exude confidence in their leadership abilities. They could tackle almost any problem as long as they had the right people on their team. The Navy, with a laissez faire attitude, did not seem to be stirred by trivial problems. Again, the right people on the team would yield results. Meanwhile, Air Force officers tended to try to solve the problems themselves and got buried in details, many times losing sight of the big-picture.

After my tour on a staff, I attended Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), where things began to fall in place. Introduced to leadership education in a new way, leadership became a passion. This newfound passion was either motivated by my excellent instructor, by the questions that plagued me for some time, or both. Why were Air Force officers different and why were Air Force officers not chosen for those top positions?

The leadership education I experienced was refreshing. It motivated me to become a better person and strive to be a better leader. It raised a whole new set of questions though. Why did this feel like the first time I was introduced to leadership? What were officers in the other services experiencing? Did Air Command and Staff College have a similar curriculum? If not, what are the implications and why are there

differences? Is there a cultural element that drives how the services approach the development of their leaders?

This brings us to the current dilemma. The answers to many of these questions lie in the results from this study. It is an attempt to answer most, if not all of the questions posed above, and to eventually provide a possible explanation behind the events in 2006 and 2007. Since unified commands are Presidentially nominated and Congressionally confirmed, we may never know the true answer without asking a President himself, but this study attempts to provide one.

This study is not a critique of the Air Force and its leaders. Instead, it is an attempt to unveil the differences behind each service's approach to leadership development. It looks at each service's leadership development program as a process. The differences revealed will prove useful in the development of a robust, systemic approach to leadership development to help maximize the leadership potential of future Air Force officers.

Culture plays a powerful role in any organization and this thesis proposes that culture is an essential element to what shapes the officers corps within. The values and beliefs of the organization are reflected in the behavior of its members and may explain General Matthew Ridgeway's words, when he said: "The Officer Corps is the heart and soul of any military organization. It must be the reservoir of character and integrity, the fountainhead of professional competence, and the

dynamo of leadership.”² At the center of every organization is a core group of people who shape and mold the organization into an effective machine. For the military, these men and women are the Officer Corps. At lower levels, leaders interact with their followers on a direct and more personal level. Marked by daily interaction, they set the tone that creates the environment and culture pervasive within the larger organization. At the highest levels, the span of control is greater, but the intimacies of leadership fade. If beliefs and values are not inline with the larger organizational goals, then problems arise and confusion mounts. This is not acceptable in a "business" where life and death decisions are made. As the parents of this great nation entrust their children to these military leaders, it becomes vital these officers abound in character and integrity.

Many of the World War II veterans speak of character as the leading attribute for leaders. Character is an amalgamation of traits that make a person who they are. In his survey of numerous WWII general officers, Edgar Puryear discovered some key attributes of good leaders, such as integrity, dependability, decisiveness, honesty, fairness, and judgment, to name a few.³ To paraphrase General Lucian Truscott, 'Character is what you are. Reputation is what others think you are. It is the difference between the two that distinguish true character.'⁴ Some people may possess reputations that far exceed their true capabilities and when confronted with a task, cannot perform. Others may have

² *Leadership: Quotations from the World's Greatest Motivators* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 186.

³ Edgar F. Puryear Jr, *Nineteen Stars: a Study in Military Character and Leadership*, 2nd ed. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2003), 289-349.

⁴ Puryear, *Nineteen Stars: a Study in Military Character and Leadership*, 290.

reputations that far underestimate who they truly are, and always continue to impress. Character is vital to our officers and to leadership as a whole. As an officer in the military, subordinates will eventually understand who you truly are, not by your words, but by your actions. Leadership is not a popularity contest, and making the correct but unpopular decisions usually reveals who a person is. It underscores the trust subordinates place in you, because it instills in those you lead “the desire to obey because they know that the orders they receive are just, sound, and necessary.”⁵

The Air Force is fortunate to have the leaders it has, but many of our senior leaders developed their own leadership abilities through personal experiences since the Air Force has not historically given leadership development its due. Outside of formal education, leadership development is a self-directed endeavor with little to no organizational guidance. Some officers pursue master’s degrees in leadership to satisfy their personal needs for development. Others rely on mentorship from senior leaders to shape their own personal leadership approach. However, many inside the Air Force do not understand the role of mentorship, nor appreciate its intent. The Air Force does not provide their officers legitimate opportunities to lead until later in their careers. Few career fields in the Air Force place new, or even junior, officers in leadership positions. Existing beliefs and policies keep rated officers in the Air Force from command until they reach O-5. Although officers may earn command of a flight in operational squadrons, it does not possess the legal authority of other commands. Compared to the other services,

⁵ Puryear, *Nineteen Stars: a Study in Military Character and Leadership*, 349.

this is significant since rated officers dominate the most senior echelons of the Air Force establishment.

As the heart and soul of any military organization, our service must ensure the officer corps receives the best leadership development program possible. Are we doing that today? If the events in 2006 are indicative, then we can do better. The foundation of organizational success lies in leadership, and time well spent developing our leaders properly will pay great dividends in the future.

As a service, we must recognize the Captains and Lieutenants in the military today will be our 4-star officers in 2030-2050. We have an obligation to make sure we prepare them the best we can for the challenges the nation faces ahead. Furthermore, 75% of the 17-24 year olds in our nation are ineligible for recruitment into the nation's military because of obesity, criminal records, and more.⁶ This ups the ante and makes leadership development for the ones we have even more important. Leadership is the nucleus of any organization and we need to take the development of our future senior leaders seriously. Let us not wait for the time to pin-on O-5 or O-6 to start developing our leaders, but attack this at day one. By starting early, they have the chance to practice and refine the requisite skills before their decisions have strategic impact.

If the US military truly wants to maintain its edge as the world's premier military, then the nation, Department of Defense, and Services need to look at leadership from a systemic and holistic perspective.

⁶ Mission: Readiness. "Ready, Willing and Unable to Serve." (Oct, 2009): 1. <http://cdn.missionreadiness.org/MR-Ready-Willing-Unable.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2012).

Moreover, to create individuals capable of leading in the increasingly complex operational environments of the future, we must embrace new and innovative ways of instilling leadership principles and philosophies into our nation's future leaders.

METHODOLOGY.

This study uses a variety of theories to analyze the service's doctrine, leadership development recourses, and culture. Chapter 1 lays the foundation for the study by focusing on Edgar Schein, Jesper Pedersen, and Jesper Sorensen's organizational culture theories. Their work provides a powerful framework for understanding an organization's culture. I first discuss what organizational culture is and address its relationship to leadership. I then draw on the works of Elizabeth Kier and Allan English to shed some light on the unique characteristics to military culture and its potential influence on decisions. Finally, Schein's multilayered framework combined with Carl Builder's analysis of services' culture reveals the underlying values and beliefs of each service. This is crucial to understanding each Services' preferences, because culture provides an element of predictability to future behavior and decisions.

In order to make this study manageable, I concentrate on the post-WWII period to today. This facilitates tracing the evolution of leadership study in each service. It provides a history of each service's approach to leadership development and helps illuminate some of the changes along the way. It also reveals some cultural proclivities for leadership development and exposes any historical resistance to changes in leadership development philosophies.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain the service-specific analysis of the Army, Navy, and Air Force leadership development programs, respectively. Using the framework provided in Chapter 1, each chapter will discuss each service department's leadership development programs.

The chapters are broken into three main components: the espoused values - captured in each service's leadership "doctrine;" the application of resources - measured through the continuum of learning as described below; and the cultural analysis of the service - to provide a possible explanation for the service's approach. First, the espoused values and beliefs explain what the service "says" is important to the institution. Then, the study will measure what a service "does" through an investigation into each component of the continuum of learning, to assess its commitment to leadership development. Finally, using a modified version of Builder's categories for analysis, the study will reveal the underlying values and beliefs of each service to help illuminate the differences along the way.

Before discussing the continuum itself, I must take a brief moment to explain the method of analysis for this aspect of the study. The analysis will use Bloom's taxonomy to assess the continuum's various elements. Bloom's taxonomy is a familiar concept among educators. The concept is based on a classification that divides learning into 6 categories: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.⁷ Bloom's taxonomy has become the educational

⁷ The most basic level is "knowledge." Simply put, knowledge is the recall of data from memory. Most of us probably memorized multiplication tables as children to commit them to memory – that is knowledge. Second, comprehension is found by understanding the meaning, purpose, or interpretation. One example is to have students put concepts in their own words, indicating they understand the essence of the concept. Third, application is the ability to place what a student has learned to practice. The application of engineering formulas to design a bridge is one example. The last three - analysis, synthesis, and evaluation – represent Bloom's highest level of learning.

standard for classifying and assessing lesson plans and school curricula in the military. Bloom's taxonomy takes a building block approach to learning that uses the previous categories to reach the highest levels of learning. Thus, Bloom's classification will help illuminate the importance of viewing the continuum of learning as a system and not just as component parts.

The continuum of learning is an amalgamation of adult learning models designed to create a habit of life-long learning. It consists of education, application, experience, and self-study. Education refers to the formal institutional process, which teaches concepts, theory, and discusses practical application. Application is supervised employment of knowledge to refine certain skills, usually performed at a unit level. Also, application is where coaching falls, because it involves the modification of behavior as the events take place. Both education and application seek to provide conceptual understanding of the skills and vicarious experiences before granting full independence and autonomy to the practitioner. Experience, or visceral experience, garners those valuable lessons in an unsupervised environment. Experience by trial and error

In most instances, analysis, evaluation, and synthesis happen nearly simultaneously. Analysis represents the ability for a student to separate concepts or problems into its component parts. Mechanics troubleshooting a problem with a vehicle is an example. Checking the electric, fuel, or exhaust systems to help dissect the problem is analysis. Synthesis is the ability to build and understand a system from its component parts. To continue the mechanic example, the mechanic likely ran through a variety of scenarios in his mind, exploring how various components of the vehicle might lead to the symptoms observed. The last level, evaluation is the ability to make judgments about the value of the ideas or material. To continue the mechanic example, a mechanic might compare the plausible causes of the mechanical symptoms and make an expert judgment about what the most likely cause is before embarking on costly repairs.

is a method of Bloom's taxonomy that incorporates the highest level of learning. Dissecting a problem, evaluating its component parts, and fusing them back together helps provide a thorough understating of the environment. Mentoring is vital to experience, because some of the most valuable learning occurs during, or after the event. Mentoring can also help avoid mistakes if the individual has the time and foresight to seek advice before the event occurs. Self-study is probably the most important and most difficult to instill within a service. It is the most important because self-study can touch on all levels of Bloom's taxonomy. Figure 1 represents these concepts graphically.




Figure 1: The Continuum of Learning

Source: *Author's Original Work*

A well-developed continuum will provide young learners the basic knowledge and concepts that form the necessary foundation for application later. Then, advanced practitioners may find examples more useful to their learning as they reflect on the concepts applied. To encourage some of the highest levels, a self-study program might encourage group discussions where members can voice their opinions to help illuminate alternative perspectives for analysis and evaluation. Once the session is over, the individual's reflection on the discussions and concepts will synthesize the information and create a better understanding of the concepts discussed.

Although self-study is one of the most important elements of the continuum, the operational demands of the military today leave service members longing for every minute they can get with their families and friends. This leaves little time or motivation for self-development. Designed to fill the gaps between formal education, application, and experience, members must embrace the self-study concept. Some Services have provided tools to help members focus on what is institutionally important during this high-paced period. This study will describe some of those tools and compare them with what the other Services provide to make an assessment. Like any skill, currency and proficiency needs to be maintained. Self-study broadens the mind with new ideas and concepts helping individuals stay current. It also maintains proficiency through the discovery and analysis of vicarious experiences.

The continuum of learning, as it applies to leadership development is a powerful concept, but not all services manage it the same way. This essentially creates several “continua” of leadership development. In Chapter 2, the study focuses on the Army’s development of leadership doctrine. It will trace the evolution of leadership doctrine to assess the institution’s beliefs and values toward leadership. Then it will use Bloom’s taxonomy to evaluate their use of education, application, experience, and self-study, as a resource. Concluding with a cultural analysis helps explain some of the Army’s institutional preferences and behavior regarding leadership development.

Chapter 3 investigates the Navy’s leadership development program. Since the Navy is less reliant on doctrine, the Navy’s values are measured through a survey of literature regarding leadership. This survey helps illuminate some of the interesting aspects of the Navy’s past that shape its current approach for leadership development. The assessment of the Navy’s continuum of leadership will use an identical approach to the

previous chapter. Once again, a cultural analysis will provide some understanding into the explanation behind the Navy's leadership development approach.

Chapter 4 discusses the Air Force's leadership development program. I placed this chapter last, because it illuminates the middle ground between the two previous chapters for its assessments. The availability of the some Air Force leadership doctrine proved elusive. Additionally, the Air Force's commitment to doctrine lies somewhere in between the Army's and the Navy's. Thus, a hybrid of the Army and Navy's assessment is appropriate. Doctrine's comparison with education, application, experience, and self-study will uncover the Air Force's commitment to the development of future senior leaders. A cultural analysis provides some clarification before moving into Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 will compare the analysis of the leadership development programs and make general recommendations for a comprehensive, systemic, leadership development program. It will synthesize the analysis of the three service cultures and their affects on developing leaders and provide a side-by-side comparison of development programs. The comparison will look at the services' use of doctrine, and the resources provided through the lens of the continuum to extract the most useful tools and approaches for leadership development. Interspersed throughout the chapter will be recommendations for incorporation into future leadership development programs. These recommendations are meant to facilitate the construction of a holistic leadership program to ensure our nation builds military leaders who can take their services beyond 2050.

Chapter 1

Service Culture and Leadership Development

Culture is a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

- Edgar H. Schein

Culture defines the norms, values, and beliefs embraced by the people of an organization. It creates perceptions and biases, and shapes the way members interpret the environment around them. This interpretation filters “pertinent” information for use and eliminates the others. These perspectives shape the analysis of a problem and focuses members on finding a solution to those organizational problems. Culture is an essential aspect to the survival of any organization. Culture is especially useful in conflict where the team who reacts fastest wins. Culture can produce a faster decision-making cycle by creating cohesion among the members and by establishing a common mental-operating picture. Moreover, it creates efficiency by developing an “intuition” in its members, and biases that predispose members to focus on certain, isolated environmental factors for analysis, yielding quicker solutions based on previous experience. However, if biases filter out the wrong “pertinent” information and fail to identify the environment correctly, it will stifle success. A solution applied to the wrong problem will not likely produce a positive outcome. Instead, the biases may exacerbate problems.

In the technologically complex forms of warfare today, it is vitally important that military leaders understand the culture in which they

operate and its effects on the members of the organization. Reciprocally, they must also understand how members of an organization may shape the culture. This interdependent relationship between an organization's culture and its members must be understood well enough to allow leaders to manage both successfully.¹

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE.

Observable indicators of an organization's culture include rules, rituals, espoused values, and habits of thinking, to name a few. In his inquiry into the relationship between leadership and organizational culture, Edgar H. Schein identifies three layers of culture. The first, and most shallow, layer begins with artifacts. Artifacts are the most observable symbols and typically encapsulate the first impressions of an organization. Artifacts are discerned through the physical interaction with the organization. They consist of languages, clothes, rituals, and products. Second, espoused beliefs focus on ideas, goals, values, ideologies, and rationalizations. These beliefs are more nebulous, because they may not reflect the actual behavior of the organization. This is where rhetoric and reality may clash. If the beliefs that provide comfort and meaning to the organization do not align with the beliefs that correlate with effective performance, then desired and observed

¹ Although this chapter relies on Edgar Schein's exploration of organizational culture, it was also influenced by the works of Gert Jan Hofstede in *Cultures and Organizations: Software for the Mind*, and Charles O'Reilly; Jennifer Chatman; David Caldwell in *People and Organizational Culture: A Profile Comparison Approach to Assessing Person-Organization Fit*.

behavior will not be the same.² The leaders may reward behavior that supports the desired beliefs of an organization, despite what the organization may profess. The espoused, or stated, beliefs are the external image the organization wishes to portray to the world, which may not always align with the fundamental values the members accept within the organization. Analysts closest to the organization may be best suited to distinguish what is stated about, and what is truly reflected in an organization.

The last, and deepest, layers of culture are these basic underlying assumptions. These form the basis of the organization. They are typically taken for granted and may not be recognizable to most inside or outside of the organization. Confronting these basic underlying assumptions is limited, intolerable to the organization, and extremely difficult to change. Schein argues: “They define what to pay attention to, what things mean, how to react and what actions to take.”³ The first two layers, he continues, may take different forms in various sub-organizations, but the basic underlying assumptions remain static throughout the entire organization. He asserts that culture is an evolutionary process.⁴ Introduction of new members and new functions may shape the culture, but elements of its past always remain.⁵

As valuable as Schein’s model is, it is not without its weaknesses. Schein, for example, explains culture in a very hierarchical and linear fashion. Basic underlying assumptions feed espoused values, which

² Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (The Jossey-Bass Business & Management Series), 4 ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010), 26.

³ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 28.

⁴ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 275.

⁵ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 231.

then shapes artifacts. Jesper S. Pedersen and Jesper S. Sørensen believe reality is far more complex. They suggest that in his effort to explain organizational culture *theoretically*, Schein demonstrates a tendency to oversimplify *reality*. They believe the relationship between artifacts, values, and underlying assumptions is a complex web of interrelated nodes where each one affects the other. Additionally, they are frustrated with the lack of explanation of “how” artifacts develop from values, or how values become basic underlying assumptions. In the end, Pedersen and Sørensen find great value in the categorizations Schein developed but caution against an overly simple analysis of them.⁶ With Pedersen’s and Sørensen’s critiques in mind, Schein’s framework provides a valuable tool for dissecting military culture.

Militaries have unique organizational cultures, because the socialization of new members is intense. Elizabeth Kier said it best when she suggested, “the military’s culture is not equivalent to national character. It may reflect some aspects of its society’s culture, but the military’s powerful assimilation processes can displace the influence of the civilian society.”⁷ The process of becoming a military member begins at basic training where members are trained, educated, and indoctrinated into their service’s culture. They are introduced to new cultural artifacts, such as language, the acronyms, and expected forms of behavior. Members must subdue individuality in favor of the organizational definition of who they are. Notably, the degree to which

⁶ Jesper S. Pedersen and Jesper S. Sørensen, *Organisational Cultures in Theory and Practice* (Aldershot, Hants, England.: Gower Pub Co, 1990), 10-26, 109-118.

⁷ Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War* (Princeton University Press, 1999), 30.

different services do this varies. This new identity, formed by the organization, is much greater than oneself. Culture provides meaning and identity from an organizational perspective, not an intrapersonal one. Nonetheless, as organizations reward behavior commensurate with the service's basic underlying assumptions, those individuals climb the ladder of success. Time reinforces and strengthens the military values, beliefs, and perceptions in the minds of members the longer they stay. In Kier's comparison of British and American military doctrine in the interwar period, she observes, "unlike most civilian organizations, militaries do not hire people with experience outside the military to become part of the core organization."⁸ This may explain why cultural change within a military organization can be so difficult.

Another reason these preferences may be difficult to change is because they are deeply ingrained and well-established in military organizations. Militaries use an indoctrination process designed to inculcate new norms of behavior and to supplant old ones. Despite a military's authoritarian structure, members may strongly resist major cultural changes. To overcome this opposition and effect cultural change, leaders must develop a strategy to ensure member buy-in, at all levels.

Kier demonstrates that military organizations tend to eschew change; thus, they reap both the benefits and limitations of this attribute. While a long-lasting culture provides the necessary cohesion within military organizations, it can also inhibit a decision maker's openness to new ways of doing business. John Kotter's organizational

⁸ Kier, *Imagining War*, 29.

change model provides one answer on “how” an organization might effect change in certain aspects of the deeper layers of culture. Although Kotter’s model is an eight-step process, they do not follow a sequential order in execution, keeping in mind the dynamic nature of culture as described by Pedersen and Sørensen. The first three steps run almost concurrently, but must be near completion before embarking on the rest. The model begins by eliminating complacency and creating a sense of urgency. The members of the organization must perceive a need to act, due to some form of organizational discontent.⁹ The second step is to build a coalition of highly respected and influential leaders within the organization that support change.¹⁰ This group of key individuals shapes the organization through their influence on processes, structures, and individuals. Step three develops a feasible, flexible vision and strategy the coalition supports.¹¹ Another key aspect of the strategy is to develop one that is easy to communicate and understand.

Kotter’s fourth step may not seem worthy of independent stature and it is usually overlooked or underestimated. “Communicating the vision” not only requires the standard written and oral commitment, but also repetition, leadership by example, and consistency. Repetition is a constant reminder to preempt regression in the change process. Related to Schein’s consistency between desired and espoused beliefs as they relate to behavior, Kotter addresses the natural tendency for leaders within the organization to revert to old habits. Therefore, they must be

⁹ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Review Press, 1996), 35-50.

¹⁰ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 51-66.

¹¹ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 67-84.

especially aware of their actions as they relate to the desired behavior. Any small defects can highlight inconsistencies to the members and create cognitive dissonance as to the true value of the change, thus defeating the change altogether.¹²

Once the organization understands the vision and strategy, Kotter's next three steps are: empowering employees for broad-based action, generating short-term wins, and consolidating gains and producing more change. While Kotter's empowerment gives members part ownership of the process, it also enables broad-based action designed to break-down old cultural barriers inhibiting the implementation of the new ideas.¹³ Short-term gains are a way for an organization to see and track progress. More importantly though, Kotter asserts that the steps thus far build momentum for the organization to "blast through the dysfunctional granite walls found in so many organizations."¹⁴ In line with Schein's model, success reinforces the beliefs into progressively deeper layers. As a major portion of the strategy, consolidating gains enables organizations to pursue increasingly greater change. This step also serves as a caution to not stop too early. The change may seem complete, but "resistance to change never fully dissipates."¹⁵

Kotter's final step is to institutionalize the change into the organization's culture. Kotter emphasizes that cultural change is last and

¹² Kotter, *Leading Change*, 85-100.

¹³ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 101-116.

¹⁴ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 116-130.

¹⁵ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 130-145.

not first. It depends on how successful are new ideas. It may require changes to promotion processes or a complete turnover in personnel.¹⁶

Kotter's model is highly reliant on the commitment of leaders to effect change. Along the entire journey, leaders play a key role in reaching the culminating step – anchoring new approaches into the culture. This final step of the process grounds the change into the organization and helps make the change stick.¹⁷ However, this takes time, because cultural change is not a fast process.

In his study, Allan English investigates the power of America's military culture on its highly integrated and operationally interdependent neighbor, the Canadian Defense Force. He outlines organizational change in much the same way as Kotter, but provides some valuable observations about the uniqueness of military organizations. Since militaries do not "hire" from outside the organization, recruiting and promotion are some of the few tools available to alter military culture.¹⁸ As Kotter describes, sometimes resistance to change requires removal of key personnel who are actively, or passively, obstructing the effort. Unlike the business world, the military does not replace those individuals from outside the organization; it brings someone up from below. Changing a culture is not a fast process to begin with, but by removing some of the most effective tools for cultural change, as the military does, it becomes even more difficult.

¹⁶ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 145-158.

¹⁷ Kotter, *Leading Change*, 22, 145-158.

¹⁸ Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: a Canadian Perspective* (Montreal· QC: McGill Queens University Press, 2004), 23.

One recent example of the time and energy involved in cultural change is the Army's beret controversy, which began in 2000. Of particular interest, Schein's model asserts that artifacts are the shallowest layer of organizational culture, above espoused values or basic underlying assumptions. On 11 November 2000, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, directed a change to the Army's official headgear as a symbol of excellence. The history of the Black Beret dates back to 1924 when British Armor units found it practical. However, in 1979, the US Army allowed Rangers to adopt the beret for their official headgear, precluding other branches from the same. In 2000, berets were symbols of elite units, with Army Special Forces, Rangers, and Airborne all having distinctive headgear. General Shinseki's logic was cultural. It was a symbol of Army transformation to a modular concept. However, it met tremendous resistance, especially from those who were in the service and did not see the functionality behind the new policy.¹⁹ Logically, new accessions did not seem to mind the change, because their roots to the artifact did not run as deep as those with more tenure. As time moved on, the greatest resistance came from increasingly senior echelons until the black beret policy was replaced in favor of the patrol cap in June of 2011. If this distinguished institution quibbled over something as insignificant as an artifact for a decade, then how ferocious would they protect their underlying beliefs or assumptions? How long would it take to change one of these deeper

¹⁹ GEN Eric Shinseki (2000, Nov 11). *CSA SENDS - THE ARMY BLACK BERET*. Retrieved Feb 19, 2012, from The United States Army: <http://www.army.mil/features/beret/beret.htm>.

layers? The answer depends on how entrenched those cultural elements are.

In the military, when decisions have life or death consequences, culture is essential. Militaries cannot allow confusion to blanket the battlefield. A common understanding of the environment is required; actions must be nearly simultaneous with orders; purpose and direction must be embodied; and objectives must coincide with the organization's goals. Culture provides efficiency and effectiveness in the chaos of war. Members must be able to communicate and understand each other quickly. Fog and friction plague soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen alike, but teamwork is the essence of military operations in battle and culture facilitates it.

At the pinnacle of every team is a leader. Leaders are vital not only for managing and integrating the team, but for "shaping and reinforcing the culture."²⁰ Building on his earlier belief that organizational culture is an evolutionary process, Schein argues that the originators of organizations lay the foundation of the culture upon which transformations occur, "it is important to recognize that even in mature companies, we can trace many of their assumptions to the beliefs and values of founders and early leaders. The special role that these leaders play is to propose the initial answers to the questions that the young group has about how to operate internally and externally."²¹ The evolutionary transformation of culture from its original form into another is shaped by a leader's ability to motivate their subordinates, and to

²⁰ English, *Understanding Military Culture: a Canadian Perspective*, 21.

²¹ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 232.

communicate their assumptions in a vivid and clear manner.²² In essence, this is Kotter's model used to maintain positive control over cultural change. Schein outlined a list of "tools," provided in Table 1, which are useful in shaping and reinforcing a culture. Whether or not the leaders are aware of them, these "tools" act as a method for embedding ideas, values, and beliefs within the organization's culture. While Schein provides the "tools," Kotter's model provides a "strategy" for implementation. Leaders may use both actively to create change, or they may permit them to act in the background helping members of the organization identify inconsistencies.

As doctrine provides the espoused values of the services, the embedding mechanisms are visible artifacts to measure culture. Acting simultaneously, these embedding mechanisms help one determine the value, or level of commitment, an organization places on certain espoused beliefs. The three embedding mechanisms in *italics* will prove useful in this study.

²² Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 235.

TABLE 1: EMBEDDING MECHANISMS

Primary Embedding Mechanisms

- *What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis*
- How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises
- *How leader allocate resources*
- Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching
- How leaders allocate rewards and status
- How leaders recruit, select, promote, and excommunicate

Secondary Articulation and Reinforcement Mechanisms

- Organizational design and structure
- *Organizational systems and procedures*
- Rites and rituals of the organization
- Design of physical space, facades, and buildings
- Stories about important events and people
- Formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters

Source: Edgar Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 236.

First, what leaders pay attention to can provide leaders a powerful tool to communicate a message. However, if a leader does not “walk-the-walk” conflict may result as inconsistencies bog subordinates down in their attempt to decipher the intent of the leader’s message, or motivate them to substitute personal solutions due to the confusion. What leaders ignore can be just as powerful. Relaxed attitudes will develop as members begin to understand where the leaders place their attention. A compilation of what is given attention, ignored, or generates an emotional reaction will eventually help members form their own opinion of what the desired beliefs within the organization are. This study will use this

element to measure the seriousness of leadership development as it pertains to each service.²³

Second, how leaders allocate resources transmits a message of what is important to the organization. Not only does this provide insight into how leaders like to manage their resources, but it also sends clear messages about their priorities. These resources include more than the traditional form, such as money, people, and equipment. They may be captured in changes to educational curriculum. Reacting to the insurgencies in the Middle East, the 2006 curriculum at Fort Leavenworth changed to emphasize Counter-Insurgency operations (COIN). A clear signal was heard within the Army that COIN was not only important, but desperately needed to be understood. Likewise, legitimate changes in the curriculum at other military institutions may indicate a level of commitment to leadership development within the service.²⁴

Third, organizational systems and procedures reinforce cultural behavior. This is about building a periodic habit or routine of behavior consistent with the desired outcome. Embedding cultural processes and ideas, as Kotter suggests, establishes routines of behavior designed to entrench the values in deeper and deeper layers. Taken for granted, the lack of procedures consistent with the desired cultural values will allow them to unravel over time. Unit level programs put in place to practice and reinforce the concepts learned at institutions, is one example of procedures or systems designed to reinforce cultural behavior. Looking

²³ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 236.

²⁴ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 244.

at this reinforcing mechanism will illuminate the lasting effects of changes to culture.²⁵

Schein's three "tools" all point to the importance of leaders, who should take an active role in embedding the cultural values they want their organizations to embrace. Leaders should teach their "organizations how to perceive, think, feel, and behave based on their own conscious and unconscious convictions."²⁶ Teaching a culture is much more than espousing certain values, or beliefs, but living them as well.

At an organizational level, action shows a level of commitment to the ideals the leaders express. It sends clear messages to an organization's members about what is important to an organization. Based on these actions, the members will make their own assessment about whether the values are meant to be embodied, or merely espoused. As it pertains to this study, Schein's embedding mechanisms will measure each service's commitment to the espoused values by analyzing the resources applied through the continuum of learning.

At the individual level in the military, subordinates, peers, and supervisors are keenly aware of officers' actions. This is likely an attempt to get a feel for these officers. An individual's actions, or inaction, tell much more about their character than the values they profess. This holds true regardless of whether an officer holds a position of authority or not. Therefore, leaders need to scrutinize their own actions, outward appearances, and priorities to understand the informal message they are sending to their observers. These seemingly superficial

²⁵ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 251.

²⁶ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 236.

actions shape how members embrace the culture of the organization and may inadvertently change it, if they gain enough momentum.

Much of the earlier discussion touches on how organizational culture shapes its members, but because the military hires from within, very little external influence is realized. By virtue of the way military organizations operate, the culture is inculcated and reinforced in an interdependent relationship with the leaders. As a junior officer makes rank and progresses, the culture they were introduced to, such as training, plays an increasingly significant role in what they perceive, think, and feel. Due to limited time and exposure, a lieutenant will not be nearly as attached to the underlying values of the organization as a major. The time individuals are exposed to the culture, as well as their daily interaction further ingrains these cultural biases into the leadership as they rise in the organizational structure. This in turn influences leader's decisions, strategies, doctrines, and approaches to problems, creating a cycle of a sustainable culture that evolves very slowly with time. Due to the reciprocal nature of the relationship between officers and their culture, leaders must remain aware of this dynamic to not lose their position as active participants in the management of their organization. If they are not vigilant, military leaders may find themselves slaves to their services. "The bottom line for leaders," Schein suggests, "is that if they do not become conscious of the cultures in which they are embedded, those cultures will manage them."²⁷

²⁷ Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 22.

Culture can create organizations that develop and evolve outside the active control of their leaders. Military culture is susceptible to this phenomenon and three characteristics that may work against the officer corps are: careerism, a “zero-defect” philosophy, and anti-intellectualism.

Careerism revolves around making sure a member’s career is safeguarded by his actions. This may come at the expense of institutional progress. English argues that careerism promotes a low-risk mentality and combined with downsizing’s effects on the evaluation system compels officers to pursue a “check-the-box” mentality, a mindset devoted to doing the minimum established by formal or informal norms to achieve success. Success is usually defined through job recognition and consequently promotion. For example, an officer in the Air Force is said to “check-the-box” by getting a Master’s degree for promotion to the next grade, although some might argue it is a norm established by the organization to help find self-motivated, highly educated officers. The perception is that it has become a requirement for promotion. It may have little to do with developing an analytic mind, a breadth of knowledge, or depth of understanding. This is true, especially since there is no distinction about the institution or what degree is obtained. So, an individual with a “check-the-box” mentality seeks to do only what is required to maintain a good image and be promoted to the next grade.

This selfish mentality carries over into assignments, job performance, and duty. In job performance, one mistake, or “defect,” could effect their evaluation and spell disaster for their job, career, and pension. Therefore, a safe, conservative “zero-defect” philosophy was slowly adopted. As a result, officers are less inclined to risk their image, job evaluation, or careers for the good of an organization. If the truth may be perceived as unwelcomed or controversial, most officers shy away and let the organization proceed on the established course. Trust is a

“causality to career survival in the minds of many officers” and self interest became more important than service to one’s country, organization, or subordinates.²⁸

Anti-intellectualism is a resistance to the development of a breadth and depth of thought, reason and comprehension; it is a complete and total disdain for intellectual pursuits.²⁹ People like John Andreas Olsen, Tom Z. Ruby, and Lloyd J. Matthews describe a culture against intellectual pursuits that poses a tremendous threat to the long-term survival, flexibility, and adaptability of the military and its officers.³⁰ They cite resistance to intellectual ideas at senior levels, and speeches by senior leaders that seem to place education at the bottom of service priorities. In 2010, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) conducted a study investigating the toll ten-years of conflict has taken on the officer corps. In it, they reference a need to “diminish anti-intellectualism” in the US military.³¹ Nonetheless, many in the military disagree with their argument. However, when discussing culture, regardless of which side one stands in this argument, perception is

²⁸ English, *Understanding Military Culture: a Canadian Perspective*, 83.

²⁹ Douglas Higbee, *Military Culture and Education* (Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 2010), 160.

³⁰ For more information on what they say reference, John Andreas Olsen, *John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books Inc., 2007)., Tom Ruby, “Flying High, Thinking Big,” *The American Interest* (May/June 2009), online: <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=613>, accessed: 2 March 2012 and Lloyd J. Mathews “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American Arms,” *Army Magazine* in 2 Parts, (July/August 2002), online: <http://www3.ausa.org/webint/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCS4R> and <http://www3.ausa.org/WEBINT/DeptArmyMagazine.nsf/byid/CCRN-6CCS56>.

³¹ John Nagl and Brian Burton, eds., *Keeping the Edge* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), 70.

reality. In this cooperative relationship, perception is what shapes culture and culture shapes the future through its members. Therefore, any resistance to highly developed thought is dangerous for any organization and, if not preempted, may transform the organization unintentionally.

These are only a few examples of the prevailing cultural perceptions that have the potential to put organizations outside the control of military leaders. Hopefully, it is clear that among a multitude of influences that leaders, members, and history shape these powerful organizational personalities. Now that the foundation for organizational culture theory, military culture, and their relationship with leadership is understood, we can investigate their influences on the individual services.

SERVICE CULTURE.

It is fitting for a study of leadership development to investigate the leaders role in shaping organizational culture as well. As outlined above, the leader is crucial to the formation of those basic underlying assumptions, which guide an organization's behavior. An investigation into the artifacts and espoused values can reveal much about a service's culture. Awareness of the symbiotic relationship between culture and its members are key to understanding how an organization behaves, and what it values. This brief glimpse into organizational culture will aid in this study's investigation of leadership development. Each service pursues slightly different approaches to the development of its leaders, and understanding culture helps elucidate the reasoning for their different interpretations.

Military culture, as discussed earlier, is a general description of how military cultures act and interact with their members; it does not apply globally to all militaries. Nor does it apply to all services in the US military to the same extent. The basic premise of indoctrination is true

for each service, but the values, beliefs, and norms are unique. Building on the works of Schein, Pedersen, Sorenson, Kier, and English, we will take a look at individual service cultures, or “personalities.”

Long-term RAND Corporation analyst Carl Builder called them service “personalities” as he described some of the cultural elements that lay beneath the services’ decisions and strategies.³² In 1989, Builder authored a book investigating how organizational culture shaped each service’s approach to strategy. Conducted before many of the studies of organizational/corporate culture, his influential work formed a foundation for understanding the military services. Moreover, recent scholarship since *The Masks of War* (written in 1989)--such as Schein’s, Pedersen’s, and Sorenson’s--point to the continued relevance of Builder’s study. Written prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and the end of the Cold War, Builder’s appraisals of the services will need revalidation, or updating. His “insider” view captured a unique insight into some of the fundamental service motivations and provides a possible explanation into their sometimes contradictory and mystifying behavior. The following chapters will use a modified version of Builder’s work, combined with elements of the other theorists to analyze the leadership development strategies in each service department.

Builder’s book serves as a practical application of Schein, Pedersen, and Sorenson’s work. Before Schein even wrote, Builder did just as Schein suggested: he compared observed behavior with espoused values to try to unveil the basic underlying assumptions each service used for planning the “next” war. Builder’s approach identified several

³² Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

underlying ideas that motivated their behavior. To describe these ideas, he ascribed “altars” to each service as a simple, metaphorical explanation of the culture. The idea of an altar conjures an image of worshiping a set of beliefs or ideals. The metaphor is a strong one for demonstrating the ingrained nature of the service’s beliefs and their organizational opposition to change. What Builder was trying to capture, is what took Schein, and the others, years of study and books of analysis to describe. Builder tried to articulate, using his metaphor, the effects of organizational culture on its members and their resistance to change. It also highlighted their biases by relating their institutional preferences for certain predetermined solutions. For example, he argued the Army’s devotion to the country and its historical memory of victory in Europe shaped its preference to prepare for a conventional war fought between NATO and the Warsaw Pact Nations. As such, he ascribed the country as the Army’s “altar for worship.” Similarly, Builder argued, that the Navy’s traditional desire for command of the sea influenced its proposals for a conventional war strategy using sea control as a basis for the conflict between the USSR and the US. Hence, the Navy’s “altar” is tradition. Lastly, the Air Force’s fascination with technology explained its quest for better fighter or bomber aircraft shaping how it prepared for fighting the Cold War. Thus, it is no surprise the Air Force placed technology as its “altar” for institutional worship. As Builder asserts, these “altars” convey the fundamental beliefs, or basic underlying assumptions, that drove each services behavior.

To discover how Builder developed these one-word descriptions of a service’s culture, an understanding of Builder’s framework is helpful. The framework he provided will form the basis for discovering how each service views leadership development. Congruent with Schein’s theory, Builder used artifacts, espoused values, and organizational behavior to uncloak the underlying assumptions each service had. In a modified

form, the five primary lenses Builder used were: 1) capability to perform the service's mission, 2) institutional associations, 3) "service legitimacy and relevancy" to national security, 4) sub-organizational hierarchy, and 5) "altars for worship."³³ The first three attempted to comprehend the espoused values of each organization. By comparing the behavior of the organization with these espoused values he checked for consistency, revealing each organization's true preferences.

The fourth provided a possible explanation as to why the first three shape the service's behavior. For example, Builder illustrated the structural explanation for division within the Air Force among Fighter and Bomber Generals and how the service changed with respect to who is in charge. He described the propensity for fighter generals to pursue fighter solutions for a conventional war in Europe, while the bomber generals sought nuclear capable bombers for the nuclear deterrence mission they were entrusted with. "The relative priorities between their two concepts depend on the division of power between the bomber and fighter pilots" in control of the institution.³⁴

Lastly, Builder's "altars" got to the root of each service's culture or their basic underlying assumptions. He described them as an idea, principle, or belief that each services places above all others. This was not a portion of his analysis as much as it is a synthesis of what he discovered. Builder's altars were simplified expressions meant to capture the essence of each organization. They described the organization and helped illuminate the seemingly "inexplicable" difference between what each organization says, and does. These maxims were each service's

³³ Builder, *Masks of War*, 17.

³⁴ Builder, *Masks of War*, 138.

basic underlying assumptions, simplified. Keep in mind, Builder's published *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* in 1989, and a lot has changed since then.

Since Builder published his book, "Jointness" has matured with the introduction of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Cold War ended and wounds healed, a decade of actions in the Baltic as the Soviet Union fractured kept the military busy, and two wars have occupied the American military since 11 September 2001. Additionally, answering the call from the presidential administration during the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), all services were set on a course of transformation. The Army moved to a modular, adaptable force, while the Navy constructed the framework of Sea Power, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing to battle area-denial capabilities. The Air Force looked at technology to improve Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and develop the next generation fighter, while the Marines relied on swift help from its joint brethren.³⁵ Although these were interrupted in some manner by the terrorist attacks in 2001, a transformation occurred, nonetheless. Understanding any organization's culture is difficult, but Builder, validated by Schein, provides the framework to begin.

Builder's framework is independent of Schein's embedding mechanisms. The mechanisms are meant to measure an organization's level of commitment to leadership development, while Builder's framework was meant to reveal a more fundamental cultural phenomenon – the basic underlying assumptions. Although they are

³⁵ 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

closely related, once the espoused values are captured, this study will undergo an investigation into the organization's commitment to their values. Builder's framework provides the last piece of the puzzle in a brief analysis to unveil the essence of a service's culture to help explain why the services approach leadership development the way they do.

This study will identify the services' culture by using Builder's first three criteria. The role of sub-organizational culture reveals more about the internal dynamics of an organization than it does inter-organizational dynamics. So, as it pertains to the comparison of leadership development programs, I have chosen to leave Builder's fourth lens out of my analysis. Therefore, the modified versions of the first three categories--service capabilities, institutional associations, and legitimacy and relevancy--will provide the analytical foundation for discovering each service culture.

Service capabilities illuminate some of the service's priorities and preferences. They help explain what the services value and what they do not. Service capabilities describe the attachment each service has to certain fundamental items they deem essential to accomplishing their respective missions. During austere times, choices must be made and the most valuable survive. Regardless of what the task is, or how the threat is defined, there is a fundamental capability each service feels it must maintain.

Institutional associations reveal something about how the members view themselves as a part of the organization. In the military, strong institutional ties reveal themselves in introductions or stories. Some institutions instill a stronger sense of pride in their members than others. Where these associations to the organization lay can help explain the underlying assumptions each organization has. This is a measure of institutional belonging. This section drives toward identifying the institutional pride each service develops in its members. Does a service

member's pride stem from their affection for their equipment or from their service as a whole? Or, do sub-organizational distinctions play a role?

Legitimacy and relevancy get to the heart of institutional interests and concerns. A look at the interests and concerns of the institutions tells much. Legitimacy refers to a service's lawful right to exist as an independent organization apart from the others, while relevancy involves a service's capabilities or missions as they apply to national security. The service insecurities are most revealing during fiscally difficult times. As the Department of Defense considers cutting \$400 billion from its budget, services begin to question the true utility of a "second land-army," or the independence of the Air Force. This discourse only helps create political land grabs for missions and capabilities, or spur justifications for their relevancy to national security. Each service ends up scrambling to ensure they remain legitimate and relevant servants of the nation.

In total, the three categories provide a glimpse into each service's culture. For leadership development, the most interesting aspects lie in how the culture and its members interact. First, service capabilities reveal service preferences and clarify how the services view their people. Institutional associations provided a bottom up look at each service, helping illuminate how the people relate to their service, whether through their association to an occupation, sub-culture, or institution. Finally, legitimacy and relevancy provided a peek into each service's insecurities, exposing their deepest interests and concerns. This analysis will reveal some "altars" to help provide a feel for the basic underlying assumptions each service has that shape how they understand problems and find answers. Whether it is technology, tradition, or country, they have a strong presence in each service. The lens in which each service views the world shapes their preferences and gravitation to certain solutions. As

this study investigates leadership development, it will discover these service “altars” to provide the “why” behind each service’s approach.

In using this framework, we must also answer two key questions. Are Builder’s findings still valid? If not, what are the services new “personalities?”



Chapter 2

An Analysis of the Army Leadership Philosophy

Today, more than ever in history, the Army is in need of leadership of the highest caliber. With the increase in the complexity of warfare, the science of war is increasingly dependent upon human guidance. No matter how complicated it may become, war is always waged by men. The man who leads and the men who are led win wars. Every member of our military force must be a leader.

- Army Field Manual 22-10, 1951

Written in the middle of the last century, this quote has a familiar tone for today's military members. As this chapter sets out to investigate leadership development in the Army, Schein's first step in understanding an organization's commitment to a belief is to understand the values they espouse. What an organization says reflects its values and for the Army, doctrine provides an excellent method to capture this. Unlike some other services, the Army places great importance in reading, understanding, and using doctrine. Although the Army asserts that it is only a guide, it is a familiar guide to all soldiers. The next step is to assess the allocation of resources to what an organization espouses. Do the leaders provide the means to attain their beliefs? This is done by looking at the Army's continuum of learning, using Bloom's taxonomy to investigate the resources made available to the institution for leadership development. Then, using Schein's framework, a comparison between the espoused values and the organization's behavior will permit an assessment of the organization's priorities. Lastly, after revealing the service's devotion to leadership development, we will take a brief look at the Army's culture. This brief analysis attempts to provide a plausible explanation for the Army's behavior. As described in chapter 1, the analysis will use a

modified version of Builder's three lenses to get to the Army's basic underlying assumption.

THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE.

The intent of this section is to paint a picture of the Army's leadership doctrine, as it transformed over the last 60 years. Instead of merely looking at the most recent doctrine, this section traces the history of doctrine to help develop an understanding of its evolution through time. This historical approach will help illuminate the timeless aspects of Army leadership doctrine. Leadership doctrine can be divided into two main segments for historical analysis - the conscript era and the all-volunteer force. Some major distinctions separate the two eras. For example, the use of conscription meant the military had a representative sample of society and as problems arose in society, the Army needed to respond, whereas the all-volunteer force saw a shift away from leadership focused on social problems and began to incorporate the human psychology of leadership. However, regardless of the era, three themes prevail throughout: the Army's responsiveness to changes in the environment, their use of prevalent leadership theories to maintain a relevant and current doctrine, and the evolutionary rise of a systematic leadership development program.

It is important to clarify that doctrine is an organizationally sanctioned body of work that lays the foundation for a member's understanding of the organization's expectations in a given subject. In an organization where doctrine is valued, the more energy placed into the doctrine, the more serious the members become about the topic. Thus, tracing leadership development from concepts of 1948 along its journey into today's doctrine will uncover the Army's opinions for leadership. From 1948 to today, the Army's leadership doctrine has evolved to address social developments, and adopt new concepts regarding human psychology and leadership theory.

Concerned about the increasing complexity in warfare, the Army built upon concepts from the previous decade to create their leadership doctrine of 1951. It consisted primarily of leadership principles, traits, and techniques. Using the definition of leadership from Field Manual 22-1, *Leadership* (1948), which focused on influencing human behavior, the 1951 manual introduced 11 new principles of leadership and a paragraph on ethics. With the occupation of Germany and Japan still fresh in their minds, and racial segregation problems rising, the doctrine provided a variety of leadership tools for these and other situations. It addressed these challenges by providing various leadership techniques for situations like leadership in combat, occupation, or for minorities (to include women). Devoid of real world examples, it relied on the officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps abundant in WWII experience. The evolution from the 1948 version to the 1951 manual saw changes in the nomenclature to reflect the most recent theories; the manual changed from leadership qualities to leadership traits.

Upon opening the 1951 manual, the prevailing trait theories advocated by psychologists of the time are obvious. In line with the theory of the time, the doctrine stated, "Leadership traits are human qualities that are of great value to the leader. Possession of these traits simplifies the task of applying leadership." Divergent from the other trait theories, a prominent psychologist, Ralph Stogdill, published a study in 1948 about personal factors in leadership. In his study, he found that although some leaders possessed the "necessary" traits, they were not unique to leaders. Additionally, leadership was situational - context mattered. Not all leadership traits guaranteed effective leadership in all

situations.¹ “The evidence suggests,” Stogdill said, “that leadership is a relation that exists between persons in a social situation, and that persons who are leaders in one situation may not necessarily be leaders in other situations.”² This matched the doctrine, when it stated, “a study of our Nation’s great military leaders reveals that none possessed all the leadership traits to the maximum degree, but that a weakness in some traits was more than compensated for by strength in others.”³ Although the degree of Stogdill’s influence was unclear, the doctrine indicated the Army did not believe in born leaders. Instead, it said, “leadership is not inherent; it depends upon traits which can be developed, and upon the application of techniques which can be learned.”⁴

In 1953, FM 22-100 *Command and Leadership for the Small Unit Leader* was introduced. Developed in the midst of the Korean War, the Army sought to clarify the roles of junior leaders and provide a tool for leadership instruction in the field. The latter is significant, because this is the first appearance, in doctrine, of an organizational need to develop leaders. Used as an adjunct to the parent manual, some of the most noticeable changes included a reduction in the number of traits from 19 to 12, the addition of a leadership problem-solving section, indicators for good leadership, and combat examples for instructional discussions at

¹ Ralph Stogdill, “Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature,” *Journal of Psychology* 25 (1948): 63-66.

² Stogdill, “Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature,” 65.

³ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-10: Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March, 1951), 16.

⁴ Army, *FM 22-100* (1951), iii.

the unit.⁵ These changes reflected the demands of the Korean War. Reducing the number of traits would facilitate memorization for use in field instruction. A checklist like problem solving mechanism might aid unit leaders in identifying problems appropriately, before embarking on a solution. Indicators of good leadership could help a leader assess his effectiveness. And, combat examples would facilitate unit-level discussion, providing a set of expectations to the soldiers to aid in the development of replacement combat leaders.

1961 marked a significant evolution in the Army's leadership doctrine. The Army consolidated the overarching leadership manual, FM 22-10, with the small unit leadership manual, FM 22-100, into one and renamed it *Military Leadership*. It was the first document to incorporate ideas from the civilian sector, like the integration of behavioral theories. Of note, the new FM devoted an entire chapter to human behavior, emphasizing the interpersonal aspect of leadership. Alluding to the impact leadership has on an organization's climate, it stated that leaders must realize their "orders will have a different effect on each of his men" and each of them will respond differently.⁶ This was a significant departure from previous leadership thought by elevating the importance of the individual to a position equal to the importance of the group. This new attitude meant leaders could no longer remain unresponsive to individual subordinate needs. Instead, they were expected to consider the effects of their decisions on their subordinates. This focus on the

⁵ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Command and Leadership for the Small Unit Leader*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February, 1953).

⁶ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June, 1961), 9.

follower is important, because it would continue to grow for the next 50 years. The manual also introduced Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs and presented techniques to aid leaders in meeting those needs. Maslow's hierarchy of needs, moving from lowest to highest are: basic, security, social, esteem, and self-actualization. Examples of each include, food, safety, relationships, a sense of personal worth, and an interest in fulfilling their true potential, respectively.⁷

References to organizational culture also appeared as FM 22-100 devoted an entire page to a soldier's "adjustment" into "Army life." The FM placed the responsibility squarely on the leader's shoulders to ensure his soldiers experienced a smooth transition into Army culture.⁸ One of the other distinctions that the 1961 version drew was the leadership difference between small units and higher commands. This cognitive separation of requisite leadership skills at higher levels was the beginning of a departure from the transcendent attributes, or "traits," of leadership. The pertinent question the Army would struggle to answer was, were the same leadership skills needed all levels of command, or were there nuanced differences? The Army's answer would not come for another 45 years.

Socially, as desegregation swept across the US, the 1961 version also saw the removal of the section on techniques for special situations, like leading minorities. However, it was the first to explicitly discuss the development of "subordinate leaders." It cited encouragement, a breadth of experiences, formal education, unit training, counseling, and

⁷ Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review* 50, (1943). 370-96.

⁸ Army, *FM 22-100*, (1961), 14.

delegation as some of the effective methods for development.⁹ Keeping the 1953 examples of leadership for discussion, it also added a film series as a method for training leadership at the unit.

As the Vietnam conflict wound down, numerous challenges arose for the Army. The Army faced a decision to move to an all-volunteer force in 1971, the 60's were marked by unresolved racial tensions looming from desegregation, a national rise in criminal activity, and drug use was deemed "Public Enemy Number One" by President Richard M. Nixon.¹⁰ To anticipate a shift to a volunteer force, the Army changed the tone of the next manual. In the 1973 manual, the service developed and expanded on the chapters on discipline, motivation, and stress.¹¹ Additionally, leaders were provided tools to address the predominant social problems in a dedicated section called "Contemporary Human Problems."¹² Three chapters appeared in this section entitled: Drug Abuse, Race Relations, and Prevention of AWOL (absent without leave). These were common problems in the military and the Army saw fit to arm every leader with the proper tools. Ultimately, these changes created a more robust and gentler version of its 1961 sister. However, the most significant changes pertained to the developments in leadership theory and psychology.

For the first time, the 1973 version mentioned leadership styles and addressed how a style depends on the "leader's personality, his men,

⁹ Army, *FM 22-100*, (1961), 46.

¹⁰ Nancy E. Marion, *A History of Federal Crime Control Initiatives, 1960-1993* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 82.

¹¹ Marion, *A History of Federal Crime Control Initiatives*, 8-1 thru 9-1.

¹² Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June, 1973), 14-1 thru 16-1.

and the situation.”¹³ Although previous manuals alluded to different styles, this is the first explicit use of the *authoritarian* and *democratic* leadership styles espoused by behavioral psychologists Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph White.¹⁴ Of particular interest, for this study, the manual also referenced *leadership development* as a cornerstone to the development of good leaders capable of shaping the soldiers of tomorrow.¹⁵ The Army delineated leadership development in two ways: an academic and real-world environment. The purpose of the academic environment was to teach “the principles and techniques of leadership and the aspects of human behavior” through “textbooks, case studies, and role-playing exercises.”¹⁶ This would then provide a solid basis for application of these concepts in the real world, where most of the valuable learning occurred. The document served them well for the upcoming decade, but leadership development was still in its infancy.

1983 marked another milestone with the introduction of a leadership framework, called *Be, Know and Do*. This new basic structure denoted an organizational appreciation for the complexity that surrounded leadership and would serve as the Army’s framework for over two decades. In this framework, the leadership principles remained, but the leadership traits became traits of character inside the “be” of “be,

¹³ Army, *FM 22-100*, (1972), 13-2.

¹⁴ Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, Ralph White, “Patterns of aggressive behavior in experimentally created social climates,” *Journal of Social Psychology* 10 (May 1939), 271-300.

¹⁵ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June, 1973), viii.

¹⁶ Army, *FM 22-100*, viii.

know, do.” Figure 2 below provides a graphic of the leadership framework.

| LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK | | |
|----------------------|---|---|
| AS A LEADER YOU MUST | | EXAMPLES |
| BE | 1. Be committed to the Professional Army Ethic | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loyalty to the nation's ideals, loyalty to unit, selfless service, personal responsibility |
| | 2. Possess Professional Character Traits | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Courage, competence, candor, commitment, integrity |
| KNOW | 3. Know the Four Factors of Leadership and How They Affect Each Other | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Follower, leader, communication, situation |
| | 4. Know Yourself | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengths and weaknesses of your character, knowledge, and skills |
| | 5. Know Human Nature | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human needs and emotions • How people respond to stress • Strengths and weaknesses of the character, knowledge, and skills of your people |
| | 6. Know Your Job | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical and tactical proficiency |
| | 7. Know Your Unit | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How to develop necessary individual and team skills • How to develop cohesion • How to develop discipline |
| DO | 8. Provide Direction | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Goal setting, problem solving, decision making, planning |
| | 9. Implement | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communicating, coordinating, supervising, evaluating |
| | 10. Motivate | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Applying principles of motivation such as developing morale and esprit in your unit; teaching, coaching and counseling |

Figure 2: Be, Know, Do Framework

Source: Army, *FM 22-100* (1983)

In 1983, organizational culture bared itself once again, in a chapter dedicated to professional beliefs, values, and ethics. It began

with the definitions of beliefs and values and then provided a brief explanation of each. The middle segment of this chapter provided the Army's professional values and soldierly values, and concluded with a new section on ethical decision-making.¹⁷ The reduced importance on traits and simultaneously increased emphasis on beliefs, values, and ethics, corresponded to the rise in popularity of James MacGregor Burns' transformational leadership theory. In this theory, leaders motivate subordinates by appealing to a higher set of ideals and values.¹⁸ By providing the members an understanding of the concepts and then by giving them a list of expected values and beliefs, the Army would cultivate and plant a cultural seed. If the seed took root, leaders could feed and nurture the seed until it was ripe. Combined with the "know" section on human needs, based on Maslow's hierarchy of needs, it would help soldiers reach a level of self-actualization. This, in turn, would create a self-sustaining highly moral and ethical culture within the service. Aligning nicely with Kotter and Schein's model from Chapter 1 -- communicating a clear and vivid picture of the organization's beliefs or values -- the Army's explicit values and expectation of what soldiers should "be". planted the seed for cultural growth.

"Know" encompassed the previous manual's human behavioral elements, and explicitly introduced self-awareness, the importance of technical and tactical knowledge, and understanding of the unit. The section devoted to self-awareness placed a new emphasis on

¹⁷ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October, 1983), 73-106.

¹⁸ James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*. 2 vols. (New York: Harpercollins, 1978), 426.

understanding the leader. The introspection was an effort to help the leader identify his personal biases that shape his perception of the environment and to help facilitate the creation of an open minded leader. This increased self-awareness might unveil a leader's strengths and weaknesses and create an environment conducive to open and candid feedback from all directions. Technical and tactical knowledge looked to garner the trust of subordinates through credibility and competency. Lastly, understanding the unit was about managing discipline and cohesion to develop an effective team.¹⁹

"Do" consisted of three distinct chapters to help leaders provide direction, implement the plans, and motivate their troops. The first incorporated and expanded on the problem-solving processes of earlier doctrine.²⁰ In "Leadership that Implements," the manual addressed communication and coordination to a degree unseen before. For example, "barriers to effective communication" tackled problems with differences in rank, effective listening skills, tendencies to retain information, a "lack of trust, respect, and confidence," understanding what information people know to perform their job, and knowing the effects of stress on communication, to name a few.²¹ The "motivation" chapter took a prescriptive approach to the concepts in earlier doctrine. It delineated 14 principles for motivating troops, such as matching the human needs of individuals with unit tasks.²²

¹⁹ Burns, *Leadership*, 133-158.

²⁰ Burns, *Leadership*, 159-185.

²¹ Burns, *Leadership*, 185-216.

²² Burns, *Leadership*, 217-250.

The most important change in this 1983 version was a full chapter devoted to leader and unit development. In it, the manual spelled out the Army's expectations for leaders. It provided recommendations for self-development; bottom-up and peer feedback; group feedback; and how to conduct unit leadership training. The manual supplied a four-step process for self-development: identify strengths and weaknesses, set goals, develop a plan, and evaluate your progress. Bottom-up feedback encouraged leaders to seek subordinate feedback to assess their performance as a leader. It departed from self-evaluative "indicators of good leadership" and provided subordinates an avenue to effect change in their leader. Additionally, group feedback was meant to provide insight into the unit's performance that the leader may not have been aware of. Unit leadership training was a process each organization could use to observe, identify, critique, and change itself. However, noticeably absent was the discussion of the function of institutional education. This lack of focus indicated the Army took a major shift away from education and toward training and experience for developing its leaders.

As the Cold War wound down and another decade passed, the Army published the next FM 22-100 in 1990. During the 80's, the Army divided leadership doctrine into 4 manuals, and the 1990 version carried on this tradition. Beside FM 22-100, the other manuals included: FM 22-101, *Leadership Counseling*; FM 22-102, *Soldier Team Development*; and FM 22-103, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*. The separation of leadership doctrine allowed rifts to form between the documents, since they were not directly linked to each other. Their physical separation created "different definitions and understanding of

what the Army and nation expected of a leader.”²³ Nevertheless, the parent manual, FM 22-100 did not differ greatly from its 1983 brother, with one major exception. The “traits of character” were replaced with leadership competencies. The use of the term “trait” characterizes an individual’s inborn abilities, while competencies may be taught. The competencies were developed from an Army study conducted of all ranks. The study identified broad categories, or “competencies,” of skills, knowledge, and attitudes that were common among all participants. Despite the effort put into this study, the emphasis placed on this change was lost as the Army relegated the competency section to an appendix for self, and subordinate assessment.²⁴

Nearly another decade passed before the next version was published in 1999. As the toll of being the world’s police force grew, the Army needed to address foreign cooperation. Recovering from operations in Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia, the Army emphasized the strategic leader’s responsibility in proper coordination and cooperation with foreign governments. In one example, the leader’s responsibility was to ensure the organizational culture helps define the

²³ J. Keith Purvis, “Four Decades and Five Manuals: U.S. Army Strategic Leadership Doctrine, 1983-2011” (monograph, Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Command and General Staff College, 2011), 4.

²⁴ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Military Leadership*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July, 1990), 66-68.

boundaries of acceptable behavior, whether for uniform wear, or how to interact with foreign nationals.²⁵

The Army also needed a manual that linked all of the others together. In 1999, the manual transformed into a capstone document for all leadership, uniting FM 22-101, 22-102, 22-103, and various pamphlets into a single document. Although a capstone document was meant to unite them, several problems still needed to be addressed. For example, the 1999 manual asserted that the skills required by organizational and strategic leaders were vastly different than those at the direct level, but the description said something else.²⁶ The document outlined three levels of leadership: direct, organizational, and strategic. Although the separation of leadership skills occurred in the 60's, the new larger and more comprehensive document meant that direct leaders were now introduced to the differences between leadership levels. Organizational level leadership is an indirect form, devoted to coping with the effect of being separated from the immediate impact of unit actions. One must learn to deal with delays in communication, and avoiding micro-management. Although the scope of responsibility and influence are larger, this manual argued that the skills for direct leadership did not translate to the other echelons. However, upon closer inspection of the Army's unique senior leader "skills" for organizational and strategic leadership, the described differences rested in the environment created by their position of responsibility and their removal from the immediate

²⁵ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership: Be Known, Do*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August, 1999), 7-17.

²⁶ Army, *FM 22-100* (1999), 6-2.

proximity of battle. The manual said, understanding soldiers, establishing intent, negotiation, and building teams were *new* skills for senior echelons.²⁷ These skills were hardly unique to senior echelons, but what was unique was the importance placed on their proficiency. A senior leader's ability to handle the complexity of the situation, and potential consequences of a "strategic" misstep mandated polished skills, not new ones. This would have to wait for the next iteration of the manual to be corrected.

In the 90's a public discourse arose about "strategic leadership." Undecided about strategic leadership, an academic search for clarity occurred in the early 90's, which sought to define, understand, and develop strategic leadership. This gave rise to numerous scholarly articles in the business and military arenas as well as several civilian and military conferences at the start of the decade. Once again, the Army adopted the latest developments in leadership thought into its doctrine. Refined over several years of academic dialogue the Army determined strategic leaders would "simultaneously sustain the Army's culture, envision the future, convey that vision to a wide audience, and personally lead change."²⁸

Charged with the responsibility for leadership development, the doctrine also took a holistic approach. Under the heading, "improving actions" this manual sought to "leave their organization better than they found them."²⁹ A leader could improve his organization through developing, building, and learning. Developing focused on the people

²⁷ Army, *FM 22-100* (1999), 6-1 thru 7-28.

²⁸ Army, *FM 22-100* (1999), 7-1.

²⁹ Army, *FM 22-100* (1999), 5-13.

and subordinates. Building provides tools to improve the organization through building strong, cohesive, and capable teams. Learning took a holistic perspective to the organization by creating a climate that fosters open, honest self-development and experiential learning. Most pertinent to this study, the development section identified four ways for developing individual leaders that laid a foundation for leadership development - institutional training, operational assignments, self-development, and mentoring. Institutional training and education provided the conceptual basis for operational assignments, self-assessment, and mentoring to take place. Figure 3 provides a graphic of the manual's concept.




Figure 3: Leadership Development

Source: Army, *FM 22-100* (1999)

The 1999 manual was published only two years before the events of 11 September 2001 took place. As the nation and military reeled from the attacks, a discussion formed among senior military leaders regarding the future of warfare. As a result, leadership was scrutinized to ensure success in this new “hybrid” type of war. On 21 December 2001, concerned that this new form of warfare might necessitate new leadership abilities, the Army Chief of Staff asked the Army War College

to conduct a study to identify strategic leader skill sets and attributes for this new type of warfare.³⁰ Only two years after publication of *Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100: Army Leadership: Be Known, Do* (1999), the US Army was rethinking its leadership doctrine.

The exercise was beneficial, as the 2006 manual, redesignated and retitled, FM 6-22, *Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile* addressed some of the inconsistencies with the previous version. Although the 2006 manual was radically reorganized from its predecessors, the inconsistencies it corrected lie in the definitions of various levels of leadership. These answered the question from the 60's - were the same leadership skills needed all levels of command, or were there nuanced differences? The Army answer is a transcendent view of leadership that calls for the same leadership competencies at all levels, with certain competencies requiring greater proficiency at increasingly senior echelons.

The return to eight transcendent competencies of leadership enables the manual to isolate the specifics for senior echelons. This return is a conscious effort as evidenced in the titles of parts one through three: the basis of leadership; the Army Leader: person of character, presence and intellect; and competency-based leadership for direct through strategic levels.³¹ The last part, part four, deals specifically with the unique complexities of leading in the strategic and operational

³⁰ Leonard Wong, Stephen Gerras, William Kidd, Robert Pricone, and Richard Swengros, "Strategic Leadership Competencies," Strategic Studies Institute, (U.S. Army War College, September 2003), 1.

³¹ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 6-22: Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October, 2006), i.

environments. Rather than discuss specific leadership competencies that are unique to strategic and organizational leadership, as previous manuals had done, the manual devotes two chapters to addressing the peculiarities of the environment instead. Although the competencies are new, they have elements that can be traced back through every manual to 1948, validating Schein's proposition that the organization's leaders have influences that outlast them. Nonetheless, after 45 years of academic debate, the Army settled on eight competencies common to all levels of leadership.

To acquire these competencies, the document emphasizes leadership development throughout. There are numerous references to training subordinates, providing them the opportunity to learn from their experiences, and tools for self-development. One of those tools, for the first time, is a comprehensive, thematic suggested reading list, eight pages long. It covers leadership theory, organizational culture, special circumstances like memoirs from individuals who participated in counter-insurgencies, and biographies of top leaders. However, the manual does not forsake a dedicated section for "developing others." This section, applicable to all leaders, states, "leader development is achieved through the lifelong synthesis of the knowledge, skills, and experiences gained through institutional training and education, organizational training, operational experience, and self-development."³² Aligned with the Joint Publication's continuum of learning, the service sought to create a learning environment in its quest to become a lifelong learning organization. According to FM 6-22, learning organizations seek

³² Army, *FM 6-22*, 8-9.

continuous improvement by adopting new techniques and procedures that get the job done more efficiently or effectively.³³

Reminiscent of the most recent developments in transformational leadership theory, the lifelong learning approach encourages members to become creative and innovative to facilitate reaching self-actualization. As discussed earlier, the incorporation of strategic leadership helps keep FM 6-22 relevant and current. One recent article in *Psychology Today* highlighted three themes common in the “new wave” of leadership development today. With transformational theory laying the foundation, they are: “a greater focus on the follower, decentralized decision making/empowered followers, and recognition of the complexity of leadership.”³⁴ As demonstrated throughout the evolution of leadership doctrine, all of these themes reside in one way or another in current Army doctrine.

Although the current FM is being rewritten, one other document reflects the Army’s focus on leadership. In 2011, the Army produced a new FM 7-0 entitled *Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*. The previous FM 7-0, published in 2008, had no mention of developing leaders in the title, or content. This thin, but important manual provides the Army expectations for unit training. The two pages dedicated to leader development stress the importance of devoting time and resources into developing the leadership attributes of

³³ Army, FM 6-22, 8-2 thru 8-3.

³⁴ Ronald E. Riggio, PhD, “Leadership 101: How Leadership Has Changed in the Last Generation,” *Psychology Today*, March 17, 2010. <http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/cutting-edge-leadership/201003/leadership-101-how-leadership-has-changed-in-the-last-generation> (accessed March 24, 2012).

every soldier. It provides a depiction of the leader development model, provided in Figure 4.³⁵




Figure 4: The Army's Leadership Development Model

Source: Army, *FM 7-0* (2011)

The Venn diagram illustrates the Army's desire to reach a balance between education, training, experience, and self-development. Although each plays a part in every domain, one is more dominant. For example, in the self-development domain, experience is dominant. Remembering Schein's model, the Army's emphasis to match actions with the words provides insight into the organization's culture as it pertains to leadership development.

Tracing the evolution of doctrine illustrates how it has transformed over the last 60 years. Yet, certain patterns emerge. First, we can see

³⁵ Department of the Army, *Department of the Army Field Manual 7-0: Training Units and Developing Leaders for Full Spectrum Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February, 2011), 2-6.

the Army respond to institutional needs as changes in the environment occurred. Throughout this study, the Army's leadership doctrine responded to societal, national, or institutional cues. The 50s marked both a national and institutional crises for the Army. As the Army responded to Korea and a perceived change in the character of warfare, the Army developed a manual to address the needs. Additionally, the institutional need for replacement leaders at all levels required a method for field development, and the Army responded with its 1953 small unit manual. The 60s and 70s were marked with social upheaval. During this time, the Army spent a tremendous amount of time during the era of conscription incorporating special leadership scenarios, techniques, and tools for the prevalent social problems. As the military transitioned to an all-volunteer force, the techniques to address social problems faded and doctrine turned its attention to motivating the volunteer soldiers. The 80s marked an institutional understanding about the complexity of leadership and began a search for a systematic solution. The 90s saw the Army respond to the confusion and dissonance created by multiple leadership documents. It also addressed the needs for cultural understanding as conflicts in the Balkans grew. Like the response to Korea manual, the Army responded again to the potential for a new and unfamiliar type of warfare only two years after releasing its 1999 manual. The events of 2001 would interrupt the relatively periodic revision of leadership doctrine and encourage the Army to reinvestigate leadership once again. Breaking the ten-year cycle, the Army immediately addressed a need for leadership and produced its latest version five years later.

Second, the Army actively sought relevant doctrine through the incorporation of dominant leadership theories. The early trait theories left its mark in the literature for nearly 40 years until competencies replaced them in 1990. Stogdill's influence marked the beginning of

situational leadership theories and the Army was quick to recognize its significance in the 50s. In the 60s and 70s, traces of the progress in human psychology can be seen in the Army's leadership doctrine, as psychology had tremendous influence in the rise of ethics, human behaviorism, motivation, and human needs. The growing emphasis on the individual follower is evidence of this. Moreover, the research in the 60s and 70s gave rise to Burns' transformational leadership theory that can be seen in the Army's manual during the 80s. Most recently, strategic leadership has played a more prominent role in leadership doctrine through the 90s and into today. Although the most current theory may be a fad, this historical synopsis provides evidence that the Army has critically chosen when to incorporate leadership theories. Additionally, there is tremendous evidence the Army developers of leadership doctrine have kept in touch with leadership theory throughout its evolution.

Third, the doctrine also illustrated the growth of leadership development from the 1940s to today. The 50s began the process by identifying a need to develop replacement leaders in the field. To capture the soldier's interest, the 60s incorporated a new medium – film – to teach leadership development. The 70s recognized the need for academic involvement in leadership development to provide leadership theory and concepts, moving beyond real-world application. The 80s departed from the self-assessment method to judge leadership performance and incorporated a multi-level feedback system providing units and individual subordinates opportunities to shape the organization. The 90s took on a holistic approach by incorporating self-development and mentoring into the picture. These culminated in 2006 with a holistic development process to extract the transcendent competencies required to lead at all levels. Ultimately, what began as a need to instill the traits

necessary for good replacement leaders during the Korean War became a comprehensive and holistic program of leadership development today.

The fourth and most important point is that leadership and its development in every soldier is espoused to be a critical component to the effective operation of the service. However, to determine its true value, as Edgar Schein proposed, we must also look at the service's behavior. Does the Army commit the time, effort, and money to accomplish leadership development, as they say they should?

THE ARMY CONTINUUM OF LEADERSHIP LEARNING.

To ensure consistency this study will use a continuum of learning to measure each organization's commitment to leadership development. A continuum of learning is a concept intended to build a habit of lifelong learning that would encourage individuals to seek personal and professional development throughout their lives, much less their careers. The Chairman's vision on Joint Officer Development categorizes the continuum of learning into: education, training, operational experience, and self-study. However, the definition of training in CSJCS 1800.01 states that training "focuses largely through the psychomotor domain on the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks." This Manichean perspective is useful in many military vocations, but does not apply to the highly dynamic and contextually dependent environment of leadership. Leadership does not consist of right and wrong, but rather various shades of gray where more than one right answer may exist. Therefore, this study has replaced "training" with Bloom's taxonomy of "application" to categorize the continuum. Bloom's taxonomy describes "application" as the transference of concepts and theories to practical situations, which is more appropriate to leadership development. Thus, the continuum of leadership consists of: education, application, operational experience, and self-study. Education may take place in a variety of situations and

environments, but for the purpose of this study, education refers only to the institutional process. The other forms of education will fall into application.

Education

The Army has three courses of instruction for educational development provided to their officers. The Basic Officer Leader Course B (BOLC B) is a follow-on course to the education received in their pre-commissioning sources (BOLC A). BOLC B is branch, or specialty, specific training that focuses on developing the skills new Lieutenants need to accomplish the mission. The 18.5-week course structure depends on the officer's military specialty. Here they are expected to hone the skills required to be competent in their specialty and garner the skills necessary to lead a group of 15-50 soldiers. The second course is the Captain's Career Course, a specialty specific course designed to prepare soldiers for command of 60 - 200 soldiers. Usually lasting about 20 weeks, it serves to introduce Captains to the staff process and prepares them for such assignments at the Battalion and Brigade levels. The resident Command and General Staff Officer Course, held at the Command and General Staff College is a year-long course that prepares Majors for command of 300-1000 soldiers and staff at higher echelons. To understand the leadership curriculum of each, the analysis will include a look at the methodology of instruction (i.e. readings, presentations, and discussions), hours and distribution, and leadership topics discussed.

Since BOLC B is managed and controlled by each Army specialty, or branch, the Army has developed a system to ensure standardization of instruction. The Center for Army Leadership, at Fort Leavenworth, KS, is the organization responsible for the development of the leadership curriculum. Any changes are distributed to each branch and available via the milBook webpage for inclusion in their course. All curricula are

divided into Training Support Packages (TSP), which are lesson plans for a particular subject. Using Bloom's taxonomy, the Army emphasizes attaining and understanding the basics concepts and theories of leadership with scenario based application that prepares Lieutenants for further supervised application in the field portions of the course. Currently, 12 leadership TSPs exist for integration into the BOLC B.³⁶ Each TSP consists of instruction and discussion time with some evaluation at the end. The evaluation is either a written product or exam. The readings usually consist of scenarios, real and fiction, to spur discussion of the topics.

In one scenario, a Lieutenant has become the new platoon leader. The scenario implies some disciplinary or climate issues exist within the fictional unit, spurring a dialogue of various topics among the students. In this scenario, one topic is to consider the effect of the leader's technical and tactical competence on the development of a good working climate. The topic considers the expectations of the unit and how their performance may impact their credibility. To meet the terminal learning objective - "develop a plan to take charge of a platoon sized organization" - some of the expected products in this scenario include the creation of a leadership statement with a vision, an inbrief in which the officer lays out their expectations, letters of introduction to family members, and initial policy letters.³⁷

³⁶ "Milbook Home, Center For Army Leadership," MilSuite, <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/center-for-army-leadership?view=documents#/?tag=14642> (accessed February 24, 2012).

³⁷ Center for Army Leadership, Leadership Research, Assessment & Doctrine Division, Fort Leavenworth, KS, "Transition into a Direct Leadership Position" Training Support Package for use in the Basic Officer Leader Course, Warrant

On average, the TSPs consist of 2.5 hours of instruction with a 30-minute evaluation. If all twelve are used during a 18.5-week course, the students will have received 36 hours of leadership instruction. The distribution of leadership education depends on the structure of the branch's other obligations to ensure proficiency in their specialty. This is important to note, because, although their primary focus is to gain expertise in the specialty, all branches combine it with leadership education. Thus, the TSPs are designed to synthesize the fresh leadership and organizational theory taught in pre-commissioning for application in the field. They contribute directly to the production of new Lieutenants capable of operating in the real Army.³⁸

The Captain's Career Course is a 20-24 week course that highlights the development of the leadership competencies essential to commanding a company, or working on a battalion or brigade staff. However, the course is undergoing some changes as the Army tests a new concept. Under the Captains Career Course -- Common Core Proof of Principle, the Army would send instructors to regional learning centers to teach an eight-week common curriculum to eligible students. Although each student would remain on their installation, they would be placed on "temporary duty for education."³⁹ The intent is to provide a

Officer Candidate School, and the Senior Leaders Course, 15 October 2010, p. 5-12, in author's possession.

³⁸ The information was compiled from the individual TSPs in "Milbook Home, Center For Army Leadership,"

MilSuite, <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/center-for-army-leadership?view=documents#/?tag=14642> (accessed February 24, 2012).

³⁹ Maj Myles Caggins III, "A New Model For Captains' Instruction: Small-Group Leaders Bring Experience to Captains' Classroom," Army.mil (1 September 2011), <http://www.army.mil/article/64822/> (accessed March 24, 2012).

learning environment free from their obligations at their unit. The greatest benefit from this new concept is the cross-pollination of various experiences from the different branches. The common core consists of leadership, critical thinking, and the competencies needed for future command and staff assignments. After completing the curriculum, the students have 120 days to proceed to their branch specific schools where they will receive the specialty specific technical and tactical education.⁴⁰

Unlike BOLC, the revised Captain's Career Course seeks to achieve Bloom's analysis, synthesis, and evaluation levels. The environment is a small group seminar type of setup that facilitates experience sharing. The shared experiences stimulate critical thought and discussion about the topic that enables students to analyze and evaluate different leadership concepts. Each 2 to 3 hour lesson discusses a variety of readings from doctrine, theory, and articles to introduce the concepts of each leadership topic. The instruction includes presentations, practical exercise, and scenarios. Ample time is also set-aside for guest speakers, or discussion.⁴¹

Under the new concept, the common core has 33 hours of leadership instruction in thirteen lessons.⁴² The lessons span how to engage the media to formal and informal leadership and influence

⁴⁰ Caggins III, "A New Model For Captains' Instruction: Small-Group Leaders Bring Experience to Captains' Classroom"

⁴¹ The information was compiled from the individual TSPs in "Milbook Home, Center For Army Leadership,"

MilSuite, <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/center-for-army-leadership?view=documents#/?tag=14642> (accessed February 24, 2012).

⁴² Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics, Fort Leavenworth, KS, "L100 Leadership: Block Advance Sheet" for use in the Mid-Grade Learning Continuum (MLC) 2015 Common Core, 1, in author's possession.

techniques. Additionally, the curriculum has another 16-hour block of five lessons for leading company size organizations.⁴³ In this section, some of the topics include: military justice in a company, resiliency for mid-grade leaders, and support to unit maintenance operations. Although some of these may seem administrative in nature, do not let the titles fool you. The military justice lesson “emphasizes the importance of transparency and equitable treatment in order to ensure good order and discipline in a unit.”⁴⁴ The “provide support to unit maintenance operations” lesson emphasizes understanding maintenance operations to be able to directly influence the care and operability of the unit’s equipment.⁴⁵ In these 49 hours of total instruction, the topics range from providing knowledge, concepts, and theory to practical application.

The Command and General Staff Officer Course focuses on developing higher-level cognitive, critical thinking, and problem-solving skills. While the course provides some of the basic theory and concepts, the intent is to provide an education that reaches the highest levels of Bloom’s taxonomy - analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. The course is setup in a small group adult learning environment, where the instructors facilitate discussions around particular lessons. The onus is placed more on the student than the instructor. The students are expected to

⁴³ Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics, Fort Leavenworth, KS, “LE100 Leadership Essential for Company-Size Organizations: Block Advance Sheet” for use in the Mid-Grade Learning Continuum (MLC) 2015 Common Core, 1, in author’s possession.

⁴⁴ Command and General Staff College, “LE100 Leadership Essential for Company-Size Organizations: Block Advance Sheet.”

⁴⁵ Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics, Fort Leavenworth, KS, “LE160 Provide support to Unit Maintenance Operations: Advance Sheet” for use in the Mid-Grade Learning Continuum (MLC) 2015 Common Core, 1, in author’s possession.

accomplish the pre-reading assignments and reflect before class to help minimize time spent on the instruction of concepts. The majority of classroom time is spent relating individual perceptions, experiences, or observations of the case studies to the concepts introduced. Concepts, or theory, are regular components to the reading assignments with practical case studies to aid in comprehension.

The curriculum is 48 hours at two-hour increments on average. The greatest difference is its distribution across nearly an entire year of academic instruction. With one leadership course every week, interspersed with other blocks of instruction, students are less likely to learn and dump the information. Although many individuals complained that the instruction was not contained in a block, or two, of instruction, the distribution was logical to meet the intent of the Army's lifelong leadership development continuum. The curriculum had to develop a process that would create a habit of study and reflection. Some of the two most important academic subjects, leadership and history, were structured similarly, forcing students to study both on a weekly basis. To help with retention, the curriculum builds upon previous lessons. Additionally, the curriculum complemented other blocks of instructions as well. For example, prior to entering the exercise half of the year, the leadership curriculum expected students to take a commander's perspective as it transitioned to leadership application.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Command and General Staff College, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS, "L100 & L200 Developing Organizations and Leaders: Block Advance Sheets" for use in resident Intermediate Level Education, 1, in author's possession.

The topics start by laying the conceptual foundations of leadership and organizational theories. Some of the topics include: power and influence, ethical organizations, learning organizations, and organizational stress. The lesson on developing learning organizations drew on the theory of learning organizations, as expressed by Kimberly Knutson and Alexis Miranda. It builds on the theory with a reading recommending several changes needed to make the Army a learning organization. Then the lesson concludes with the NASA *Challenger* accident, as a case study.⁴⁷ Each lesson is constructed in a like manner.

The leadership education provided Army officers from O-1 to O-4 is comprehensive and robust. Although the focus of Basic Officer Leadership Course is tactical and technical proficiency, leadership instruction is integrated. Drawing on the theoretical foundations of their pre-commissioning educations, Lieutenants have an opportunity to apply what they learned in the field. Captains who have been in the operational environment return to the classroom in the Captain's Career Course to expand their leadership knowledge, refresh the conceptual foundation. Additionally, the structure provides an opportunity to analyze and evaluate new perspectives from their colleagues and internalize lessons they may have not yet experienced. After being promoted to Major, Army officers attend CGSC to refresh the theoretical concepts of leadership once again. Though the focus is on increasing developing advanced cognitive skills and a habit of lifelong learning,

⁴⁷ Command and General Staff College, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, KS, "L108 Developing Learning Organizations: Advance Sheets" for use in resident Intermediate Level Education, 299-301, in author's possession.

students gain an opportunity to share their experiences. The leadership education they gain, as it is designed, should stick with them and create a never-ending thirst for knowledge.

Application

This nonstop quest for knowledge must be passed on to those who have not attained such a desire and application provides one avenue. Supervised leadership application, or coaching, is usually conducted at the unit, with the use of training aids, reading materials, and slides. Units may conduct application in a classroom, or in the field. Although some theory and concepts may be introduced, an emphasis is placed on practicing the necessary skills to ensure the concepts are applied properly. Application relies on supervision and constant performance feedback to help build competence and confidence in a leader. The goal is to create independent unit leaders capable of leading in the real world.

The mandatory Officer Professional Development (OPD) program is the Army's method for ensuring opportunities for leadership application occurs at the unit. Although the commander is given the flexibility to construct the curriculum as he sees fit, leadership "training" is required by regulation. According to Army Regulation 350-1 (AR 350-1), commanders "must deliberately plan, prepare, execute, and assess leader training and leader development as part of their overall unit training program."⁴⁸ The commander can make or break a good leadership development program. In a blog entry, dated 21 March 2012, a soldier responded to his commander's suggested OPD program by explaining his

⁴⁸ Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 2011, 93.

view of an outstanding OPD program. In the blog, he described a bi-weekly OPD program that uses hands-on application and covered standard topics (i.e. leadership, motivation, influence, etc.). He described how the program captured the interest of the soldiers through open and candid discussion, and helped soldiers apply what they learned through various role-playing scenarios.⁴⁹

As depicted above, the Officer Professional Development program is highly dependent on the commander, but the commander is not left entirely to his own devices. Resources are provided through the Center for Army Leadership. The center provides units with TSPs, similar to those used for BOLC, for unit-level use on the same milBook website. Additionally, an abundance of other material is available for download on the same website. The forums and blogs allow people to discuss some tips and tricks of their OPD, or vent over leadership's inability to see the need for a particular topic. MilBook itself provides a handy resource for understanding, constructing, venting, and applying an officer development program at any unit.

If built and resourced properly, an application program dedicated to the development of the organization's leaders has merit. The ability to practice and receive feedback in a relatively benign environment allows members to make mistakes and learn. The mistakes they make typically do not have the same consequences as real world events. The ability to

⁴⁹ To protect the author of this controlled access blog, in a non-attribution environment, the author's name is anonymous. Anonymous, comment on "Concept and Rhythm For the Lpd," HCO Leader Development Group, comment posted November 17, 2011, <https://www.milsuite.mil/book/message/70226#70226> (accessed March 21, 2012).

make mistakes and reflect on them during relative peace helps soldiers deconstruct events as they unfolded, internalizing the most important lessons. This tool could be beneficial to breaking a zero-defect culture. A well-designed “training” program might permit students to experience failure in a non-attribution environment to create a habit of mind counterproductive to a zero-defect culture. This does not suggest one should encourage failure, but instead make it an acceptable part of the learning process. This experience in “training” will translate to real-world application and could become some of the best learning they will receive. As education and application set the groundwork for success, operational experience is the best teaching method, as the consequences are real and sometimes grave.

Experiences

Experience touches on the highest levels of Bloom’s taxonomy. Whether conducted through conscious thought, or through trial and error, experience provides individuals with analysis, evaluation, and synthesis of real-world events. The physical results of trial and error learning provide evaluation, while developing alternate solutions suggests some form of analysis. Synthesis manifests itself in the solutions that provide the desired outcomes. The opportunity to lead provides experience for these higher levels.

To understand how experiences effect leadership development, we must look at the Army’s crawl, walk, and run approach. We have already touched on some of the opportunities afforded Army officers throughout their career, but we must elaborate a little further to appreciate their effect.

Almost immediately, a new Lieutenant is thrust into a leadership position with responsibility for more than himself. As a platoon leader of 15-50 soldiers, he is responsible for the troops’ welfare, discipline, performance in the field, and equipment. Although his span of influence

is relatively narrow, leadership at this level is direct, characterized by daily interaction, and intimate. In the field, where a platoon may be tasked with an objective, the platoon leader is responsible for integrating the efforts of the team and carrying out that task. The leader is close enough to observe the unit's actions and correct issues as they appear. His physical proximity to the action reduces uncertainty. The effectiveness of the platoon depends on the leader's interpersonal skills, tact, and ability to create the proper environment. If a positive environment is created and the unit is mission-oriented, bottom-up mentoring will occur. Sergeants who care to see their Lieutenant and platoon succeed will help foster camaraderie. The experiences and skills developed at this level will only be built upon in the future, as the leader prepares to walk.

Command of a company, or equivalent unit, is the next test of leadership abilities for an officer. This level of leadership marks a transition period between direct and indirect leadership. A company usually consists of 4 to 6 platoons of various sizes. As this scope of responsibility and span of influence increase, so does the complexity. A company is the first instance where the responsibilities of leadership join the legal authority of command. Different methods must be used to lead this larger organization. The span of influence at the company level dictates a reduction in the frequency of interaction with the soldiers, reducing the intimacies as well. The leader can no longer observe every soldier and their action. The increased span of influence is a double-edged sword. A company commander also gets four times the problems than his platoon leaders, but he has a legal obligation to deal with them appropriately. Fair and equitable treatment of the soldiers is essential to the creation of a positive climate. Although direct leadership still plays a vital role in developing the proper climate and culture, the leader is learning the skills of indirect leadership. Effective communication is one

of those key skills. It is required to convey the expectations, vision, and intent of the organization. To ensure the platoons understand a mission, a commander must be unambiguous and articulate.

In the field, complex, coordinated planning enters the picture as platoons may be used in a variety of ways. A platoon may be tasked to take a single common objective, act as independent unit working towards a larger common goal, or against several different objectives. These all present a new level of complexity to leadership. As such, the company commander must have faith in his subordinate leaders' abilities to accomplish their assigned tasks. These complexities place a greater importance on the quality of technical, tactical, and leadership "training" the unit receives under the commander's control. Therefore, the commander must rely on his platoon leaders for their leadership. At this level, a leader is more concerned with the capabilities of the platoon than the individuals within the unit.

In company command, direct and indirect leadership play equal roles. The skills gained at the platoon level are refined and built upon to incorporate those required for indirect leadership. As a leader of 200 soldiers, your actions are important to developing the proper climate and culture. Since daily interaction may not be possible, the interactions the soldiers receive have greater influence. Leading by example is more important and a leader's actions are observable through the performance of his unit. At this level, where complexity and uncertainty show their faces, a leader's cognitive abilities must also expand. Clear, concise, and effective communication is vital.

As an O-4, battalion command may still be a bit far, but the experiences are not. In the Army, as the number two (XO), or three (S3) officer in a battalion, you must understand the responsibilities of the commander fully. Although the job descriptions differ, it is imperative that the XO or S3 is capable of taking command of the battalion during a

time of crisis. However, on a daily basis, direct leadership is focused on the conduct of the immediate staff.

The scope of responsibility and span of influence is even larger with 300 to 1,000 soldiers in a battalion. So, the problems are even greater. However, company commanders will handle many of the problems, except the most serious. Direct leadership competencies and skills are honed; indirect leadership should be refined, but have a solid base; and the footing is poured for strategic leadership. Building on the foundation provided in previous leadership positions, strategic leadership requires more critical and ethical reasoning, creativity, and problem-solving skills. The focus turns to longer time horizons and multiple perspectives. Developing strategic leadership requires a focused effort to recognize individual biases that shape the way those leaders see the environment. George Forsythe asserts the development is “concerned more with who the leader is and how the leader makes sense out of the world than with what the leader does.”⁵⁰

The experiences Majors attain at this level set them up for success in direct, indirect, and strategic levels of leadership. Introduction into broader thinking, and the refinement of key leadership attributes rounds out their leadership development. However, the progression from platoon leader, to company command, and XO or S3 is not linear. There are many detours along the way. Visceral experiences are great teachers, however, and self-study provides a method for gaining experience vicariously.

⁵⁰ George B. Forsythe, “The Preparation of Strategic Leaders”, *Parameters* (1992), 38-49.

Self-Study

Outside of the officer professional development program, AR 350-1 also requires officers to create a self-development plan; practice critical leader tasks to maintain proficiency; expand their knowledge of history, doctrine, professional developments, and keep up with current events; and seek challenging assignments for personal growth.⁵¹ As an officer creates such a plan, there are a few tools available. The Army produces a self-development handbook, which is reminiscent of the 4-step process outlined in the 1983 doctrine. However, there are two tools of importance: the 360-degree assessment and the professional reading list.

The 360-degree assessment is a web-based multi-source tool designed to provide soldiers feedback about their performance. In an effort to ensure soldiers are using the assessment tool, a recent change to the Army Evaluating Reporting System Regulation mandates that raters verify initiation and completion of the assessment. The memorandum clearly states that since the system is a self-assessment tool, the rater will not use the results of the assessment in his formal evaluation of the officer.⁵²

The 360-degree assessment is divided into three main themes. They are all conducted in a survey format with approximate 45-75 statements, where the respondent is expected to rate the individual on a 5 point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The first theme assesses an individual's adaptability to stress requiring

⁵¹ Army Regulation 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*. Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 2011, 93.

⁵² John M. McHugh, Memorandum for Distribution, Army Directive 2011-16 (Changes to the Army Evaluation Reporting System), (Washington DC: Secretary of the Army, 15 Sept 2011) 1-2.

problem solving skills, interpersonal qualities (i.e. active listening, openness, etc.), and a predisposition to learn new things. The second measures an individual's performance against the Army's eight leadership competencies. The last evaluates the individual against the Army's eight personal attributes associated with leadership and teamwork. The evaluatee initiates the 360-degree assessment by selecting a minimum of 3 superiors, 5 peers, and 5 subordinates to respond within a user selected timeframe from 10 to 60 days. The system automatically generates notifications of their desired participation in the assessment.⁵³

After initiating the assessment, a soldier can conduct a self-assessment by answering the same questionnaires. Once all participants complete their portion, or the time has expired, a detailed report is produced for the individual. At this time, the individual can compare the self-assessment with the anonymous, candid assessments of the participants. The results are broken into self, superior, subordinate, and peer categories the results are averaged to aid in anonymity. In achieving self-awareness, where the impressions of others correlate to your own self-image, a comparison between the self-assessment and the assessment submitted by the participants is valuable. A detailed study of the results may reveal some overconfidence, or help boost confidence in other areas. Most importantly, the results provide an honest

⁵³ All information was through personal experience with the 360-assessment tool available at <https://msaf.army.mil/My360/Default.aspx>.

assessment of how others perceive him. It allows a soldier to identify his weakest and strongest qualities for future self-development.⁵⁴

Remember the regulation requires an officer to actively participate in his own self-development. Upon recognition of the individual's weakness, the soldier can develop an Individual Development Plan (IDP). The multi-source assessment and feedback (MSAF) webpage provides a development action guide useful in production of the IDP. In it, the guide dissects the categories of the assessment to facilitate a greater understanding of what they entail. The guide also includes behaviors associated with good performance in those categories, along with developmental suggestions. For example, should an individual find himself rated low by his subordinates in "develops leaders," one of the eight leadership competencies, he might discover his weakness lays in the "Promotes Organizational Learning, Creativity, and Initiative" category, where one of the behaviors is "encourages open discussion for improvement of the unit."⁵⁵ Additionally, it suggests development activities, like holding more frequent development meetings, learning three non-work related items about everybody, or conduct brown-bag lunches for development sessions.⁵⁶ Lastly, the guide provides a suggested reading list tailored to help soldiers identify what books to read based on their identified strengths and weaknesses. An example is provided below in Figure 5.

⁵⁴ All information was through personal experience with the 360-assessment tool available at <https://msaf.army.mil/My360/Default.aspx>.

⁵⁵ Center for Army Leadership, *Development Action Guide: Multisource Assessment and Feedback Program*, (October 2007), 19.

⁵⁶ Center for Army Leadership, *Development Action Guide*, 20.

| Lead Others | Extend Influence | Leads by Example | Communicates | Creates a Positive Environment | Prepares Self | Develops Leaders | Gets Results |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------|---|---|
| Enables/Motivates High Performance | Influences beyond chain of command | Epitomizes Warrior Ethos | Role Model | Communicates Shared Understanding | Builds the Team | Demonstrates Respect and Cultural Awareness | Looks after welfare of Soldiers & Families |
| | | | | | Prepares Self | Develops Leaders | Promotes organizational learning, creativity, and initiative |
| | | | | | | | Demonstrates Technical and Tactical Knowledge |
| | | | | | | | Plans and executes successful operations |
| | | | | | | | Employs Conceptual Skills |
| | | | | | | | Effective in Ambiguous Situations |
| | | | | | | | Ackoff, Russell Lincoln. <i>The Art of Problem Solving: Accompanied by Ackoff's Fables</i> . New York: Wiley, 1978. |
| X | | X | | | | | X |
| | | | | | | | Ambrose, Stephen E. <i>Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest</i> . New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992. |
| | | | | X | X | | —, <i>Citizen Soldiers</i> . New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977. |
| | | | | | | X | Autry, James A. <i>The Art of Caring Leadership</i> . New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991. |

Figure 5: Army MSAF Suggested Reading

Source: Army, *Development Action Guide* (2007)

The matrix has the requisite leadership competencies at the top with the subcategories below. The book titles run along the right side and the intersection describes the suggested reading. Using the example provided above, an individual might decide to read Russell Ackoff's *The Art of Problem Solving: Accompanied by Ackoff's Fables*, and Stephen Ambrose's *Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest*. This is a robust list of 88 books ranging from doctrine and theory, to personal biographies and memoirs. Although this may overlap with the Army Chief of Staff's list, it is an independent list focused on developing leaders.

The Chief of Staff of the Army's list currently offers 82 titles to spur professional reading. The goal of the program is to develop "a

disciplined, focused commitment to a personal course of reading, study, thought, and reflection.”⁵⁷ This list is divided into four themes, the Army profession, the force of decisive action, broadening leaders, and the strategic environment.⁵⁸ In each category, the Army provides a brief synopsis of the book, emphasizing the thematic aspects.

The two tools described above are some of the most useful in the soldier’s inventory. However, they are not the only ones. Along with other publications, numerous development and leadership guides exist to provide useful devices for self-development. Another is the use of blogs and community forums to discuss issues within a specific specialty or career field. This is an area where grievances can be aired and resolved before senior leadership involvement is required.

The continuum of learning unites education, application, experience, and self-study into a comprehensive process for developing the habits of lifelong learning. As it applies to leadership development, the Army has produced a comprehensive and holistic approach that covers every aspect of a soldier’s career. Whether as a new Lieutenant, or a senior Major, the Army provides institutional education and application to provide the theoretical and conceptual foundation to build upon. Army officers are offered numerous opportunities for leadership in official capacities with the legal authority to act. The initial experiences focus on developing the fundamentals for effective leadership, like interpersonal skills. From there, the experiences build upon the

⁵⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List*, (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 2012).

⁵⁸ Army, *The U.S. Army Chief of Staff’s Professional Reading List*.

previous success to deal with a less tangible method of leadership – indirect leadership. After those skills are honed, the cognitive skills of leadership become the focus at the strategic leadership level. In between these opportunities to gain real work experience, self-study takes the place of development to bridge the gaps. All-in-all, the picture painted by this robust program demonstrates the Army's commitment to leadership development.

ARMY CULTURE.

The last step in the chapter is to evaluate the Army's culture. As we discussed in Chapter 1, Builder's framework provides a useful tool for analyzing the Army's Culture. Before we can compare the espoused values—in the US Army's case, doctrine—with the behavior—as observed in the continuum of learning—we must understand the organizational culture as a whole. In 1989, Builder said the Army had a culture of devotion to the country. The Army's altar was the country itself. As mentioned, in chapter 1, a lot has happened since 1989 and we should not assume his characterizations are still valid. So, this section looks to investigate the Army's culture, using Builder's earlier characterization as a starting point.

Akin to Builder's approach, this study will focus on three specific categorizations to reveal the Army's culture: 1) capability to perform the service's mission, 2) institutional associations, 3) "service legitimacy and relevancy" to national security. Only after understanding and synthesizing the information in this section to reveal the service's "altar" may we begin to understand how they influence leadership development.

Service capabilities unveil some of the service's highest priorities. They explain the service's attachment to certain fundamental values. It is at the core of who they are and what they deem essential to accomplishing the Army's mission. Regardless of what the task is, or

how the threat is defined, there is a fundamental capability each service feels it must maintain.

For the Army, their capabilities rely on their people. As military strategist and theorist, Rear Admiral Wylie once said, “*the ultimate determinant in war is the man on scene with a gun*” – the soldier.⁵⁹ The “individual” defines the Army. Recent budget discussions with the Army revolve around the number of personnel the Army will retain to meet its national security requirements. As a representation of “end-strength,” the Army is always concerned with the number of brigades, and it remains the most “salient measure of its readiness to fight.”⁶⁰

As service capabilities look from the top down, institutional associations look from the bottom up. They provide indicators about how the members view themselves as a part of the organization. This is a measure of institutional belonging. Some institutions instill stronger ties in their members than others. Where these associations to the organization lay unveils the underlying assumptions each organization has. Strong institutional ties tend to reveal themselves in common interaction, such as introductions or stories.

An informal survey around various joint environments might reveal a lot, as a casual observer can note topics of conversations and what is said in introductions. It does not take much time to realize Army associations tend toward sub-cultures. The hierarchy of the various branches is obvious in their conversations and discussions. Although the hierarchy between infantry and armor soldiers depends on the

⁵⁹ Joseph C. Wylie, *Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Classics of Sea Power)* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Inst Pr, 1989), 72.

⁶⁰ Builder, *Masks of War*, 22.

conflict at hand, they rank above all the others. Next in line are the Artillery and Aviation branches.⁶¹ All of these branches, as part of the maneuver elements, represent the pointed end of the spear. Despite their importance in conflict, the other branches are support elements that do not garner the same respect as the maneuver branches.

Although, soldiers draw distinctions from their branches, or sub-cultures, they still have a strong association with the greater institution itself. It is common to hear soldiers say, “I’m Army Artillery” or “I’m an Army MP,” but the occupational branches are rarely broken from the “Army” distinction. This indicates a very strong affection for the Army as an institution. Bottom-up, the loyalty to the Army is just as strong as the Army’s loyalty to their people.

To understand how these loyalties play out, we must look at the institutional insecurities. Institutional interests and concerns about legitimacy and relevancy divulge institutional insecurities and help form an understanding about behavior. Insecurities explain political jockeying for missions and capabilities, as well as where an institution may stand on certain national security issues. For example, if a service were secure in its relevancy, but not its legitimacy the expected behavior would be the institutional defending its mission or independence.

The Army has remained the most secure of the services in both.⁶² The Army’s relevancy and legitimacy was challenged at the start of the Cold War, and again in the Baltic conflicts. At the start of the Cold War, the Army found itself struggling to maintain relevancy as it searched for

⁶¹ These observations are based on personal conversations with Army officers in my previous assignments and in Army Command and General Staff School.

⁶² Builder, *Masks of War*, 30.

ways to be a part of the nuclear deterrent mission. The independent Air Force snatched the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from the Army's grasp, while the Navy claimed the use of its aircraft carriers and submarines for nuclear delivery options. Denied access to the assets that could have strategic nuclear effects, the Army eventually abandoned all "strategic" nuclear deterrence ambitions. However, as an essential element to the defense of Europe, the Army sought tactical nuclear weapons as a vital part of the deterrence strategy. This set the Army up, because as nuclear war tensions loosened, the service was at the forefront of the conventional deterrent posture.

In the 1990s, the Baltic wars uncovered some zealots advocating the "decisive" role of U.S. airpower in Kosovo. Although it may seem decisive, the jury is still out. The situation which led to the final agreements in Kosovo have yet to be studied in detail. The outside influence of Russian forces, the increase of NATO forces in Macedonia, and work on the Albanian road network may have played a role in the resolution. A good argument for either side can be made. Nonetheless, the most recent conflicts in the Iraq and Afghanistan only reaffirmed the belief that the soldier is truly the ultimate arbiter of war, quieting any critics. Therefore, the Army remains firm in its stance on relevancy and legitimacy.

These lenses have provided some insight into the Army's culture. Comfortable with their position among the services, the Army has a close bond with the nation. When the nation complains about casualties, the Army asks for body armor, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), or Improvised Explosive Device (IED) detection systems. The nation responds in kind by providing what the Army needs to address the public's concerns. The Army is aware their ability to perform the mission relies on the resources the nation provides. Less reliant on technology, the Army's decisions hinge on its members. When DoD

applies fiscal pressure, the Army is quick to answer with manpower reductions. To the Army, it is about a job, not technology, or heritage. It has a desire to maintain the lead as the finest and most capable land force in the world, but it also understands the burden that places on the nation. This unwavering dedication to accomplish the mission entrusted to them by the nation, lives within its people. Most soldiers are not concerned about the next gadget, toy, or their own personal welfare; they want to get the job done. In a mutually reinforcing circle, soldiers trust the institution to do what it needs to get the job done and the institution trusts its people to perform it. Builder had it right when he said the Army is the “most loyal servant” of the nation.⁶³ The Army’s altar is duty – duty to the nation.

CONCLUSION.

The Army’s dedication to duty and getting the job done reveals itself in the analysis of doctrine. The Army is an institution that values preparedness. Army officers must be ready to answer the nation’s call and be able to perform when they do. The institution values its members, just as much as the members value the institution. This mutual interest has created a culture of change. While the methods to strengthen the value changes with time and context, the value is static – the importance of leadership development and the betterment of the institution. As a result, this belief in leadership development has ensured the doctrine remains current, relevant, and practical. It also facilitated the creation of processes and procedures to ensure leadership development occurs in a holistic manner. The values not only influenced

⁶³ Builder, *Masks of War*, 20.

their doctrine throughout history, but also reflect the current resources the institution commits to leadership development.

As espoused values, the Army's doctrine showed a true dedication to their people to ensure they have the right tools to accomplish the mission. This explains the painstaking effort the Army made to stay current in academic development in leadership study, and the sections devoted to social problems the Army was battling. It also explains the urgent response to provide leadership instruction in the fields during Korea, the changes during the Balkans, or the renovations to the leadership manual only two years after the 1999 release.

As we look at the resources the Army devotes to leadership development, a dedication to the mission appears again. The Army dedicates the time, effort, and resources necessary to create a robust leadership development program based on the continuum of learning. The institutional education and application provide the basic conceptual framework for creating effective leaders. The coaching and mentorship opportunities, as one learns along the way, are incredible. To use a familiar adage, "experience is the best teacher," and in leadership this may be true. However, without the proper conceptual foundation provided through education, application, and self-study, the organization that places its trust in having the right people at the right place, at the right time faces a risky proposition in this increasingly complex environment of tomorrow.

Chapter 3

Inside Naval Leadership Development

The Navy has both a tradition and a future --and we look with pride and confidence in both directions.

- Admiral George Anderson

Navy leadership development has a storied past. The history is significant to understanding the evolution of events that bring us to their current leadership development philosophy. A three-step process is required to understand this philosophy completely: a look into what the service values, what leaders pay attention to and where they place their resources, and illuminating the underlying reasons “why” through an analysis of service culture. Thus, the first step in understanding the Navy’s organizational values is to take a historical survey of leadership, educational, and cultural literature and extract some of the common themes associated with leadership and its development. Through this method, the study will irradiate the service’s most important aspects of Navy leadership development. The second step explores the resources and devotion of senior leadership to certain leadership development concepts and methodologies. Combined with Bloom’s taxonomy, this section will use the learning continuum in its analysis. The last, and final, step will use the three concepts of service capabilities, institutional associations, and relevancy and legitimacy to analyze Navy culture and reveal its underlying assumptions.

NAVAL LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT: A SURVEY IN LITERATURE.

This section’s purpose is to convey an image of the Navy’s leadership development philosophy. The approach used here takes a survey of the literature that discusses Navy leadership and leadership education, or application, to try to uncover the espoused values. Some of

the material is from officers within the service, while others are academics who spent years studying the Navy. The following is a synthesis of the ideas presented in numerous articles, books, and biographies. Because of this approach, I had to cast my net wide in a search for suitable material. Despite my best efforts to focus my efforts on the period between 1948 and today, I had to look at material that dates back further. Additionally, the Navy places a considerable amount of importance on the leadership education each officer learns at their pre-commissioning sources. Thus, a look at Annapolis, as the model for other commissioning sources in the Navy, helped develop a broader understanding of the Navy's beliefs toward leadership. The journey on which we are about to embark will try to remain consistent with the Post-WWII period, however, references to periods further back in history are interspersed. Throughout this post-WWII period, three major shifts in Navy leadership development are evident. A growing brig population attributed to growing racial tensions at sea marks the first shift. The Navy recognized the leadership problem and viewed it as an accountability issue, motivating the release of General Order 21. The second shift in Navy leadership development occurred in the 70s as social problems spilled over into each service. This time the Navy abandoned the accountability issue and sought to set the foundation for good leadership through proper education and training for naval officers. Disappointed in the results from the education and training initiative, the third shift occurred in 2001 with the Navy's leadership continuum. The latest approach looks to a systematic approach to leadership development, building on previous organizational strengths. Throughout the Navy's history three themes pertaining to leadership education and development within the Navy stand out: a sense of tradition, the importance of experience, and a robust mentorship program.

Denied the establishment of a formal academy due to the concerns of a standing military force prior to 1845, the Navy relied on the on-the-job method of educating midshipmen at sea.¹ The system was derived from the British system of officer development intended to impart discipline, obedience, initiative, professional knowledge, and leadership. It was thought that the best school for instruction in the naval profession was the deck of a ship. Early, midshipmen received their entire education aboard a ship at sea. The Navy believed there was no better way of educating and training midshipmen.²

According to William Leeman, the education they gained at sea depended highly upon the ship's commanding officer, or mentor. The Navy had no standards for what the midshipmen were to experience or learn. With no standardization, midshipmen's experiences were different. "Some midshipmen earned the opportunity to command a vessel ... [while others] served as the aide to the Secretary of the Navy."³ "One of the great benefits of the navy's approach to education and training," Leeman continues, "was the opportunity it provided midshipmen to learn their profession under the guidance of mentors" some of which were the nation's first naval heroes.⁴ In one example, a young midshipman was so enamored with his mentor that he modeled his own leadership style after that of his mentor. On-the-job education

¹ William P. Leeman, *The Long Road to Annapolis: the Founding of the Naval Academy and the Emerging American Republic* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 6.

² Leeman, *The Long Road to Annapolis*, 49.

³ Leeman, *The Long Road to Annapolis*, 62.

⁴ Leeman, *The Long Road to Annapolis*, 65.

combined with mentorship provided the Navy a viable solution for the production of a professional naval officer.

Consequently, once political support for a naval academy was won, the Navy continued to pursue the idea of education at sea. Annapolis was founded in 1845 on the West Point four-year professional education model. Annapolis' purpose was to provide a liberal education, but emphasized practical skills and professional indoctrination.⁵ With the success of seaborne education looming, the Navy pursued a supplemental solution – summer cruises.

By 1850, the school, now retitled “the Naval Academy,” had developed a summer cruise program similar to West Point’s summer encampments. The intent was to allow education and training at sea to augment the midshipman’s education and indoctrination on land. This also had the added benefit of allowing midshipmen with no seafaring experience to be introduced gradually into the challenges of being at sea. Under this program, midshipmen attended shore-based courses during most of the year and then go to sea every summer during their four-year education. To facilitate this, the school procured their own vessels that represented operational warships, but did not have the distractions associated with a military mission.⁶

Summer cruises provided a wealth of experiences for the future officers. They provided an introduction into the psychological isolation from society and the physiological troubles, such as seasickness. It also offered practical experience with the technical aspects of operating a

⁵ Mark C. Hunter, *A Society of Gentlemen: Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy, 1845-1861* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 128.

⁶ Hunter, *A Society of Gentlemen*, 228.

ship. Most importantly, it provided midshipmen “valuable leadership experience by serving as officer of the deck and navigator on a rotational basis.”⁷

Implicit throughout the Navy’s history, the power of individual observation was critical to leadership development. Experience relied on the ability of the officer to be able to observe leadership behavior and understand its true intent. The officer must recognize good leadership and bad leadership in the development of his own style. To paraphrase Rear Admiral Jack Darby, naval officers will be exposed to many different types of leaders and leadership styles. They will carry two imaginary bags; one with “good” styles, and one with “bad” styles. Throughout their career, the officer will pull from the “good” bag, but remember the “bad” ones, and will be sure to develop a style that fits himself.⁸ Although watching good and bad leaders can contribute to a personal style of leadership, an individual’s interpretation of what is good and bad varies. This subjectivity poses a threat to organizational standards and without further guidance or intervention could contribute to the progression of “bad” leadership styles.

Born of these early ideas, the modern US Navy nonetheless maintained many of the same traditions in leadership development. The US Naval Academy maintains the summer cruises in much the same way they were created in 1850, albeit with modern equipment. The summer cruises gradually expose midshipmen to the challenges of life at sea. Additionally, one cruise is mandatory for all commissioning sources. The

⁷ Hunter, *A Society of Gentlemen*, 228.

⁸ Admiral Jack Darby, quoted in Karel Montor, ed., *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, 2nd ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 4.

first class warfare cruise is the last, final, and sometimes only cruise for a midshipman. The cruise is “the capstone of maritime and leadership training.”⁹ The development of midshipmen set the tone for the approach the Navy has taken toward leadership development of their officers, post-commissioning.

The Navy’s philosophy is one of lifelong learning and self-development. In *Naval Leadership, Voices of Experience*, the editors describe the philosophy:

Education is not necessarily tied to a formal learning-teaching relationship; it is often accomplished at a personal level. The civilian phrase for this type of education is on-the-job training. Have you ever heard the cliché “trained but not educated” in reference to the kind of learning done at the Naval Academy? This is incongruous, because a good naval officer – that is, a true leader – is indeed well trained, but his *training* is the most sophisticated *education* in the world. He listens, absorbs, studies, and practices over and over, in a seemingly endless course of development. This kind of activity is essential to the leader. The ideal is not to be well trained once, but to be always in training!¹⁰

Written in 1998, this single quote emphasizes the longstanding attraction toward mentorship and experience the Navy maintains today. However, before proceeding, a brief look into the evolution of the Navy’s leadership education post-WWII is prudent.

⁹ Department of the Navy, United States Naval Academy, “United State Naval Academy Instruction 1530.1B,” for use in the Midshipman Summer Cruise Training Program, (3 April 2008), 3.

¹⁰ Karel Montor, *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, 183.

In the anthology, *Military Leadership*, Donald Parker¹¹ asserts that the Navy prior to WWII believed the purpose for leadership education was to enhance the performance of natural leaders, as well as those less gifted, in leadership positions.¹² Consequently, any training officers received focused on learning the knowledge and skills required to direct the efforts of others. In a well-disciplined and effective force, this was a viable assumption. However, the Navy's perspective on leadership took a turn in the 1950s. Relying heavily on experience, symptoms began to show evidence of poor leadership. In one sample of 10,000 sailors, the study revealed "two-thirds perceived that their officers and petty officers were uninterested in them as human beings."¹³ The efforts that prompted the study are even more interesting. At the time, the Navy faced a growing brig population the same size as the Submarine force.¹⁴ This sparked a controversy that ignited a passion for a resolution.

To provide a little context, the 1950s were marked by societal upheaval. In 1952, Congress signed the Immigration and Naturalization Act removing ethnic barriers to citizenship. Likewise, the Supreme Court

¹¹ Donald Parker at the time of publication in 1981 was a retired Navy Captain and Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior and Industrial Relations in the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan. His naval career highlights included command of a antisubmarine Patrol Squadron, faculty at the Naval War College, and Commanding Officer of the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center.

¹² James H. Buck, Lawrence J. Korb, and editors, *Military Leadership* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc, 1981), 195.

¹³ J. Hubbell, "To Give Young Men a Goal," *Reader's Digest*, May 1960, cited in James H. Buck, Lawrence J. Korb, and editors, *Military Leadership* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc, 1981), 196.

¹⁴ A brig is "a prison in a ship, or on shore base" used for pre-trial confinement, or as part of serving a sentence. Rear Admiral Harley Cope, *The Naval Officer's Manual*, 3 ed. (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, May 1955), 519.

declared racial segregation unconstitutional in 1954. As tensions grew, 1955 was a significant date in desegregation history with Rosa Parks' bus protest. Representative of society, the services faced similar issues.

As Morris MacGregor notes, racial tensions increased across the services as the number of minorities in uniform grew. Just prior to the alarming symptoms of poor leadership, 1956 and 1957 saw the greatest proportion of African-American sailors in the Navy.¹⁵ The resulting racial conflict might explain the large brig population, no matter what side of the argument one was on. For the Navy, these social problems raised a significant concern. Discipline and obedience is vital to the safe operation of a ship at sea. Any disruptions could lead to a mutinous situation and risk losing ship, captain, and crew. Although the situations probably never reached this level of concern, the perceptions likely did.

During the long history of the Navy, this became a major turning point for leadership development. These events marked a realization of the inadequacy of leadership traditions, and forced senior Navy officials to consider solutions for their leadership problems. In their search for answers, the Navy would swing between radical changes and traditional methods as they moved through this trial and error page of history. Just as the Army responded to similar desegregation issues through doctrine, the Navy responded with a General Order.

On 17 May 1958, the Secretary of the Navy issued General Order No. 21. The purpose of the order was to "reemphasize and revitalize

¹⁵ Morris J. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Department Publication)(Department of the Army, 1981), 416.

Naval leadership in all its aspects.”¹⁶ In essence, the order sought to hold commands accountable for their officer’s ability to meet the leadership standards and responsibilities outlined in Navy regulations. However, it provided no guidance to the commands on how to accomplish the goals, leaving every community to their own devices for a solution. To assess the institution’s progress, the order charged the Navy Inspector with the responsibility to report his findings and initiate “corrective actions,” accordingly.¹⁷ Teresa Cissell and David Polley suggest the lack of visible change within the service required senior Navy leaders to reissue the order in 1963.¹⁸ The renewed emphasis on General Order No. 21 also corresponded to the issue of a new Navy leadership manual.

Naval officers were not left completely helpless though. In 1959, the US Navy published a second edition of *Naval Leadership*. In this version, the publication provided naval officers with leadership concepts of psychology, motivation and learning, along with leadership techniques, case studies, and a suggested reading list.¹⁹ This comprehensive work provided several useful tools to the naval officer for the proper application of leadership.

¹⁶ Secretary Thomas Gates, “General Order No. 21: Naval Leadership,” 17 May 1958, quoted in Department of the Navy, *NAVPERS 15934: United States Navy Leadership Manual*, (1963), vii.

¹⁷ Navy, *NAVPERS 15934*, viii.

¹⁸ Teresa Cissell and David Polley, “Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET): Its Relationship To Shipboard EffectivenessEffectivness and Readiness,” (thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), 13.

¹⁹ United States Naval Academy, Department of the Navy, *Naval Leadership*, Annapolis, U.S. Naval Institute, 1953.

The manual immediately began with a copy of the general order and an appeal to logic by explaining why leadership development is important. The manual provides the tools for commanding officers to use in their leadership training sessions. It provides some practical suggestions for implementation, such as “check for personal leadership, or standard naval leadership discussion outlines.”²⁰ Checks for personal leadership included a self-assessment tool that permitted sailors to identify areas for improvement. Discussion outlines was an institutional effort to inject important leadership topics were discussed. Major progress was not realized, however, until the Navy mandated 10 hours of leadership training per year under the General Military Training concept in 1966.²¹ Parker suggests that commanding officers did not see the value in the training and it was delegated to less capable officers.²²

The 1970’s, marked by drug abuse, racism, and the transition to an all-volunteer force, required a more drastic change to current development programs. Fortunately, the new Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr. was ready for the job. Zumwalt felt that his appointment was directly related to his personal views on how sailors should be treated.²³ To enact this change, Zumwalt followed an outline similar to what Kotter suggests for organizational change; he replaced key personnel to enact the change, overhauled processes, and jettisoned some of the Navy’s traditions. Unsatisfied with the results from General

²⁰ Navy, *NAVPERS 15934*, 1-7, 23-45.

²¹ James H. Buck, et al., *Military Leadership*, 198.

²² Buck, *Military Leadership*, 198.

²³ Buck, *Military Leadership*, 199.

Order 21, the Navy decided they must augment their existing reliance on experience at sea with something more – leadership education.

Although the Admiral's goals were noble, the change did not have the time to demonstrate its effectiveness before they were overcome by events. Under a new name, the Leadership and Management Training (LMT) program was now 10-days and incorporated some of the recent developments in leadership and management from academia.²⁴

However, only a few years after its enactment, the racial incidents of 1972 aboard the *USS Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation* prompted a congressional investigation into the incidents. The congressional investigations created awareness into the service-wide problems, but also placed increased importance on “expanding and emphasizing” the leadership programs.²⁵ The year following the congressional study's release, Admiral Zumwalt relinquished command to Admiral James Holloway, III.

Anxious to make changes, Admiral Holloway ordered an investigation into the effectiveness of current leadership and management programs. Much to his surprise, the panel of experts suggested the program did not suffer from a lack of leadership curriculum, but rather in synchronizing of the 58 formal and 11 correspondence courses available. Additionally, the panel cautioned that further expansion of the program without synchronization would likely

²⁴ Buck, *Military Leadership*, 200.

²⁵ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Forces, *Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the US Navy*. 92nd Cong., 2d sess., 1973, H.A.S.C. 92-81. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1973. http://www.history.navy.mil/library/special/racial_incidents.htm (accessed 31 March, 2012).

not meet the fleet's needs. The caution went unattended, and the Navy dismissed the panel and put out a proposal for contractors to develop a program.²⁶ Rather than synchronize existing courses, Admiral Holloway created more.

Officially implemented in 1979, the new program, called Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET), took a competency-based approach. One of the greatest critiques of the program regarded the research behind the identification of the naval competencies taught. To the critics, they were not grounded in leadership theory nor derived from any known research method.²⁷ One major distinction in the LMET program, however, was the decreased emphasis of leadership training conducted at the unit level. Commanding officers no longer had to attend to leadership training at sea; the new program assumed—rightly or wrongly—that officers would arrive fully prepared to embark upon their duties. Despite commanding officers being relieved of the official responsibility by the LMET program, *Command at Sea* (1982) called upon naval tradition to maintain this practice. Sometimes referred to as the naval officer's "bible," *Command at Sea* asserted that after a commanding officer has placed the officers in proper billets he must lead the individual development of his officers and "this starts with leadership training."²⁸ Satisfied with naval officer

²⁶ Buck, *Military Leadership*, 201-204.

²⁷ F. Luthans, in a memorandum to Dr. B. King, Office of Naval Research, April 18, 1979 quoted in James H. Buck, Lawrence J. Korb, and editors, *Military Leadership* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc, 1981), 212.

²⁸ William P. Mack, Albert H. Konetzni, and Jr, *Command at Sea*, 4th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1982), 142.

knowledge and comprehension, the Navy discovered a deficiency in application.

In the early 1990s, the Navy's leadership program changed again to address application. The Navy added an additional course, called the Navy Leadership Development Program. Designated NAVLEAD, the one-week program was designed to augment the LMET program and create in the officer corps motivation for lifelong leadership development. The intent was to provide an application-based emphasis on the education and training already received. However, when a study revealed that only 38 percent of officers attended the course, and only junior officers in the submarine and surface warfare communities, the program's focus turned to the enlisted force development instead.²⁹ This prompted senior naval officers to find another solution, once again, for officer leadership development. Though the gradual evolution of leadership and management training up to this point had benefited the Navy, it did not yield the results the service desired.

In 2001, the Navy conducted another assessment of their leadership development program, called the *Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy Training*. The purpose of the study was to develop an approach for a lifelong learning continuum. The study revealed that previous efforts to transform the Navy did not achieve their goals for several reasons, but a significant one was that the Navy "never

²⁹ Commander Christopher D. Hayes, "Developing the Navy's Operational Leaders: A Critical Look," *Naval War College Review* 61, no. 3 (Summer 2008) 95. <http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8612250f-273f-4fa8-93d7-a973cecae773/Developing-the-Navy-s-Operational-Leaders--A-Criti> (accessed 31 March, 2012).

established strong central training leadership and/or management.”³⁰ The review also called for senior leadership endorsement and active participation in implementing the change. This is something previous studies may have desired, but never explicitly stated. However, Commander Hayes stated that the findings of the 2001 study were no different than a similar study in 1993. Although many of the recommendations were novel, the findings remained the same.³¹

In 2006, the vision of the review began to materialize when Admiral Michael Mullen sent a message to all sailors calling for a leadership development continuum. At first glance, the new program resembled the LMET program, with selection for attendance depending on the job a sailor held. Additionally, the Navy retained the competency-based system established in 1979, but tailored the instruction to instill the appropriate skills for application at sea. Just as NAVLEAD was added to the LMET concept to provide an element of application to leadership development, the new leadership continuum incorporated the practical aspects of NAVLEAD from the 90s into its model. Today, the leadership continuum uses a systematic method to leadership development. The continuum is comprised of in-residence courses, e-learning, command-delivered training, and on-the-job training.³² This new concept is a perfect fit for the analysis of the next section, as the study looks to:

³⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Navy, *Revolution in Training: Executive Review of Navy Training*, (Washington DC: HQ Department of the Navy, 8 August 2001), 19.

³¹ Hayes, “Developing the Navy’s Operational Leaders,” 95.

³² Admiral Michael Mullen, “Navy Leadership Continuum” in a general administrative message to the Navy, (19 Jan 2006), 2.

education, application, experience, and self-development to understand the Navy's commitment to this latest philosophy.

THE NAVY LEADERSHIP CONTINUUM.

Mullen's program remains in effect today. Building off of the Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET) program established in 1976, the CNO recognized that leadership education needed revitalizing and the key to the Navy's success was through an initiative to meet the Navy's needs.³³ Revitalization efforts focused on a developing a more robust program. Targeting both enlisted and officers alike, the CNO's message said Leadership Development Programs (LDP) "are comprised of in-residence courses, e-learning, command delivered, on-the-job training (OJT), and other education and training events." It further clarified that the program is a position-dependent program and those assigned to leadership positions are required to fulfill the program's leadership goals. This change is a departure from the LMET program of earlier.

Training is an interesting term within the military. The services use the term to describe the occupational psychomotor skills required to perform a job. In this definition, there is only one correct answer. Leadership is comprised of numerous solutions to a problem and cannot be prescribed by a "go" or "no-go" mentality. This checklist mentality does not afford members the ability to practice leadership in a dynamic environment. Where applicable, this study replaces the term "training" with Bloom's taxonomy of "application" in its definition of the continuum

³³ Mullen, "Navy Leadership Continuum," 1.
http://www.military.com/MilitaryCareers/Content/0,14556,MPDC_CareerNews_Navy_012406-4,00.html (accessed 23 March, 2012).

to facilitate the differentiation between “training” for psychomotor skills, and application as it applies to leadership development. Therefore, this study will examine the primary methods for leadership development described in the CNO’s message using the four learning continuum pillars: education, application, operational experience, and self-study.

Education

Like the Army, the Navy has identified three opportunities in an officer’s career to take advantage of leadership education. The first is the Division Officer’s Leadership Course (DIVOLC). This course is a one-week of instruction conducted prior to assuming any duties as a division officer. The course may be taught independently at an approved education center or integrated into the specialty specific “training” for a new Ensign, depending on the specialty. The responsibilities of a division officer are similar to those of a new lieutenant in the Army. The division officer course is designed to provide an Ensign the requisite knowledge for effective operation, management, and leadership in a unit with 12 - 50 sailors. The Department Head Leadership Course (DHLC) is designed for experienced O3s that have typically completed two Division Officer (DivO) tours. The department head course, like the Army’s Captain Career Course, expands on the knowledge attained in the previous course to prepare officers for leading over 275 sailors of multiple divisions. Finally, the third course, Navy Command and Staff College (?) prepares Lieutenant Commander’s (LCDR) for staff assignments and subsequent command of a ship. To analyze the curriculum of the three courses, we will look at the methodology, hours and distribution, and topics.

The Division Officer Leadership Course and Department Head Courses are one-week courses with 40 hours of instruction each. Both courses attempt to educate through all levels of Bloom’s taxonomy.

Taught in a block, they both seek to impart “job specific” leadership skills and tools prior to assuming a specific position.

In the Navy, divisions are categorized functionally (i.e. radar maintenance, administration, avionics, etc). The duty of a division officer is marked by daily interaction with enlisted sailors. This direct form of leadership requires the creation of a healthy and positive working climate, team building skills, comprehension of human behavior, and basic leadership skills. Designed to meet these needs, the DIVOLC is “the first in the series of officer training courses designed to improve leadership throughout the Navy.”³⁴ It introduces leadership and organizational behavior theories, motivation concepts, specific problem scenarios, and work climate considerations in 35 curriculum hours. The remaining 5 hours of the course is devoted to discussing the expectations and administrative tools specific to a DivO tour.

The DIVOLC course focuses more on providing new officers the practical tools needed to be successful in their jobs by using some of the prominent leadership theories and concepts. The course seeks to initially provide the knowledge and comprehension of the requisite concepts before embarking on the higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy. One of the first lessons is designed to impress upon the young sailors the importance of creating the proper working relationship with their primary enlisted advisor, their Chief. Among other concepts, the lesson emphasizes striking a proper balance between receiving mentorship from

³⁴ Department of the Navy, Center for Personal and Professional Development, Virginia Beach, VA, “Division Officer Leadership Course – Trainee Guide” for use in the Division Officer Leadership Course October 2011, 0-1-5, in author's possession.

the Chief and providing direction. Too much of either is not representative of good leadership and can pose problems for the unit in the future.³⁵ Building upon this and designed around a seminar style education, the instructors present multiple models, concepts, and theories, some of which include emotional intelligence theory, situation leadership theory, and the Vroom-Yetton decision-making model for use in hypothetical scenarios to encourage discussions.³⁶ These scenarios facilitate the application of the knowledge in Bloom's taxonomy.

In one lesson, students must confront three scenarios. These scenarios are designed to help officers identify the subtle indicators of operational stress and aid them in finding solutions. The open discussion format allows a variety of ideas to be presented by the students to broaden one's thinking, attaining the analysis, synthesis and evaluation stages of Bloom's structure. One scenario describes a married enlisted sailor who, on a port call, becomes intoxicated and makes some questionable decisions that lead to infidelity. The sailor then exhibits some severe signs of depression. The new DivOs are then expected to identify the severity of the situation, and develop immediate, short-term, and long-term actions.³⁷ These exercises and discussions help new Ensigns understand the potential scenarios they may face in their new position, and think through some of the possible solutions

³⁵ Center for Personal and Professional Development, "Division Officer Leadership Course – Trainee Guide," 1-2-4.

³⁶ Center for Personal and Professional Development, "Division Officer Leadership Course – Trainee Guide," 3-4-1 thru 4-3-4.

³⁷ Department of the Navy, Center for Personal and Professional Development, Virginia Beach, VA, "Division Officer Leadership Course – Playbook" for use in the Division Officer Leadership Course October 2011, 3-4-9, in author's possession.

before the actual events occur. Although it is not designed to prepare them for every scenario, it prompts them to start preparing for confronting difficult leadership decisions.

In line with Navy tradition of keeping a journal at sea, the students are expected to keep a journal of key ideas or concepts they plan to use in their careers. To assess their comprehension and progress in the course, there are a few assignments and assessments along the way. After one-week, the course culminates in a capstone exercise where each individual is expected to produce an “action plan” responding to a complex scenario designed to make an officer think through all of the concepts presented in class. The scenario usually involves ethical decisions and conflicting interests: should the officer take the appropriate action and ruin an otherwise stellar career of a vital team member, or take a more lenient approach and help the sailor recover? These are the challenges every officer must face at one point in their career and this course encourages officers to think through these fictitious events before they become real.

The Department Head Leadership Course (DHLC) provides more depth into leadership instruction. Although the DIVOLC is not a prerequisite to the DHLC, a building block approach is evident. The course builds on the concepts from DIVOLC to aid in their development as leaders. Relying heavily on the basic knowledge gained in DIVOLC, DHLC looks to focus on application with more time spent in Bloom’s higher levels. For example, the situational leadership theory from DIVOLC is reinforced by the Keirsey-Bates Temperament Sorter to help officers understand the needs of their subordinates in DHLC. The Keirsey-Bates Temperament Sorter is an extension of the Myers-Briggs personality type test. Both provide slightly different results based on a test that categorizes a person’s personality into one of 16 types. This facilitates a greater understanding of human behavior, by providing

insight into one's own personality and as well as the personalities of the subordinates. Combined with the situational leadership model, the course uses these concepts to encourage future department heads to formulate potential solutions that are situation dependent and may reach a compromise between all the personality types in the unit. For example, one technique is to have a "standard method to solicit input at a meeting," such as going around the table to seek specific input from each individual.³⁸ This creates a comfortable environment for inclusion of the Introvert and limits the Extrovert from monopolizing the discussion.³⁹ This describes only some of the interlinked concepts the course uses.

The DHLC is designed from the beginning for students to share their operational experiences. The syllabus clearly states that the "trainees' experiences are the foundation for learning."⁴⁰ This in mind, the course maintains the same seminar construct as DIVOLC. However, much less time is devoted to instruction of the concepts, thus providing more time for sharing individual insights into similar scenarios or experiences.

Once an officer is promoted to Lieutenant Commander, some form of Intermediate Level Education is required. If chosen to attend in

³⁸ Department of the Navy, Center for Personal and Professional Development, Virginia Beach, VA, "Division Head Leadership Course – Trainee Guide" for use in the Division Officer Leadership Course October 2011, 1-23, in author's possession.

³⁹ Center for Personal and Professional Development, Virginia Beach, VA, "Division Head Leadership Course – Trainee Guide," 1-23.

⁴⁰ Department of the Navy, Center for Personal and Professional Development, Virginia Beach, VA, "Division Head Leadership Course – Trainee Guide" for use in the Division Officer Leadership Course October 2011, 0-1, in author's possession.

residence, the College of Naval Command and Staff course, at the Naval War College, is a course intended to increase the cognitive abilities of the officers as they prepare for a staff assignment and subsequently, the independent command of a large ship. The nearly yearlong course focuses on developing strategic, critical thinkers, proficient in joint methods. Leadership is a sub-course in the much larger National Security Affairs core curriculum. According to the student guide, the purpose of the course is not to teach leadership, but to provide tools, illuminate issues and dilemmas, and offer students the “intellectual space needed to individually deepen and improve their already proven leadership skills.”⁴¹

The curriculum is approximately 25 hours of leadership study, divided into 17 sessions over 8 weeks. The students study leadership 2-3 times per week in a seminar-style format. The course presents leadership concepts with case studies to supplement the topic and provoke thought. In these thought provoking in-class debates, there is no right answer. Thus, the sub-course focuses on reaching the highest levels of Bloom’s educational classification.

Additionally, the sub-course coincides with the National Security Affairs block of instruction within the core curriculum. As such, most of the leadership topics are designed to complement the larger block of instruction. For example, one lesson focuses on the meaning behind the profession of arms and how individual interpretations of an officer’s role may affect civil-military relations. The lesson lays a conceptual

⁴¹ College of Naval Command and Staff, Naval Staff College, Newport, RI, “TSDM Leadership Concepts, Annex B, Study Guide” for use in resident Intermediate Level Education, B-1, in author’s possession.

foundation using Samuel Huntington's theory on civil-military relations and then expands upon it with articles containing various perspectives for discussion. In one article, for example, Mackubin Owens asserts the typical officer does not understand their roles in civil military relations. He asserts civil-military relations consist of much broader and more complex ideas than simply civilian control.⁴² He concludes the article by calling for both parties to develop trust and a mutual understanding. The military must maintain its voice in strategy, while understanding its subordination to politics. While the civilians must create an environment which facilitates open and frank discussion about military employment. An essential element of leadership, the block of instruction calls for moral courage and integrity from military leaders to say what is right. Whatever the topic, the purpose of the concepts, different perspectives, and case studies, these lessons are meant to spur discussion and provoke thought to help the officer recognize their own perceptions, or biases, and critically think through problems.

The leadership education naval officers receive relies heavily on experience. Using the building block approach of education, the Division Officer Leadership Course and the Department Head Leadership Course build upon each other. Laying the foundation, DIVOLC is designed to supplement pre-commissioning leadership instruction with additional knowledge, before officers gain experience in the real-world. The DHLC builds on the experiences attained as a DIVO and the knowledge

⁴² Mackubin Thomas Owens, "What Military Officers Need to Know About Civil-Military Relations," *Naval War College Review* 65, no. 2 (Spring 2012). <http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/Documents/What-Military-Officers-Need-to-Know-about-Civil-Mi.pdf> (accessed March 25, 2012).

acquired at DIVOLC to facilitate a cooperative learning environment where everyone learns various forms of leadership application from one other. Newly promoted O-4s may attend the College of Naval Command and Staff to refresh theoretical leadership concepts and share their experiences, focusing on analyzing, evaluating and synthesizing scenarios, and information.

Application

When it comes to leadership application the Navy has several methods, none of which are standardized. Drawing on the knowledge presumably gained in education, application may incorporate on-the-job experience, coaching, or leadership discussions led by the Captain. It is no surprise that for the Navy, on-the-job (OJT) training dominates. Naval officers are expected to learn leadership through success and failure. They can witness, firsthand, the effects of their decisions on the morale of the people and live out the unintended consequences of the decisions they make. However, OJT usually corresponds with coaching from above and below.

Although not codified, the OJT process throughout a naval officer's career relies on the feedback and advice of the officer's Chief, peers, and direct supervisor, in order of their frequency. The Chief is just as interested in the success of his unit as anyone else. This provides officers the opportunity to use up-to 25 years of experience to refine their decision-making and leadership skills. However, as discussed in the section on education, a naval officer must strike a balance between the two extremes of blindly following and blatantly disregarding the advice. Another useful coach is an officer's peer. Akin to the DHLC course at sea, the officers are encouraged to share experiences and seek one another's advice. The camaraderie formed on a ship makes this a good source for bouncing leadership ideas off of each other before making critical decisions. Using these vicarious experiences, naval officers can

learn through other people's mistakes in a retribution free environment. Kept for last, coaching from above is usually reserved for difficult situations few have experienced. However, the willingness to seek advice from a supervisor depends highly on the rapport the junior officer has with his superior. Depending on the position of responsibility and the personality of the superior, this can go well or very poorly.

Leadership application in the Navy, as it is described, is very nebulous. There is no official guidance or prescription to follow. However, this is not to suggest that leadership application does not occur. One of the responsibilities of the Commanding Officer (CO) is to lead the development of the officers under his command.⁴³ However, since there is no official guidance, a CO may conduct leadership "training" in a multitude of ways. Usually conducted in the wardroom, every CO is different and has taken tips from every Commanding Officer they have served under. Unsurprisingly, COs interpret their responsibilities differently, and what one may consider leadership "training" would not qualify for another. Thus, one CO may approach leadership development from Bloom's lowest levels, while another might seek to reach the highest, and a third might focus on management instead. However, a good commander might consider the performance and the dynamics of the unit to tailor the "training" required. All of these contribute to the concept that context matters. Although there is no standard for leadership application in the Navy, they have adapted by giving the Commanding Officers the flexibility required to meet the needs

⁴³ Capt. James Stavridis and Vice Adm. William P. Mack, "Command at Sea", 5th ed., (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 101.

of their unit. The service places their trust in these leaders to prepare the next generation.

Experiences

The Navy places an inordinate amount of importance on experience. As such, one would expect the Navy to provide opportunities for their officers to lead early and often, and they do. As education and application lay the foundation, nothing attains the highest levels of Bloom's taxonomy best like experience. The ability to receive real leadership feedback nearly simultaneously provides young officers the opportunity to analyze, evaluate, and synthesize the effects of their actions. Each community (aviation, submarine, or surface warfare) places a slightly different emphasis on the role of leadership at each level, but they all provide opportunities in a similar fashion. A look at the responsibilities of Division Officers, Department Heads, and XOs will provide some insight into the opportunities the Navy provides for their officers. However, the study would be incomplete if I did not address the robust mentorship program the Navy relies so heavily on.

Like a platoon leader in the Army, the division officer is responsible for the welfare of 15-50 sailors in their execution of their job. Although some divisions are much larger, depending on the function and ship, these are usually reserved for experienced DivOs on a second sea tour. Additionally, he is responsible for their training, scheduling, setting the work climate, and addressing all personal issues within the division.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Department of the Navy, "OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3120.32C CHANGE TRANSMITTAL 6: Standard Organization and Regulations of the US Navy," (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 26 May 2005), article 360.

This level of leadership is intimate, direct, and includes daily interaction. This is the most personal level of leadership. The officers will get to know their sailors and build a rapport that can last throughout their careers. The DivO's interpersonal skills, required to motivate the sailors, are also critical to the division's performance. This is especially important for sailors who must face non-stop reminders of work as they move about a ship. There is no escaping your job when you are on a ship, because there is no other society to escape to.

The department head has the experience of a division officer under his belt, but maintains the responsibility for multiple divisions. The number of sailors for which a department head can range from less than one hundred to several hundred sailors, depending on the department. Naturally, the scope of the responsibilities increase with the increase in personnel, but the department head is also responsible directly to the commanding officer for the effective operation of the department. Leadership at this level is slightly removed from the direct leadership level of division officer, and takes on an indirect form. The department head deals with more administrative matters, such as department funding, equipment management, and assessments of department readiness. However, the influence of the department head will extend throughout the department. Although interpersonal skills still play a vital role, the focus is shifted to developing the relationships with the commanding officer, executive officer, and other department heads.⁴⁵

It is common for officers to rotate department or division positions, commensurate with their rank, while at sea. This helps provide

⁴⁵ Navy, "OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3120.32C," article 310.

opportunities for other officers to lead and manage a variety of functions as they gain exposure to all facets of ship borne operations. In general, after a series of sea tours, the officers usually have a shore-duty assignment for pursuing educational opportunities, like obtaining advanced degrees or fulfilling professional military education requirements. For example, a “typical” surface warfare officer career, through O-4, might start as an Ensign with 4 years dedicated to sea duty to obtain all necessary qualification and gain experience. This would be followed by 2-3 years shore duty to meet education and professional development requirements. The officer would then return for 3-4 years of sea duty to serve as a department head before leaving for an education assignment and staff. The unwritten rule is that the time spent ashore should be minimized, allowing for maximization of the experiences gain at sea.

Upon returning from a staff tour as an O-4, the next step is the Executive Officer position (XO). The experiences gained in this position are preparation for command. As the number two officer onboard, your responsibilities mimic the commander’s. However, the department officers report directly to the commanding officer and inform the XO as a courtesy.⁴⁶ Although the scenario is unlikely, should a crisis occur and the commanding officer be relieved of command, the XO must be ready to assume command of the ship. Nonetheless, the XO’s primary responsibilities are to ensure smooth and proper operation of the ship. Some of these duties include, assignment of new personnel who have completed indoctrination, supervise the education and training of all

⁴⁶ Navy, “OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3120.32C,” article 310.

personnel, regulate liberty, direct the unit's public affairs program, and serve as the senior member of several boards and councils.⁴⁷

As the scope of responsibility and span of influence changes, the Navy offers a detailed mentorship program to help officers along the way. This program plays a vital role in the proper leadership development of their officers. In an institution reliant on experiences to teach the necessary skills, mentorship is key. Mentorship looks at the individual and provides tailored advice to hone the officer's skills and propel them through their career.

I placed mentorship in this section, because mentorship is different from coaching. Figure 6 below demonstrates the differences.




Figure 6: Counseling, Coaching, Mentoring

Source: Dr. Ted Thomas and Jim Thomas, "Mentoring, Coaching, and Counseling: Toward A Common Understanding," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/repository/dcl_Mentoring.pdf (accessed 31 March 2012).

Coaching is a performance-based approach to providing an individual or team advice. The end goal is to ensure the team attains success.

Coaching is typically conducted in the midst of an activity and is related to the accomplishment of the task. As it applies to leadership, coaching

⁴⁷ Navy, "OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3120.32C," article 302.

is receiving advice about leadership as the individual practices leadership. Mentoring is focused on developing the individual. The goal is to attain individual success regardless of the task. Mentorship relies heavily on the experience of the mentor and is focused on the future. A leader may ask for his mentor's advice in anticipation of a leadership problem, but the mentor most often is not available to offer it during the actual execution.

The Navy describes mentorship as a "relationship between two people where a trusted person (mentor) helps another person (protégé) learn something the latter would otherwise have learned less proficiently, more slowly, or not at all."⁴⁸ The definition's emphasis on trust signifies a willingness to share personal experiences. It describes personal development for the benefit of the individual, not the team. It is not task oriented, but tailored to the specific needs of the protégé. The Navy takes mentorship seriously and they have developed a guide that is downloadable to anyone in the Navy, as long as they have a Navy Knowledge Online account.

The Navy mentorship guide, in a presentation format, is a tool the service provides to support prospective mentors and protégés for walking through the mentorship process. The guide is designed to ease the mentorship process and help ensure individual success. It describes a mutually involved process in which both parties participate in the active development of the protégé. It provides suggestions for finding mentors

⁴⁸ Department of the Navy, Navy Personnel Command, "NAVPERSCOMINST 1500.1: Navy Personnel Command (NAVPERSOM) Mentoring Program," (Millington TN: Navy Personnel Command, 16 April 2009), 1. <http://www.med.navy.mil/diversity/Pages/mentorshipprograminstruction2009.pdf> (accessed 31 March 2012).

(or protégés), like looking for a two grade level difference, and someone you admire. And, cautions against behavior associated with dysfunctional relationships, such as one participant dominating the relationship, or doing the work for the protégé. Additionally, it describes the two different forms of mentorship.

The two forms of mentorship are formal and informal. Formal mentorship describes an assigned mentor who was deemed responsible by the institution for the officer's development. Mentorship, however, cannot be forced. Mentorship depends on the creation of a personal bond that enables each participant to talk freely about leadership decisions, experiences, and career choices. A certain amount of respect and trust is required in a good mentorship relationship. Consequently, informal mentorship is the optimal method for developing the mentor-protégé relationship. To be realistic though, not all officers possess the nerve to find a mentor. This is when formal mentorship can be useful. The formal assignment of a mentor may be the push young officers need to overcome any fears and initiate a mentoring relationship. Nonetheless, in a mentor-protégé relationship, trust and respect must be present. So, if the personal dynamics are not there, find another mentor.

The lessons naval officers learn throughout this experience laden process directly correlates to their ability to lead later. Through these experiences, they learn direct, indirect, and strategic leadership skills necessary for future adaptability and flexibility. Any deficiencies in the other aspects of leadership development within the service are made up by their tradition in experiential based leadership. The navy embodies the idea that learning leadership is a continuous process and it takes a lifetime of experiences to develop. In *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, the editors make a comparison to a medical doctor and say, "A medical doctor, for example, accepts total responsibility for other people's lives fairly early on. In the military, however, responsibility

gradually increases. This means that the education process takes much longer for the leader than for the doctor, whose formal education ended when he received his degree. Both the doctor and the naval leader, however, learn a great deal through experience.”⁴⁹

Self-Study

Designed to bridge the gap between education, application, and experience, self-study is especially important. Self-study provides the unique capability to reach all aspects of Bloom’s taxonomy tailored for each individual. Some of the Navy’s few tools available for officer leadership self-study are: the 360-degree feedback program, and the Navy professional reading list.

Launched in May 2005, the 360-degree feedback program underwent testing in a pilot program onboard various surface warfare community ships and the program remains today. The 360-degree feedback is a voluntary program for all naval officers, except Flag and commanding officers.⁵⁰ Thus, the level of program participation depends highly on commanding officer advocacy and officer experiences. Consequently, evidence does not indicate widespread use at this time.

As a viable self-awareness tool for officers, the program originated in the positive experiences many Flag officers had during their orientation program for their new responsibilities in the Navy Flag Officer

⁴⁹ Montor, *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, xxv.

⁵⁰ Jill Laster, “AF asks airmen to rate their own performance,” *Air Force Times Online*, (18 March 2012), <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/03/air-force-airmen-to-rate-their-own-performance-031812w/> (accessed 31 March 2012).

Training Symposium (NFOTS).⁵¹ The 360-degree feedback program is structured similarly to the Army's, with differences in the questions asked, the competencies compared, and the resources provided. The program is divided into two parts, an emotional quotient inventory and a multi-source assessment. The emotional quotient inventory, designed to measure an individual's emotional and social competency as it relates to decision-making. The inventory is compared against a database of national standards to determine the level of competence. The 360-degree assessment uses 68 questions to evaluate the individual against the Navy's 25 competencies. After collecting feedback from subordinates, peers, and supervisors, the program produces a report for self-reflection. The program also provides an analysis guide to aid in deciphering the results from the report and to aid in the creation of an individual development plan. Depending on the results, the assessment provides links to various e-learning courses, lectures, and classroom-based instruction to aid in individual improvement. Unlike the Army, there is no correlation to the Navy reading lists for self-development.

The Chief of Naval Operations suggested reading list consists of 60 titles categorized by experience and subject matter. There are roughly 10 books in each of the six subject categories: critical thinking, joint and combined warfare, leadership, management and strategic planning, naval and military heritage, and regional and cultural awareness. The Navy takes the reading list concept one step further by providing an experienced based filter as well. The idea is to focus a sailor's

⁵¹ James M. Williams, "The Surface Warfare Community's 360-degree Feedback Pilot Program: A Preliminary Analysis and Evaluation Plan," (thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, June 2005), 27.

development on their experience level to ensure the material is commensurate with the knowledge required for their job. This enables the reading program to focus on the entire spectrum of Bloom's categorization. The reading for young sailors focuses on developing the appropriate knowledge and comprehension with entertaining books. Meanwhile the most senior sailors are provided thought provoking material to promote development of the cognitive skills. Although the list is tailored for a specific rank, this does not preclude individuals from reading the other books.

The tools provided above are useful tools for a naval officer's development. The 360-degree feedback program provides a decent opportunity for officers to understand the relationship between self-image and perceptions. It increases an officer's self-awareness through an anonymous system designed to capture the general sentiments of a group. If used appropriately, the officer can improve himself to help decrease the differences between self-image and perception. It is unfortunate the 360-degree feedback does not use the CNO reading list as a resource, because the CNO reading list could be an extremely useful tool for self-development. The list is a comprehensive list that covers a variety of subjects and interests. Officers who use the reading list as a foundation for building their own list will benefit greatly in their future career.

The Navy's leadership continuum is a relatively new effort that incorporates all aspects of the learning continuum into leadership development. The Navy has identified key milestones for leadership development that align nicely with the development of officers through O-4. In application, the Navy is always training and leadership development is no exception. There are no standards for leadership instruction or measurement, which creates a variety of experiences and

lessons throughout the fleet. To supplement any official “training” an officer might receive, coaching plays an extremely important role. Coaching is strong in the Navy and they use it effectively. The unique relationship between officer and Chief makes up for any gaps left in standardized “training.”

History has proven the Navy’s penchant toward experience, so it is no surprise the service places such great importance on its role in developing leaders. Partially due to the limitations of ship borne operations, the Navy thrusts new officers into leadership positions and tends to keep them there throughout their career. Only a few small breaks occur when an officer is responsible only to himself, and those are usually associated with education opportunities or special duty assignments, like a Flag aide. However, the formal and informal mentorship program the Navy has implemented augments the experiences gained at sea. The program itself is a relatively simple concept, but it has taken root in all aspects of the Navy. The development of individual officers relies heavily on this experience-based tool.

Self-development in the Navy is designed to make-up for any leadership growth holes throughout an officer’s career and the Navy has a few tools. The Navy 360-degree program holds tremendous potential as a self-development tool; however, institutional resistance has limited its progress. The CNO reading list is another option, but there is no organizational influence for its use.

The Navy’s leadership continuum is still relatively new in its development. So, the true effectiveness of the initiative will only be revealed in due time. Overall, the Navy is dedicated to the development of their officers. The approach the Navy takes is represented in the material above, but it only paints a portion of the picture required to

understand Navy leadership development. To understand the full picture this study must investigate Navy culture as a whole.

NAVY CULTURE.

Before we can compare the Navy's espoused values with its behavior, we must understand the organizational culture as a whole. This aspect is crucial to draw distinctions of causality between culture and leadership development. As discussed in Chapter 1, Builder's framework, validated by the organizational culture theorists, is practical for analyzing the Navy's Culture. "Tradition," Builder said, "has always been an important part of military life, but the Navy, much more than any of the other services, has cherished and clung to tradition."⁵² However, Builder's assessment of the Navy's culture needs to be validated as current, or updated. This section will investigate the Navy's culture and see if tradition still holds.

The analysis is centered on three categorizations of culture: 1) capability to perform the service's mission, 2) institutional associations, 3) "service legitimacy and relevancy" to national security. After a thorough investigation, the study will fuse the information in this section to develop a Navy "altar" to aid in understanding its influence on leadership development.

If you recall from Chapter 1, service capabilities expose some of the service's highest priorities. They help identify some of the service's fundamental values. These capabilities define the organization, and shape what they deem as indispensable. No matter the calling, this fundamental capability is what the Navy insists it must maintain and, as

⁵² Builder, *Masks of War*, 18.

Kier so eloquently pointed out in chapter 1, breaking this embedded thought can prove extremely difficult.

The Navy has always fought for its “capital” ships. Whether it was the Battleship in the interwar period or the Super Carrier and submarines of today, they are always concerned with a decrease in the number of these special instruments of war. Today, threats to these ships equates to threats to our nation’s ability to project power, secure the global commons, and protect our national security interests abroad. Over the last few years, discussion of reducing the Navy to a fleet of less than 11 Carriers has met significant resistance. In 2010, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta was on the defensive when he said, “I may want to change things, but I’m not crazy. I’m not going to cut a carrier, OK? But people ought to start thinking about how they’re going to use carriers.”⁵³ Alluding to cuts associated with various other naval vessels and infrastructure in the Navy’s arsenal, he had backed off the threat to the Carrier. Despite budget pressures from the Department of Defense, the Navy won the battle and received a commitment from DOD to keep their 11 carriers.⁵⁴ Some of the Navy’s consternation may be valid though. These superstructures cost \$12 billion and 4-5 years to construct.⁵⁵ Irrespective, they remain *the* prized possession of the Navy.

⁵³ Joshua Stewart, “SECNAV: 11 Carriers ‘about Right’,” *Navy Times*, 30 Apr 11. <http://www.navytimes.com/news/2011/04/navy-mabus-11-carriers-about-right-043011w>. (accessed February 21, 2012).

⁵⁴ Christopher Cavas, “U.S. Navy Sidesteps Most Pentagon Cuts,” *Defense News*, 26 Jan 2012. <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120126/DEFREG02/301260013/U-S-Navy-Sidesteps-Most-Pentagon-Cuts>. (accessed February 21, 2012).

⁵⁵ U.S. Library of Congress. U.S. Congressional Research Service, *Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress*, by

As service capabilities provide the institutional perspective, institutional associations are meant to take the member perspective. The associations provide indicators of a member's identity, as it relates to the organization. Along the scale of this institutional belonging, the Navy falls in the middle. As this study shows, where these associations to the organization lay correlates to the strength of their underlying assumptions. Astute observers can extract some institutional associations during casual conversations with the members.

Sailor's distinctions lean toward sub-cultures and rank. The Navy's enlisted rank structure already lends itself to identification of occupational specialty. On introductions, Sailors tend to say things like "I'm a Gunner's Mate Second-Class," or "Plumber's Apprentice," then round it out with "on a Destroyer" or "Sub." These give the inquirer an idea of their occupation as a sub-culture, experience-level and rank, and the type of ship they serve on. The officer's tend to associate themselves with sub-cultures, such as naval aviation, submariners, or surface warfare.

A brief look at the past will explain why these sub-cultural exist in the modern Navy. Historically, surface warfare was *the* only "respectable" form of warfare in any navy. During the interwar period, the reputation of the submarine was one of an "unfair and unsportsmanlike weapon, a weapon of piracy and barbarity."⁵⁶ However, its success in WWII and evolutionary utility in the Nuclear Deterrence

Ronald O'Rourke, Congressional Rep. RS20643, Washington: The Service, February 9, 2012, 14, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20643_20110412.pdf (accessed February 21, 2012).

⁵⁶ Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 227.

Triad has given this sub-culture stature within the Navy. For naval aviators, their rise to parity is attributed to the efforts of Admiral William Moffett and the Morrow Board in 1925.⁵⁷ As a staunch advocate for naval aviation, Admiral Moffett used the proclamations of General William Mitchell to encourage Navy leaders to give aviation a chance. Building upon his successes and the Moffett Boards recommendations that naval aviators would command aviation units, Moffett provided a career path for naval aviators that included command at sea.⁵⁸ These developments established that all three sub-cultures could attain command at sea with potential to rise to the top-most positions in the service.

The rise of these individual sub-cultures has not united the Navy, but instead created stronger ties to the various sub-cultures than to the institution itself. The efforts of the leaders in the other sub-cultures, like Admiral Moffett, paved the way for aviation to attain validity and respect within the service. However, this may be at the expense of a greater institutional identity.

To appreciate how the service's focus on capital ships, and the member's loyalties to their sub-culture, the study will investigate the institutional insecurities next. Institutional insecurities, through the

⁵⁷ Murray and Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, 211.

⁵⁸ Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles, "Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy," Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1994, p. 82; Charles M. Melhorn, *Two-block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974), p. 98; and Geoffrey Till, *Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey* (London: MacDonald and Jane's, 1979), p. 45 as cited in Murray and Millett, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, p. 396.

lens of a service's interests and concerns about legitimacy and relevancy, explain service behavior. Insecurities motivate services to outmaneuver the others for larger portions of the budget, ownership of innovative capabilities, and strategies for national security. For example, if a service were secure in its relevancy, but not its legitimacy the expected behavior would be the institutional defense of its mission or independence.

The Navy's position has remained relatively static since Builder assessed their place on the scale of legitimacy and relevancy. Builder believed the Navy remains confident in their legitimacy as an independent service.⁵⁹ However, their relevancy seems to be in a state of constant flux. During the 1950s, the "Revolt of the Admirals" found the Navy jostling within DOD to gain a piece of the nuclear deterrence mission, culminating in the acquisition of the ballistic missile submarine fleet.⁶⁰ Some might argue that this jockeying for position was to secure a respectable portion of the Defense Budget, while others might contend it was a difference in smart deterrence strategy. Historian, Jeffrey Barlow alludes to a third motivation that was neither. The Navy was concerned about a threat to its conventional capabilities, specifically, its carriers.

⁵⁹ Builder, *Masks of War*, 29.

⁶⁰ In his book, Neil Sheehan provides a useful narrative that outlines the competing deterrence strategies between the Air Force and the Navy. The Navy sought the use of nuclear laden aircraft, launched from aircraft carriers with submarine-launched ballistic missiles to fulfill the deterrence mission. Alternately, the Air Force relied on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and penetrating strategic bombers. Neil Sheehan, *A Fiery Peace in a Cold War: Bernard Schriever and the Ultimate Weapon*, 1st Vintage Books ed. (New York: Vintage, 2010), page.

Among the multiple factors Barlow lists that led to the disagreements between the Air Force and the Navy from 1945 to 1950, relevancy was the issue at hand. After the war, the Navy was convinced of the aircraft carrier's importance to fleet operations. Additionally, President Truman initiated a military drawdown that reduced the funds available for large projects. The Air Force wanted a new bomber, while the Navy wanted a flush-deck carrier. The service both saw each other as threats. The arguments that ensued created perception problems for either side. Like Robert Jervis' spiral model, what one side thought was innocent and reasonable, was perceived by the other as a threat to their relevancy.⁶¹ The Air Force viewed the Navy's rhetoric as a plan to seize control of strategic air warfare. The Navy, Barlow says, was "convinced that the Air Force attempts to circumscribe the strength and capabilities of its force of aircraft carriers was only the first step in the eventual elimination of carrier air power."⁶² Consequently, this launched a Public Relations war between the two services. Eventually, the Navy convinced congress of the aircraft carrier's importance, securing their place in the service to the country once again.

Most recently though, the Base Realignment and Closure Committee (BRAC) has created a decades long reduction in basing overseas that inspires naval officers. This reduction in capability to forward deploy land-based aircraft places increased importance in the Navy's super carriers. In order for the US to continue to project power,

⁶¹ For more information on Jervis' spiral model see: Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62-67.

⁶² Jeffrey G. Barlow, *Revolt of the Admirals: the Fight For Naval Aviation, 1945-1950* (Washington, DC: Government Reprints Press, 2001), 292-293.

the nation needs a Navy. The Navy is also a symbol of a nation's strength. The presence of the US Navy creates stability in an otherwise unstable world, discouraging regional powers from acting unilaterally against their neighbors. The Navy's legitimacy remains firm, while its relevancy fluctuates with the times.

Hopefully, a look at service capabilities, institutional associations, and the Navy's comfort with legitimacy and relevancy has illuminated important aspect of Navy culture. Irrespective of military, commercial, or private groupings, seafaring is steeped in tradition. Most, if not all, of the traditions serve a rational purpose, but they do form the underlying basis on which decisions are made. Born from the British Royal Navy, the US Navy maintains some of the same 200-year-old rituals and traditions today. One example includes the commissioning pennant that marks a ship's activation, becoming one of the active ships of the fleet. "No written procedure for commissioning was laid down in [the] Navy's early days, but the act of commissioning was familiar, derived from established British naval custom."⁶³

The British traditions passed on to the US Navy are more than just ones of heritage; they are ones of supremacy. Despite US and British attempts to reach parity during the interwar periods, the US naval dominance attained after WWII has lasted to today. To the Navy, capital ships *were* and *are* the preeminent symbol of any seafaring nation. They are a measure of its strength, power, and capability. Any fiscally motivated loss of capital ships poses a threat to the global lead the US

⁶³ Naval History Center, "Commissioning Pennant," Naval History and Heritage Command, <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq106-1.htm> (accessed February 23, 2012).

Navy currently enjoys. The prestige of the Navy, and the nation, depend on it. This tradition of supremacy passed down from the Royal Navy underlies their insecurities for relevancy. An inability to prove relevancy would threaten the advantage they share in capital ships and subsequently threatens their supremacy. Not unlike other services, the Navy will fight hard for their capital ships and promote relevancy to keep them safe. The institutional pride the Navy has in its capital ships spills over onto its members. For enlisted, service on one is a measure of success. For officers, command at sea, much less command of a capital ship, is coveted and highly sought after. Despite the sub-cultural affiliations, the ambition for command unites them all.

It is no surprise, that the Navy's altar is tradition. Builder's assessment was spot on, and if tradition is truly one of the Navy's basic underlying assumptions, there is no reason to expect it to change anytime soon. Tradition has served the US Navy well throughout history; it continues to offer comfort and relief during times of stress.

CONCLUSION.

The Navy's long and storied faith in tradition is evident in all aspects of leadership development. This study has provided evidence of leadership development that traces its origins back to the 19th century. It has also provided a glimpse into the Navy's propensity to return to its traditions despite noble efforts to change the organization for its own good. The values of experience, on-the-job training, and developing individual styles are essential to any leadership development programs the Navy implements. Schein proposes that the Navy, nor any organization, will ever "jettison" its culture, as Admiral Zumwalt attempted to do in the 1970s, but change may be accomplished through a slow evolution.

As the study opened the doors to the Navy's Leadership Continuum, the importance of those values became quickly apparent in

the service's belief in experience, coaching, and mentorship. The Navy takes the adage, "experience is the best teacher" to a new level. However, after decades of trying, the Navy has seen the utility in laying a foundation of theory and concepts for leadership development through education. The remaining elements of the leadership continuum expose senior leadership's devotion to developing the future of the Naval leadership. Time is the best method for creating change in the Navy. As tradition drives its resistance to an initiative, either the programs survive or strong evidence of success is required to create change. Thus, as long as senior leadership continues to advocate its use, but not force its application, the Navy will eventually adopt all methods for leadership development. Overall, the Navy is committing the time, effort, and resources necessary to move away from a right person, right place, and right time mentality into a robust leadership continuum capable of extracting the most of an officer's leadership potential.

Chapter 4

Air Force Leadership Development

Today we live in a fast-changing and challenging world. This is an era of rapidly advancing technology. How well we keep pace will depend to a large degree upon our leadership and management effectiveness.

- General Curtis E. Lemay

This chapter will investigate leadership development in the Air Force, using a combination of Schein, Builder, and Bloom's models. The first step, according to Schein, is to understand the organization's espoused values. The study will survey various forms of literature to reveal what the Air Force values. Unlike the Army, the Air Force does not place great importance in reading, understanding, and using doctrine. Although it values doctrine more than the Navy, an analysis of doctrine alone cannot be trusted. Therefore, Schein's second step plays an even greater role in this analysis. In this case, to assess an organization's commitment, a glimpse at the resources devoted to leadership development can be especially revealing. This attempts to answer the questions: do the leaders' actions coincide with their words? Do they provide the necessary means? Like the other chapters, this Chapter will use a combination of the continuum of learning and Bloom's taxonomy to assess the Air Force's level of commitment to leadership development. Then, a comparison between the espoused values and the organization's behavior will permit an assessment of the organization's priorities. However, a brief look at the Air Force's culture has explanatory power for understanding Air Force behavior as it pertains to leadership development. Reflecting on chapter 1, the analysis uses a version of Builder's three lenses to reveal the service's basic underlying assumption. The conclusion culminates in a synthesis of each section

and provides an interpretation of how Air Force culture shapes leadership development within the service.

AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT: WHAT THE SERVICE SAYS.

To convey an image of Air Force leadership doctrine, as it evolved over the last 60 years, the study will use a hybrid of the methods previously used in Chapters 2 and 3. When able, the study will trace the history of leadership doctrine to help develop an understanding of its transformation over time. This historical approach will help illuminate the timeless aspects of Air Force leadership doctrine. However, gaps in leadership doctrine occurred between 1973 and 2004, forcing another approach. The approach used here takes a survey of Air Force literature across time. As the Air Force rescinded its doctrine in 1973, a supervisory training program took its place. In 1983, several command and leadership guides were produced by Air University to bring leadership back to the forefront. Combined with some literature drafted by Air Force officers, this survey will try to uncover the espoused values, as the other chapters have done. Thus, the following is a synthesis of the ideas presented in doctrine, training manuals, guides, and articles. Since the study begins and ends with doctrine, my use of the term “doctrine” in this Chapter refers to all references, although not all of them are official doctrine.

The section will use a chronological method to convey the evolution of leadership doctrine. The history can be divided into three main segments for historical analysis: the conscript era up to 1973, a period of leadership training, and the reintroduction of doctrine in 2004. Some major distinctions occur between the three periods. As we will see, the Air Force led the services in its early leadership doctrine. The Army and Navy did not explicitly discuss many of the same concepts in their doctrine for another several decades. The close ties with civilian industry

and academia kept the Air Force abreast of the latest developments. Evidence that the authors of the manuals maintained their contact with the latest concepts in leadership theory continued into the 60s. It focused on the sociological and psychological elements of leadership, the role of the follower, and the complexity of the environment. During the era of conscription, the Air Force did not provide techniques for leaders to use, but instead took a human psychology approach to help understand the needs of the individual. Around 1963, however, Air Force doctrine shifted its focus from people to “the mission.” This emphasis on the mission being more important than everything else began to detract from the human element. It created a culture that treated people as a commodity. This demonstrated an unfortunate decline in USAF leadership thinking that reached its nadir by 1973 when leadership doctrine disappeared altogether. This absence in the 70s placed the responsibility for leadership development square on the shoulders of personnel, in response the Air Force education system turned to expertise from the field to maintain its leadership contact.

A concern for where the Air Force was headed brought leadership development back into the forefront of senior leader’s minds as the Middle East became a hotbed. Though these three periods describe the evolution of leadership doctrine within the service, some general patterns emerge. The first is the Air Force’s early attempts at leadership doctrine looked at the latest academic studies and the most current leadership theories. Secondly, as a result of this search for the most current theories, the USAF increasingly adopted not a leadership mindset but a management one, which, in turn, created frustration among airmen. However, the Air Force finally learned—albeit slowly and methodical—and it developed a more appropriate leadership development program.

Shortly after gaining its independence, the Air Force published its first leadership doctrine, Air Force Manual (AFM) 35-15. The manual

attempted to understand the complexity of leadership, investigated the role of the follower, and emphasized the only known leadership metric at the time – organizational success. Together, these made for a relatively comprehensive manual.

The authors captured the complexity of leadership immediately in the manual's discussion of leadership as an art when they said, "The very fact that leadership is an art should discourage becoming a mechanical leader. Leadership does not provide formulas, rules, or methods which will fit every situation. Leadership is an intangible quality which cannot be seen, felt, or measured except through its results with mathematical accuracy. If you have skill as a leader, however; you can predict results within the limits of your objectives."¹ Discouraging a checklist mentality to leadership, the authors described how context matters. It placed the importance on individual preparation and called for a constant quest for leadership knowledge and experience. To help airmen relate, the authors used flying analogies to emphasize a need for continuous learning such as, "when I return from a flight without having learned something about flying, it will be time for me to quit."² It also encouraged the use of various avenues for self-improvement like academia, industry, and the sister services.

Ahead of the Army and Navy at the time, the Air Force drew on the advancements in academia, the other services, and industry to incorporate the most relevant lessons in leadership. Garnering lessons from World War II, the service was quick to recognize the role of human

¹ Department of the Air Force, *AFM 35-15: Air Force Leadership*, (Washington, DC: December 1948), 1.

² Air Force, *AFM 35-15* (1948), 1.

psychology in effective leadership and made it the manual's greatest strength. The subjects ranged from general psychology and human behaviorism to social and military psychology.³ The dedication to the sociological and psychological dimension is evident in the effort placed on understanding the individual. Of the 81-page manual, over half is devoted to individual recognition, responsibility, confidence, discipline, and morale.⁴ This also includes a 21-page annex dedicated to "psychology and leadership" alone.⁵ Touching on what would later become transformational leadership theory, the authors state, "human desire to be a part of a greater entity exists to some extent in all of us....It is the force that causes all of us to seek identification with groups....It is the power that permits some men to die willingly."⁶ The Air Force quickly gravitated to this drive for "self-realization." It continued to discuss the power of the "cause" to a soldier's willingness to fight and die despite the physical and mental environment. To build on the foundation laid by psychology, the manual also used publications and research from the Army, Navy, and civilian industry to provide practical examples, strengthen its message, and validate its principles.

Although the Air Force emphasized people, the mission was just as important. Mission provided the only feasible way to measure leadership success. Thus, a two-page section devoted to the mission discussed the measurable aspect of leadership – organizational success. To emphasize the importance of accomplishing the mission, the authors stated, "no

³ Air Force, *AFM 35-15* (1948), 53-54.

⁴ Air Force, *AFM 35-15* (1948), iii-iv.

⁵ Air Force, *AFM 35-15* (1948), 60-81.

⁶ Air Force, *AFM 35-15* (1948), 21.

matter how well you apply the art of leadership...if your leadership is not directed completely toward the mission's execution, your leadership has failed.”⁷ This permitted a focus on the human element of leadership, while maintaining a focus on the mission.

To supplement *Air Force Leadership*, the Air Force redesignated a pre-existing manual dedicated to flying training and made it available for all airmen due to its growing popularity within the force.⁸ Originally Flying Training Air Force Manual 50-1, *Living for Leadership* became AFM 50-21. This manual did not replace *Air Force Leadership*, but instead complemented it. Published in 1955, the reasons for this manual's popularity are obvious. Despite being 71 pages, the magazine style of presentation is both easy to read and entertaining. While AFM 35-15 was extremely academic in structure and content, AFM 50-21 was heavily illustrated, enjoyable, and concise. The document emphasized western societal values at a time when the communist ideal posed a threat to the nation's way of life. Although *Living for Leadership* focused on how to live, rather than how to lead, this did not preclude the document from addressing some serious leadership elements. The document touches on elements like leadership by example, values and beliefs, moral leadership, duty, honor, and trust as foundations for good leadership.

AFM 35-15 would form the backbone of Air Force leadership guidance and understanding for over 15 years, before both AFM 35-15 and 50-21 were rescinded in 1962. Redesignated AFM 50-3 in 1963, *Air*

⁷ Air Force, *AFM 35-15* (1948), 8.

⁸ Department of the Air Force, *AFM 50-21: Living for Leadership*, (Washington, DC: December 1955), Foreword.

Force Leadership is an identical twin of its 1948 version, with a two-page exception. The changes to the manual on pages 6 and 7 marked the beginning of a gradual change in focus that would follow the Air Force for another 40 years. Though it was only two pages, the change set the tone for the rest of the document. “Command responsibilities,” the authors stated, “demand that the mission be fulfilled by whatever legal means possible.”⁹ The authors would continue to describe authority vested in the commander and that “leadership creates and uses the power within the people.”¹⁰ The 1963 manual showed traces of a gradual rise in mission emphasis and a subsequent managerial mindset. From this point forward, however, the general tone of doctrine would evolve to convey an image of airmen as an object to be used, increasingly forsaking the psychological dimension of leadership. This would give rise to “Air Force managers,” and not leaders.

To explain further, there are many definitions of management, but the Army’s definition of management in 1973 provides some clarity. Management, to the Army, is “the process of planning, organizing, coordinating, directing, and controlling resources such as men, material, time and money to accomplish the organizational mission.”¹¹ This generally accepted definition of management within the military discusses the processes and procedures, which guide managers and not leaders. The traces of a managerial mindset that first appeared in 1963 forsakes human psychology and does not consider motivation, morals, or

⁹ Department of the Air Force, *AFM 50-3: Air Force Leadership*, (Washington, DC: 1963), 6.

¹⁰ Air Force, *AFM 50-3* (1963), 6.

¹¹ Army, *FM 22-100* (1973), 1-2.

trust. The small change in 1963 would eventually give rise to an authoritarian style of “commandership” that directed people rather than motivated them for over 40 years.

Before proceeding to the description of its successor in 1966, another subtlety worthy of mentioning occurred in 1963. The simple redesignation of AFM 35-15 to AFM 50-3 is significant. Under the 35 series, the responsibility for the management of the manual fell to the Air Adjutant, or personnel department. This is also where the dress and appearance, and drill and ceremony manuals resided. As a result, more airmen were familiar with the 35 series of manuals, as they represented the Air Force’s interests from an organizational perspective. The 50 series, was a training series of documents that fell under the responsibility of Air Training Command. Although these manuals were just as important from an organizational perspective, their use was usually limited to instructional environments and took on a training mentality. This move from a 35 series to a 50 series, started leadership doctrine on a course toward a bivariate, or pass and fail, training approach that would last for decades. As discussed in earlier chapters, and inline with the 1948 doctrine, leadership is not black and white; the art is in the shades of gray.

Thus, it is no surprise that in 1966, the new AFM 50-3 took on a training flavor. This nearly 180-page manual kept much of the content from its predecessors, but was amended to address some of the most recent modern leadership developments and was radically reorganized. Some of the most interesting Air Force additions were the chapters on roles and responsibilities, situational leadership, and self-development. In addition to outlining the differences between commander, manager, and leader, the first chapter spelled out the roles and responsibilities of leadership by emphasizing the importance of mission accomplishment even more. “Mission accomplishment is the only reason for the existence

of the military instrument...[the leader's] sense of mission, the goals and the motivation for obtaining them that are yours as an individual become meshed with a higher order of needs and values.”¹² To be expected, accomplishing a military mission is of utmost importance and often requires the sacrifice of life. The 1966 USAF doctrine, however, placed the importance of attaining the “mission” at the expense of human understanding, omitting the human dimension of war. As one continues through the rest of the manual, some cognitive dissonance occurs. The manual places great importance on both the mission and the individual, but alludes to people as a resource to be used. Military members, no doubt, are expected to accept a certain amount of sacrifice to accomplish the mission, but morale of the members is a key element to unit success. Thus, the ability to motivate people through good leadership is still required. The references to people as a resource in 1966 assumed away the human aspect of leadership and marked a philosophical shift away from the leadership of people toward the management of resources.

The chapter devoted to “the situation” discussed topics like technological change, adaptive leadership, and leadership styles.¹³ “Technological change” discussed viewing problems from a systems thinking perspective to handle complex problems.¹⁴ The emphasis placed on understanding the system may derive from the nodal analysis conducted in the Air Corps Tactical School that led to target selection during WWII. Nonetheless, the systems approach implied the

¹² Department of the Air Force, *AFM 50-3: Air Force Leadership*, (Washington, DC: August 1966), 27.

¹³ Air Force, *AFM 50-3* (1966), 73-81.

¹⁴ Air Force, *AFM 50-3* (1966), 73.

importance of critical thought in leadership and decision-making. The section, “adapting leadership to the situation,” discusses the Air Force’s idea of leadership. This concept was an organizational effort to encourage investigation into new ideas and experimentation with “new ways of doing things.”¹⁵ It addressed the importance in analyzing the context of the situation and using systems thinking to understand it holistically before applying the appropriate leadership style.

The chapter on “Styles of Leadership” alluded to the theories of behavioral psychologists Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, and Ralph White.¹⁶ Here the manual reviewed the *authoritarian* and *democratic* leadership styles in a variety of situations. The authors emphasized a leader’s need to understand the importance of the formal and informal structures of the organization. The formal structure describes the legal chain of command outlined by the organizational charts. The informal structure identifies the individuals with the greatest influence over the organization regardless of official position. Understanding both of these structures will aid the leader in “analyzing what’s going on in his unit.”¹⁷ This not only points to the predominant thoughts within the Air Force in regard to leadership, but also highlights the fact the authors were referencing leadership concepts as they developed the manual.

Another representation of current thought in human psychology was the chapter on self-development. This chapter used Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs to emphasize the importance of continuous

¹⁵ Air Force, *AFM 50-3* (1966), 75.

¹⁶ Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, Ralph White, “Patterns of aggressive behavior in experimentally created social climates,” *Journal of Social Psychology* 10 (May 1939), 271-300.

¹⁷ Air Force, *AFM 50-3* (1966), 76.

improvement. First, the chapter called for a leader to be self-aware in an effort to pre-empt the potential development of caustic leadership attributes. Then, it suggested leaders needed to be able to identify within themselves and in others their internal motivations through Maslow's lenses. For example, during the discussion on belonging, the authors wrote, "the authoritarian...is nonetheless dangerous and damaging. This is a man that destroys everything below him. Be prepared to recognize this type, but above all, get command of yourself immediately" should you show signs within yourself.¹⁸ This type of description continues for another several pages through each level of Maslow's hierarchy. The chapter also provided a method for correcting any observed deficiencies in leadership through a self-development program. The authors of the manual contended, "leadership development is self-development." "Your adequacy as a leader," they continued, "increases only as you dedicate yourself to self-improvement."¹⁹ The program outlines how to set goals, and identify areas for development. For assessment, the manual examined "image congruency." Psychologist Carl Rogers introduced the concept of congruency in the 50s, as it related to self-image. According to Rogers' concept, the more an individual's ideal-self and self-image align, the more confident and secure the individual becomes.²⁰ By 1966, academia had adapted Rogers' concept to incorporate feedback from others and incorporated group dynamics.

¹⁸ Air Force, *AFM 50-3* (1966), 117.

¹⁹ Air Force, *AFM 50-3* (1966), 121.

²⁰ McLeod, S. A. (2007). Simply Psychology; Carl Rogers. Retrieved from <http://www.simplypsychology.org/carl-rogers.html>.

As the Vietnam conflict wound down and the transition to an all-volunteer force approached, the Air Force rescinded AFM 50-3 in 1973. The comprehensive leadership manual based on some of the most recent research in sociology, psychology, and leadership was abandoned with nothing to take its place. This would hold true for nearly 12 years, before something arose that resembled leadership doctrine in 1985. In the meantime, Air University continued to provide limited leadership guidance through supervisor training, student leadership projects at Air Command and Staff College, and collections of leadership articles compiled by the Air Force Leadership and Management Planning Advisory Group (LMPAG).

After rescinding 50-3 in 1973, the Air Force's only remaining leadership guidance was provided through the "Management Training Program for Air Force Supervisors," taught at base level. Air Force Regulation (AFR) 50-37 outlined who was eligible to attend, how the course was structured, as well as the course curriculum. The purpose of the course was to ensure the effective management of Air Force resources through the development of skilled and competent supervisors.²¹ The program targeted first-level supervisors, like company grade officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians. The course was conducted in two parts. The first 50-hour block of instruction was voluntary for supervisors of all military personnel. The block "inform[ed] the supervisor of his responsibilities as a manager...and provide[d] him with an opportunity to apply information from the fields of management

²¹ Headquarter, Department of the Air Force, AFR 50-37: "Management Training Program for Air Force Supervisors," (Washington, DC: July 1970), 1.

and behavioral science.”²² The second, *mandatory*, 30-hour block covered command and base administration.²³ The meat of the instruction materials included the 50-2 series of Air Force Pamphlets (AFP). This management-heavy collection of 25 pamphlets guided airmen through the dos and don’ts of Air Force management. Each pamphlet was an individual lesson plan for instruction at base level; titles included *How to Solve Problems*, *How to Analyze the Distribution of Work*, and culminated with *How to Increase Job Performance through Good Leadership*.²⁴ The last pamphlet walked the class through a variety of leadership styles and scenarios for discussion. This heavy emphasis on management training excluded leadership guidance. The program shifted its target audience to civilian supervisors in the 80s, but the content remained largely untouched into the early 90s before the program was scrapped.

Although the Air Force had rescinded 50-3 in 1973, the number and topics of leadership papers drafted at either Air University during the 70s tell of a potential institutional concern over leadership development. Of the 11 manuscripts available for research at the Fairchild Research Information Center in the decade from 1970 to 1980, over half overtly view Air Force leadership as a “problem,” “crisis,” “missing factors,” and requiring a “critical analysis” or “new model.”²⁵ One thesis in 1978

²² Air Force, AFR 50-37: “Management Training Program for Air Force Supervisors,” 2.

²³ Air Force, AFR 50-37: “Management Training Program for Air Force Supervisors,” 2.

²⁴ Headquarter, Department of the Air Force, Air Force Pamphlets 50-2-1 thru 50-2-25 (Washington, DC: 1955).

²⁵ This is derived from the author’s synthesis of a brief survey of 37 Air War College and Air Command and Staff College theses found in a search of the

provides a “handbook” for junior leaders.²⁶ The rest call for change using a more moderated approach instead. This study chose three theses to illustrate the ongoing frustrations with leadership development. In one paper, Lt Col Doyle Larson captured the general sociological problems the military faced in 1970. He attributed the decline of professionalism, dedication, and commitment to a lack of proper training at the middle-management levels. In his paper, he discussed drug abuse, racial tensions, and dwindling military resources. Of particular note, he referred to Air Force leadership as “Air Force management” in his recommendations.²⁷ The use of the term “management” emphasized the gradual drift away from a philosophy on leadership and human interaction. In another paper, Lt Col Stanley Schneider investigated “quality leadership.”²⁸ In the analysis, Schneider indicated a gradual shift away from personnel when he said, “the rated officer corps within the Air Force began to suffer from an attitude that the system disregards the individual.”²⁹ Although he concluded there was no crisis in military leadership, he continued to express his discontent with current management principles in an annex. With people viewed as a resource, he said, “my thoughts at present are that the Air Force treats its

Fairchild Research Information Center documents section from 1970 to 1990. This does not incorporate theses from other schools, Air Force Institute of Technology, or professional articles written outside of the academic environment at Maxwell Air Force Base.

²⁶ Frank J. Huston, “Leadership Handbook for young Air Force people” (research paper, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, Air University, April 1978).

²⁷ Doyle E. Larson, “Impending Crisis in Air Force Leadership” (research paper, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, Air University, May 1971), 1-24.

²⁸ Stanley P. Schneider, “A Critical Analysis of Air Force Leadership” (research paper, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, Air University, Feb 1973), 8.

²⁹ Schneider, “A Critical Analysis of Air Force Leadership,” 15.

personnel as though they were numbers solely for filling blocks of requirements.”³⁰ Discussing the establishment of English’s careerism and “zero-defect” culture within the service, Schneider continued, “the leadership whom I came in contact with, except for a very small number (original emphasis) were more interested in their careers”...than doing what was right.³¹

In 1971, Lt Col Mark Diebolt searched for answers to the leadership dilemma that faced the service and highlights the deficiency in leadership development. Diebolt asserted the role of technology and “over-centralization,” had contributed to a leadership deficiency. He claimed that technology had fostered a decreased interest and reliance on sociological and psychological factors. Diebolt continued to describe the art of leadership and the importance of experience in grooming future leaders. His conclusion illuminated the institutional focus on management and need for leadership as it refers to senior leadership as “Air Force managers.” He then proceeded to make two recommendations. The Air Force needed to conduct studies to determine “the effects of psychological and sociological patterns on performance” and “the compatibility of current management trends with the exercise of leadership.”³²

The personal perspectives of these three military professionals provide unique insight into the institution at the time. They illuminate the emergence of certain trends, such as the decreased priority of human

³⁰ Schneider, “A Critical Analysis of Air Force Leadership,” 64.

³¹ Schneider, “A Critical Analysis of Air Force Leadership,” 65.

³² Mark T. Diebolt, “A Study of Air Force Leadership and Morale” (research paper, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, Air University, May 1971), 32.

capital, an increased management focus, and general concern for the future of the institution. Although AFM 50-3 was rescinded in 1973, problems with leadership were pervasive throughout the military. These three examples provided a glimpse into the social, professional, and future troubles leaders would face. At this point, the Air Force was on a slippery slope and something needed to be done. Although the Air Force did not respond with doctrine for another 30 years, several organizations did step up.

Charged with the responsibility for training future leaders, Air University began publishing *AU-2: Guidelines for Command* in 1976. Air Command and Staff College students and faculty developed this leadership handbook as a group project. The handbook consisted of one-page or two-page articles addressing contemporary issues from the field for commanders and supervisors as they prepared to command a unit of their own. This project has continued with varying frequency to today. In one brief example, “Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders: The Forgotten Part of Leadership,” a faculty contributor emphasized five steps to help develop subordinates: assess their capabilities, delegate, provide clear expectations, provide feedback, and do not expect immediate perfection.³³ This document provided a useful forum for recent commanders and supervisors to address contemporary leadership issues facing the Air Force. However, this provided little institutional guidance for leadership development.

Similar to *Guidelines for Command*, Air University also published *AU-24 Concepts for Air Force Leadership* in 1983. This document took a

³³ Headquarter, Air University, *AU-2: Guidelines for Command*, Department of the Air Force, (Maxwell AFB, AL: September 1988), 13.

more academic approach than *Guidelines for Command*, as this anthology was a compilation of leadership articles from military, academic, and civilian professionals. Clearly frustrated with the management emphasis the institution had developed, the preface states, “for too long, we have tended to highlight leaders as managers and have downplayed the development of true leaders.”³⁴ To address the management focus, the editors sought to enhance leadership development by providing a series of thought-provoking leadership articles for consumption.³⁵ Administered by the Leadership and Management Development Center, now the Ira C. Eaker Center for Professional Development, the book kept pace with some of the most current developments in leadership thought through the inclusion of academic articles. The articles include contributions from well-known authors such as Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz, and Kenneth Blanchard. The articles from professional military authors like Gen Maxwell Taylor, Lt Gen Ira Eaker, and VAdm James Stockdale added an element of relevance to what was said by their civilian counterparts. The struggle to deemphasize the managerial focus proved to be an uphill battle.

In 1982, Bernard Bass published a book with a new leadership theory – transactional leadership. This leadership philosophy would call into question the dangers of transformational leadership.³⁶ As the new

³⁴ Headquarter, Air University, *AU-24: Concepts for Air Force Leadership*, Department of the Air Force, (Maxwell AFB, AL: 1983), i.

³⁵ Air University, *AU-24*, i.

³⁶ Ralph M. Stogdill & Bernard Bass, *Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: a Survey of Theory and Research.*, Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Free Press, 1981), 611.

theory's reward and punishment-based leadership philosophy gained popularity, the managerial style of leadership was prevalent in business, academia, and in the military. The Leadership and Management Development Center had their work cut out for them, because the most current leadership theory had a managerial flavor that AU-24 was making a conscious effort to divorce itself from.

At over 300 pages, AU-24 was organized thematically. The 1983 version is broken into four dimensions: personal, organizational, interpersonal and perspectives. These dimensions focused the reader on a particular topic of leadership theory and psychology, and interspersed it with practical examples from the military for relevancy. For example, in the dimension that led off with Samuel Huntington's "Officership as a Profession," Colonel Wayne L. Gosnell asserted that the process by which Air Force junior officers are indoctrinated into their job created "occupationalists."³⁷ Just as junior officers are developing their opinions about the institution in their first few years, the institution asked them to focus on becoming experts in their fields.³⁸ Consequently, their understanding of the organization is an occupational one; and one that shapes the rest of their careers. Gosnell closes with a few recommendations, to include a self-development program, and encouraged senior leaders to facilitate a cultural change. Although this is no substitute for leadership doctrine, AU-24 filled a necessary institutional gap for leadership guidance by incorporating highly relevant and current professional articles. AU-24 survives today and has grown to over 500 pages in an electronic form on the Air War College website.

³⁷ Air University, *AU-24*, 1-95 thru 1-100.

³⁸ Air University, *AU-24*, 1-96.

Once again, as frustrations with leadership grew within the service, the Air Force returned to the fundamentals when it published Air Force Pamphlet 35-49 in 1985. AFP 35-49, *Air Force Leadership*, was a 12-page document that clearly delineated the Air Force's focus on the mission and the people. "Leadership is the art," the document states, "of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission. The basic concept the effective leader must keep in mind encompasses two fundamental elements: the mission and the people."³⁹ The pamphlet continued to provide six leadership traits, and ten principles for future leaders. Further analysis of the traits and principles revealed a close tie to the traits and principles of the 1948 manual. The two-page section on mission emphasized the importance of context in understanding and applying leadership. The pamphlet closes with a one-page discussion on leadership preparation. It called for leaders to think about leadership, observe leaders in action, study leadership and the profession of arms, and practice leadership whenever possible. Interestingly, the pamphlet concluded with 14 books for suggested leadership reading.⁴⁰

Although the pamphlet did not provide an institutional direction like the previous manuals, the pamphlet's return to a 35 series designation says something. The shift in focus during the 50 series created a heavy training style of doctrine, until it disappeared altogether. Additionally, under the 50 series, the rise of management philosophies and black and white approaches to leadership development frustrated many airmen. A return to the personnel department may have indicated

³⁹ Department of the Air Force, *AFP 35-49: Air Force Leadership*, (Washington, DC: September 1985), 1.

⁴⁰ Air Force, *AFP 35-49*, 1-12.

an institutional desire to return the focus to its airmen and give leadership the necessary emphasis needed.

For the Air Force, the 1990s was plagued by the latest fad in business practices - Total Quality Management (TQM). Although, the essence of TQM revolved around leadership, very little direction was available. The Air Force relied on AFP 35-49 and *The Quality Approach*, a guide to the implementation of TQM, yielding 21 pages in total. In his quest for leadership doctrine, Lt Col David Bertholf asserts that although the information is viable, "it is too limited and superficial in context."⁴¹ The lack of leadership doctrine had reached a climax within the Air Force, and Bertholf's final sentence is telling of the general sentiment within the service. "One of the fundamental things we are doing wrong is being tentative and compromising on providing leadership doctrine."⁴² Fortunately, he was not the only one who had reached their limits. In 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Michael Ryan, had also reached his as he "ordered a preparation of a new leadership doctrine for the service."⁴³ "A smaller force structure combined with an accelerating pace of change," Ryan said, "requires some proactive thinking about leadership development."⁴⁴ However, working with very little to start

⁴¹ David J. Bertholf, "What is and Where is the United States Air Force Leadership Doctrine?" (research paper, Maxwell Air Force Base: Air War College, Air University, April 1995), 1-42.

⁴² Bertholf, "What is and Where is the United States Air Force Leadership Doctrine?," 1-42.

⁴³ Shannon H. Brown, PhD, "The Sources of Leadership Doctrine in the Air Force," *Air and Space Power Journal* (Winter 2002): 37-46, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/win02/Win02.pdf> (accessed April 26, 2012).

⁴⁴ Department of the Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (Washington, DC: February 2004), 16.

from, the creation of a new doctrine required significant time and effort. General Ryan's efforts eventually led to the document we know today as Air Force Doctrine Document 1-1.

AFDD 1-1, *Leadership and Force Development*, took 5 years of work and several drafts prior to finally publishing in 2004. The first publication was a 36-page document broken into four chapters. Like some of its earliest predecessors, AFDD 1-1 balanced mission and people evenly with references to leadership strewn throughout. Chapter One defined Air Force Leadership as "the art and science of influencing and directing people to accomplish the mission."⁴⁵ It also broke leadership into three components: core values, leadership competencies, and leadership actions. As we have discussed throughout the study, core values provided a foundation for institutional culture. The trick was getting the members to adopt them and AFDD 1-1 was a step in the right direction. Leadership competencies were a combination of occupational expertise that provided credibility as a leader and enduring leadership characteristics that could be developed and refined. The enduring leadership competencies were a set of 16 leadership attributes the Air Force felt needed to be developed. These 16 competencies were further divided into three categories that coincided with the levels of war and the three leadership levels. The personal leadership level represented the tactical level of war and described attributes that were crucial to establishing a strong foundation in a direct, face-to-face method of leadership. Competencies like "inspire trust" and "lead courageously"

⁴⁵ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 1.

represented the personal leadership level.⁴⁶ The operational level of war, associated mostly with “leading people/teams,” recognized the increased experience of its target audience and provided competencies that fostered team building and cohesion, such as “Mentor and Coach for Growth and Success” and “Partner to Maximize Results.”⁴⁷ The final category was “leading the institution” and captured the strategic level through the recognition of their responsibilities to the institution. Like the Army, although each one corresponded to a particular level of war, the authors were careful to emphasize that leaders apply these competencies at all three echelons to varying degrees.⁴⁸

Chapters two and three focused on the force development portion of the manual. Although force development was the focus of these two chapters, leadership development remained the theme. The chapters described a holistic concept to develop future leaders by incorporating education, training, and experience into the methodology. The authors made a conscious effort to describe a process of development that captured the institution’s values and codified them in doctrine. *AFDD 1-1* then suggested the force development process and allocation of resources be based on this doctrine.⁴⁹ Keys to sustaining a force’s capability, the manual states, “are motivational tools such as recognition, compensation, and benefits that require a focused investment of limited resources to achieve specific force shaping

⁴⁶ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 41.

⁴⁷ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 42.

⁴⁸ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 3.

⁴⁹ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 14-25.

outcomes.”⁵⁰ “Education and training,” the manual continued, “represent a large investment of resources and are the primary tools in developing Airmen.”⁵¹ Although these chapters captured the force development process in general, a large emphasis was placed on leadership development. Upon closer inspection, the process has many similarities with Schein’s theory for understanding an organization’s culture. Schein’s process revealed the underlying assumptions by looking at the espoused values codified in doctrine, and compared them with the organization’s actions to understand the essence of the organization. It seemed, after nearly 30 “doctrineless” years, the Air Force was back on the right path.

Chapter four emphasized the education and training aspects of the force development process for leadership. The impression is that this chapter was to provide guidance to the education and training communities for the development of curriculum.⁵² At the time, this was a necessary organizational message to the education and training communities, who had taken the burden for leadership development upon themselves for good reason. The institution was now stepping up to provide a clear, unified vision, however, of where the organization wanted to go with respect to leadership development. The chapter broke education and training up into the three levels of war and provided examples of education and training activities. For example, at the tactical level some of the activities might include “fundamental

⁵⁰ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 24.

⁵¹ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 26.

⁵² Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 29.

education, specialty training, continuation training, and leadership education.”⁵³ This continued for every level of leadership.

AFDD 1-1 recognized the responsibility of the institution and its senior leaders to develop the force. Not just from an occupational perspective, but from a leadership one as well. “Creating future Air Force leaders is the responsibility of the current leaders” and the more effort put into their development, “the better the leaders it will produce.”⁵⁴ The manual concluded with a reference to its managerial history, when it said, “leadership and force development must continue to provide the Air Force with its most valuable resource: its people...”⁵⁵ The reference to its people as a resource no longer carries the negative connotation that it used to in the 70s, 80s, and 90s. This may be an artifact of several generations where they knew nothing else, but tracing the history of doctrine revealed its origins.

The latest revision of *AFDD 1-1* was published, as this study was beginning in November of 2011. The new document was radically reorganized to make the document more “cohesive.”⁵⁶ The document is now in a three chapter format, with its predecessor’s education and training chapter distributed throughout the document. Chapter one received the greatest revision as it jettisoned the mission and people section to provide airmen with an understanding of who they are, the institution’s values, and a sense of purpose. Chapter one does a good job of setting the tone for the document and providing airmen the

⁵³ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 29.

⁵⁴ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 36.

⁵⁵ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), 36.

⁵⁶ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2004), i.

reasons why they should care about leadership and force development. The rest of the document's content is largely unchanged, but highly reorganized.

The document does not place the same emphasis on leadership and its development, however, as its predecessor. Although the document mentions leadership throughout, the emphasis, compared to its predecessor, is reduced. For example, the list of education and training activities, now under the discussion for tactical expertise, no longer explicitly states "leadership education" as it did in the 2004 and 2006 versions. The current document has now combined "fundamental education" and "leadership education" into "basic and primary development education and undergraduate academic degree programs."⁵⁷ The explicit removal of leadership education and its "lumping" into general education does leadership development a disservice. Removing the reference to leadership education from doctrine permits curriculum developers to ignore leadership as a critical component to force development.

Another example of a change in the tone of the document regards leadership competencies. The previous manual was consistent as it described their use to varying degrees; depending on the rank, position of responsibility, and operational environment. However, the new document has verbiage that creates dissonance with respect to the competencies' transcendent character. In the change in nomenclature from "enduring competencies" to "institutional competencies" the author states, as leaders progress "within the Air Force, they serve in more

⁵⁷ Department of the Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (Washington, DC: February 2011),28.

complex and interdependent organizations, have increased personal responsibility and authority, and require *significantly different competencies* than their subordinates (emphasis added).⁵⁸ The emphasis on “significantly different competencies” is reminiscent of the Army’s subtle change in the 1961 FM 22-100 that created consistency problems for over 45 years. The pertinent question the Army would struggle to answer was, were the same leadership skills needed at all levels of command to varying degrees, or were there significant differences between each level? If the verbiage from AFDD 1-1 were drawn on a chart, one would expect to have little to no overlap between the competencies. Instead, the new doctrine borrows the same chart from its predecessor that provides a visual depiction of the institutional competencies in Figure 7. This modified version of the same chart from the original *AFDD 1-1* portrays leadership as having common competencies that vary by degrees and does not support any “significant differences.”

⁵⁸ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2011), 35.




Figure 7: Relationship of Leadership Levels with Institutional Competencies

Source: Air Force, *AFDD 1-1* (2011)

Charts are useful for communicating difficult concepts, but the entire document, from verbiage to illustrations, must be consistent. So, this change begs the question for the Air Force, do leadership competencies vary by degree at different levels of command, or are there qualitative differences? The answer to these questions may not be known for quite some time, but the strategic narrative these subtle changes make can have a lasting impact on the institution.

These are only two of the many subtle examples that create dissonance between the various messages within the document. It is likely the changes reflect a personal bias of the revising authors and do not represent malicious intent to steer the organization in any particular direction. In general, the focus of the document has shifted from leadership development to one of occupational force development. The emphasis on leadership is diminishing while an increase in general force preparedness seems to be occurring. General Ryan's original intent was to create a document that developed leaders and the title "leadership and force development" represented a union of the force development concept with leadership development. The most recent revision isolates the two

concepts, focusing on the occupational force development at the junior levels, and emphasizing leadership development at increasingly senior echelons.

Leading the other services once again, the Air Force identified three avenues to develop leaders: education, training, and experience. It called on education to provide the knowledge, training to impart the skills, and experience to synthesize the two. Although the program is relatively new, compared to the other services, the Air Force now has a doctrine to evolve as the service moves toward 2050. Despite some of these criticisms of *AFDD 1-1*, the document has improved. The document is larger and contains a list of competencies, which is more comprehensive and borrows ideas from its sister services. Chapter one lays a stronger foundation for who airmen are, the purpose for their service to the country, and communicates the institutional values of the Air Force. It also provides a brief, review of leadership doctrine to illuminate its historical roots and provides some context for the importance of leadership doctrine today.

Air Force leadership doctrine has varied greatly over the last 60 years. This study has traced its history to illuminate its transformation over time. The history was divided into three main sections, the conscript era up to 1973 when leadership doctrine disappeared, a period of leadership training, and the eventual rise of leadership doctrine again in 2004. There are three major themes that arise during these periods: the currency and relevance of leadership doctrine in its various forms, the decline in emphasis on the human aspect of leadership and increase in management principles and ideas, and the long-standing frustration with leadership development and its slow rise to a semi-systematic approach.

Before leadership doctrine disappeared within the service, the Air Force led the other services in its early leadership doctrine. The service's focus on the sociological and psychological elements of leadership, the emphasis on role of the follower, and early recognition about the complexity of the leadership environment was ahead of its time. The Army and Navy did not explicitly discuss these concepts in their doctrine for another several decades. The close ties with civilian industry and academia kept the Air Force abreast of the latest developments. The fact that manuals in the 60s maintained their contact with the latest concepts in leadership theory is evident in the incorporation of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, Rogers' image congruence, and transformational leadership theory before Burns expressed it. During doctrine's absence in the 70s, the Air Force called on expertise from the field to maintain its leadership contact. The students at Air Command and Staff College provided practical guidance for future leaders based on real-world scenarios. The 80s saw the involvement of academia through the incorporation of prominent leadership theories, concepts, and thoughts in AU-24. Air University continues to provide the latest in leadership thought through AU-24 today. The 90s saw the meshing of the institution's penchant for management and latest leadership philosophies in Total Quality Management until General Ryan directed the development of something more concrete in 1999.

The 1966 doctrine marked the beginning of an institutional change within the Air Force. The placement of leadership doctrine in the hands of Air Training Command accentuated the rise of a management philosophy across the Air Force. Combined, the change to a 50 series manual and a change in the tone of the 1966 document to a mission focus, the Air Force altered its attitude toward people. The management philosophy was solidified into Air Force culture during the 70s by the *Management Training Program for Air Force Supervisors*, as a "suitable"

replacement for leadership education at the junior levels. Eventually these “leaders” would rise to the upper echelons of the Air Force relying on the strong foundations provided by their early exposure to the “how to” ideas of management. This is demonstrated in the use of “Air Force managers” in references to Air Force senior leadership during the 70s, 80s, and 90s. Although not synonymous, “manager” was used as a synonym for “leadership” until the late 90s. Air University made a conscious effort to clarify the distinction between managers and leaders in the 80s with the introduction of AU-24. However, it would prove futile until senior leadership made a deliberate effort in the late 90s. The call for better leadership development eventually led to an institutional movement for a comprehensive program represented in *AFDD 1-1*.

AIR FORCE CONTINUUM OF LEADERSHIP: WHAT THE SERVICE DOES.

Following Schein’s methodology, this section will assess the organization’s commitment to their own espoused values - leadership development - by looking at the resources devoted to its cause. The continuum of leadership is a concept intended to build a habit of lifelong leadership learning through personal and professional development. Comparing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Air Force continua of learning, the Chairman added self-study in 2005. Ultimately, the categories included: education, training, operational experience, and self-study. The Joint Staff’s definition of training, however, is not conducive to leadership development. As Chapter one discusses, CSJCS 1800.01D focuses on psychomotor skills in its

definition of training.⁵⁹ In this definition of training, there is only one way to perform a job. This is not congruent with the dynamic environment in which leadership is applied. Leadership consists of numerous right answers and many wrong ones; it cannot be measured by a set predetermined solution. Thus, this study replaces “training” with Bloom’s taxonomy of “application” to categorize the continuum. Therefore, the continuum of leadership used consists of: education, application, operational experience, and self-study. For clarification, education can occur in a variety of environments, but for the purpose of this study, education refers only to the institutional process. All other forms of education will fall into application.

Education

The Air Force has only two courses for educational development provided to O-4s and below, Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College. In a fiscally motivated decision by the service’s senior leaders in 2011, the service cancelled the basic course for new lieutenants.⁶⁰ This meant Squadron Officer School (SOS) needed to expand its curriculum to accommodate the course’s cancellation. Under its drastically revised curriculum, SOS is now an 8-week course that focuses on providing a strong leadership foundation for their students. This course hones a Captain’s team building and interpersonal leadership skills after they have achieved some degree of expertise in

⁵⁹ Joint Staff, *CJCSI 1800.01D: Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)*, change 1, (Washington, DC: 15 December 2011), A-2.

⁶⁰ Phil Barube, “Company Grade Officer Pme Undergoes Transformation,” *AF Force News Online*, July 8, 2011.<http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123263346> (accessed April 27, 2012).

their specialty during their first years of service. The resident Air Command and Staff College is a year-long course that introduces Majors to the staff process and prepares them for such assignments at a variety of echelons. To understand the leadership curriculum of each, the analysis will include a look at the methodology of instruction (i.e. readings, presentations, and discussions), hours and distribution, and leadership topics discussed.

The revised SOS curriculum deliberately focuses on the higher levels of Bloom's taxonomy to maximize a Captain's education during the 8-week course. Under the previous curriculum, the course focused on the knowledge level of Blooms taxonomy, while touching on comprehension, and culminating in application. To clarify, it began with rote memorization of leadership concepts, gradually asking students to put the concepts into their own words – comprehension, and culminated in several Leadership Reaction Course (LRC) exercises for application. However, under this new concept, the curriculum begins immediately in the comprehension and application levels with a graduate-level seminar style of instruction.⁶¹ The lessons and student products are designed to reach some of Bloom's synthesis, evaluation, and analysis levels.

The Squadron Officer School's entire curriculum is now devoted to the development of effective leaders. It has expunged "the activities that had become divorced from the College's leadership focus."⁶² The program is intended to make junior officers well versed in military

⁶¹ Staff, Squadron Officer College, "Squadron Officer College," Air University, <http://sos.maxwell.af.mil/> (accessed April 27, 2012).

⁶² Squadron Officer College, "Squadron Officer College," <http://sos.maxwell.af.mil/>.

history, theory, and doctrine, capable of informal and formal leadership at the flight level, and create effective communicators.⁶³ The program consists of 5 areas of study, which include: profession of arms, warfare, leadership, international security, and communication studies. The curriculum focuses on the relatively new Full-Range Leadership Model. This leadership meta-theory is based on Bernard Bass' 1990 assertion that leaders exhibit a combination of transactional and transformational leadership. The meta-theory that evolved contends that leadership in practice touches on nearly every leadership theory developed, hence, the full-range of leadership.⁶⁴ Students discuss and analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the various theories throughout the curriculum.

Inherent in the structure of the course is a service cross-pollination of specialties that provide a breadth of Air Force experience to this seminar style of education. Building on this opportunity, each student is encouraged to participate fully in classroom discussions and provide their real-world experiences for group analysis and individual reflection. Each 1 to 2 hour lesson covers a variety of topics from doctrine and theory to articles from professional journals to the introduction of the leadership concepts. The school has abandoned the lecture-based format of previous generations. Instead, the school expects students to come to class prepared, having read the appropriate material the night before, to maximize classroom discussion. Although

⁶³ Squadron Officer College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, "Squadron Officer School Resident Program," draft, for use in *AU-10: Air University Academic Catalog, Academic Year 2012-2013*, in author's possession.

⁶⁴ The book, in its entirety, walks the reader through various leadership theories to describe the full range leadership model. Bruce J. Avolio, *Full Range Leadership Development*, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc, 2011).

the reading load is relatively light, the selections are targeted at the pertinent information for instruction.⁶⁵ The classroom time focuses on practical experiences and scenarios.

Probably the most fascinating course offered at SOS is currently an elective, going through several trial runs. The second life leadership series is a virtual leadership classroom for SOS in-resident attendees. After providing a brief orientation to the virtual campus, the students can wander around the campus and explore a variety of experiences as if they were there. Currently, the program discusses topics like the full-range leadership model as it developed through the various theories. The course touches on theories like Great Man, Trait, and Situational leadership, before taking the students back in time to experience General MacArthur's West Point speech in 1962. Of course, the speech is segmented to facilitate discussion and analysis of his leadership approach. There is some great potential as an instructional mechanism to extract lessons from history and visualize the events as they unfolded for analysis, evaluation, and synthesis.⁶⁶ If the program garners enough interest, and receives positive feedback, it may be incorporated into the core curriculum at SOS and provided to non-resident attendees.

Of the 196 total hours of instruction at SOS, excluding electives, the leadership block consists of 44. The lessons include analysis of coaching and mentoring, decision-making, and organizational change.

⁶⁵ This is a subjective assessment made by the author after reviewing the lesson plans for the Leadership Studies block, Squadron Officer College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL "Lesson Plans L-5100 thru L-5520," in author's possession.

⁶⁶ Squadron Officer College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, "Second Life Leadership Series Overview" for use in residence Squadron Officer School, in author's possession.

In the lesson for “leading change,” the students receive Kotter’s eight-step process in a six-page summary paper for pre-reading. In class the students analyze potential changes to environment, evaluate what changes need to occur, and discuss how they, as a Captain, can contribute.⁶⁷ For the capstone lesson, the students present a “4-6 minute reflection presentation” on their most significant leadership experience while at SOS.⁶⁸ This is facilitated by the fact the faculty expects students to maintain a leadership journal with a minimum of bi-weekly entries throughout the course. The intent behind the journal is to promote reflection and synthesis of the coursework and experiences while at SOS. The school sets junior officers up for formal and informal leadership opportunities at the squadron level and higher.

The Air Command and Staff Course focuses on developing higher-level cognitive, analytical thinking, and problem-solving skills. If chosen to attend in-residence, the students will experience a course designed to reach some of Bloom’s highest levels of education - analysis, synthesis, and evaluation. Like the other services, the course is setup in a seminar style graduate-level learning environment. The instructors guide the discussions around particular lessons, but much of the responsibility for lower levels of learning is placed more on the student. Expected to accomplish the reading assignments and reflect before class, the student’s participation in class is the dominant learning mechanism.

⁶⁷ Squadron Officer College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, “Leading Change Lesson Plan L-5410” for use in Squadron Officer School, in author’s possession.

⁶⁸ Squadron Officer College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, “Leadership Reflection Presentation Lesson Plan, L-5295” for use in residence Squadron Officer School, in author’s possession.

The majority of classroom time is spent relating individual perceptions, experiences, or observations of the concepts introduced.

The leadership curriculum consists of two blocks of instruction. The two 40-hour blocks called Leadership in Warfare and The Practice of Command are divided into the two school semesters. Leadership in Warfare provides a novel approach to leadership education by taking a historical approach. Departing from the foundations of leadership theory that so many leadership courses teach, leadership in warfare identifies patterns throughout history that military leaders faced and presents them to the student for analysis and evaluation. The intent is to provide students historical examples of factors that empower and constrain leaders, and help them recognize them as they appear. For example, as the course shifts to World War II, one lesson investigates the challenges General “Pete” Quesada faced as he struggled to increase the influence of tactical airpower in North Africa.⁶⁹ General Quesada not only faced an institutional problem with tactical airpower, but also had to deal with the other services’ perceptions on the proper use of airpower in North Africa. This use of history also aligns well with the other curriculum to maximize their synergies.

The Practice of Command course is another 40-hour block of instruction that investigates contemporary leadership issues. This course is offered as the very last course of the year and is intended to spur reflective leadership thought. This curriculum for the course is highly dynamic and revolves around “hot button” issues of the day. It

⁶⁹ Department of Strategy and Leadership, Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL, “Leadership and Warfare Course Syllabus,” for use in resident Intermediate Level Education, 5, in author’s possession.

consists of a series of provocative and controversial readings that incite discussion. The discussion is meant to force students to reflect and discover their own leadership biases as they prepare to depart for staff or command.

The greatest difference between the two courses is their distribution. The first course spans nearly an entire semester, while the second is conducted as a two-week block just prior to graduation. In the first course, one to two leadership courses every week, interspersed with other blocks of instruction, forces students to remember the information for the duration of the semester. The content of the second course does not build on the previous course and is not tied in any way. It is the only course students receive during those last two weeks.

Both courses lack strong sociological and psychological foundations in leadership and organizational theories. The extent of the leadership theory is limited to a few examples like Schein and Builder, who are more organizational theorists than leadership scholars. Nonetheless, the historical perspective does have utility as an airman prepares to lead a unit. Armed with this novel perspective, airman can recognize some of the symptoms of these historical challenges and begin to address the problem by reflecting on the various solutions provided by the historical leaders.

Application

Education provides the foundation, while application provides the opportunity to gain expertise. Application relies on supervision and constant performance feedback to help build competence and confidence in a leader. Application does more than provide a solid basis in leadership knowledge, but also provides a non-attribution, benign environment where mistakes do not have dire consequences. Application can foster some of the best experiential learning opportunities, as long as the members take those experiences serious. The Air Force has taken a

new approach to develop such a program in their Leadership Development Program (LDP), available to second lieutenants and above.

The Leadership Development Program is a certified professional continuing education program for officers. The program is a self-paced six-month long program designed to enhance leadership development across the service. The program offers four online courses to improve leadership education within the service. The first course is an organizational leadership that focuses on developing the students “change-management acumen” to lead change in today’s dynamic environment. The second is an officer development course that emphasizes the roles and responsibilities of professional Air Force officers and provides students an opportunity to conduct a multilevel self-assessment to identify areas for improvement. The flight commander course is tailored to prepare junior officers for the challenges of leadership at the flight commander level. It explores topics like motivation, mentoring, decision-making, ethics, and communication, to name a few. The final course is the expeditionary leadership course that provides an understanding of regional sensitivities. The course focuses on cultural awareness, intercultural competence, and examines the challenges of leading in a deployed environment.⁷⁰

In addition to the SOS non-resident distance-learning curriculum, the Air Force also offers a leadership specific distance-learning course that qualifies its participants for primary developmental education credit. Entitled “Course 20,” the course is intended to impart the tools required to “execute and excel in the daily leadership and management challenges

⁷⁰ Staff, Squadron Officer College, “Leadership Development Program (LDP)” Air University, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/soc/ldp.html> (accessed April 27, 2012).

that characterize” a Captain’s duties.⁷¹ The course consists of 138 total program hours divided into three leadership sections, ethical leadership, decision-making, and building teams and coalitions.⁷² The curriculum is divided into 13 learning modules that discuss various leadership theories, the importance of effective communication, and problem solving at the knowledge and comprehension levels of Bloom’s taxonomy.

Although many of these courses add value to leadership development, the greatest contributor to leadership development is the coaching young officers receive from their subordinates, peers, and supervisors. Like the Navy, the Air Force relies on the expertise of its enlisted force to help mold these junior officers. The Senior Noncommissioned Officers (SNCO) and Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) of the Air Force are just as interested in unit performance as anyone else. They both offer vast amounts of experience that young officers can use to refine decisions. However, unlike the Navy, there is not a tradition that standardizes the approaches officers’ use. Thus, a variety of personalities on both sides can create an environment in which no learning occurs.

Experiences

As education and application provide a solid foundation for learning, practical learning occurs at the highest levels of Bloom’s taxonomy in experience. Experience provides real world feedback about individual actions that correlate to analysis, evaluation, and synthesis.

⁷¹ Staff, Squadron Officer College, “Distance Learning Program (Course 20),” Air University, http://www.au.af.mil/au/soc/course_20.html, (accessed April 27, 2012).

⁷² Squadron Officer College, “Distance Learning Program (Course 20)”.

Thus, the opportunity to lead provides experience, one of the best teachers in existence.

The formal opportunities afforded Air Force officers to lead vary greatly within the service. Depending on the officer's specialty, Lieutenants may find themselves leading 50 airmen on their first day, while others may only lead themselves. The non-rated, or non-flying, specialties typically find themselves leading a few individuals, military or civilian, within the first few years. For the rated personnel, or flyers, their first opportunity to lead usually does not exist until they land themselves a job as a senior Captain. The differences are wide, when one compares the specialties. For example, it is not unheard of for a maintenance officer to lead over 50 airmen in their first job. The numbers would then rise to a hundred as a junior Captain, and then several hundred as a senior Captain or Major. By the time maintenance officers arrive in at Intermediate Level Education (ILE), they are well versed in the interpersonal skills of leadership. The same holds true for security force officers, civil engineers, and to lesser degree personnelists, finance officers, or comptrollers.

On the other end of the spectrum are fighter pilots. Fighter squadrons do not consist of large numbers of airmen. They consist of roughly 30 or 40 individuals, which include the commander, director of operations, and assistant directors of operations. An officer may be given oversight on a few of his peers as a flight commander, or in a shop of a few officers for administrative squadron duties. Nonetheless, with only a few officers assigned to the unit, the majority of these officers usually arrive at ILE knowing only those leadership skills attained in the air. This type of leadership is a very directive and authoritarian style of leadership that does not have to consider individual motivation, because the desire to survive alone provides enough. The directive nature of ensuring your wingman is in the right position to prosecute the target, or

providing mutual support against hostiles is not the style of leadership most humans are accustomed to, or respond well to. Thus, many consider the “fighter type” mentality an abrasive, directive leadership style that does not work well outside the rated community. It is not generally concerned with the sociological, or psychological aspects of human behavior, like stress, motivation, influence, or human needs.

Although peer leadership can sometimes prove far more difficult than leading enlisted, most junior officers in a flying squadron do not cut their teeth on leadership until they are a senior Captain. Meanwhile their classmates have led their initial 30 and are moving to increased responsibility and genuine authority bestowed by command. This increases the importance of other Air Force programs, like mentorship.

The Air Force mentorship program is an official program directed by Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 36-34. The directive states mentorship is a “fundamental responsibility of all Air Force supervisors.”⁷³ With or without experience, mentorship is vital to the proper development of Air Force leaders. The Air Force calls mentorship a relationship designed to “prepare people for the increased responsibilities they will assume as they progress in their careers.”⁷⁴ Although the program can assign mentors, the intent is for the relationship to develop on its own. Air Force officers are encouraged to

⁷³ F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force, “Air Force Policy Directive 36-34, Air Force Mentoring Program,” (Washington, DC: July 2000), 1 <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFPD36-34.pdf> (accessed April 27, 2012).

⁷⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, “Air Force Instruction 36-3401, Air Force Mentoring,” (Washington, DC: June 2000), 1, <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/afi36-3401.pdf> (accessed April 27, 2012).

seek the advice of various professional officers to help further their personal and professional goals. Once obtained, a mentor will help the protégé develop near-, mid-, and long-term goals.⁷⁵ The mentor can also help the protégé focus on specific milestones needed to accomplish those goals, and provide advice along the way. The mentor is also a useful resource when challenging situations confront a young officer, or distinct career path choices appear. Despite some of the strict verbiage outlined in AFI 36-3401 that places mentorship responsibilities squarely on the shoulders of direct supervisors, mentorship in reality has evolved into a voluntary system reminiscent of the Army's, which "goes beyond the chain of command."⁷⁶

The mentorship program provides airmen the opportunities to learn from other's mistakes without feeling the consequences. Mentorship fills a vital gap in experience, when opportunities to lead are disparate. However, this makes programs developed to expand the basis of experience even more important, programs like self-study where the potential to reach all levels of Bloom's taxonomy exists.

Self-Study

Self-study provides a tremendous opportunity for all of the services. A well-designed self-study program can leverage the entirety of Bloom's taxonomy to encourage personal development in a multitude of fields at a variety of levels. The Air Force currently considers self-study the sole responsibility of the member, and its tools reflect this perspective.

⁷⁵ Air Force, "Air Force Instruction 36-3401, Air Force Mentoring," 2.

⁷⁶ *Field Manual 6-22: Army Leadership: Competent, Confident, and Agile*, (October, 2006), 8-14.

Although the Air Force is testing a self-assessment tool, the real intent of the tool is to facilitate superior-subordinate interaction. Called The Airman Comprehensive Assessment, the program is supposed to “create a conduit for more broad and open communication between airmen and their supervisors.”⁷⁷ This is a departure from the assessment tools provided in the other services. The focus is not on analyzing the individual for personal improvement, but on developing a healthy relationship instead. This leaves airmen with little to no multi-source feedback on their actual performance.

Although the Air Force does not provide a tool to identify areas for personal improvement, it does provide one tool for self-study, the professional reading list. Originally developed by General Ronald Fogelman in 1996, the program was designed to “develop a common frame of reference among Air Force members -- officers, enlisted, and civilians -- to help each of us become better, more effective advocates of air and space power.”⁷⁸ Since, the reading list has changed to incorporate literature on heritage, organizational change, critical thinking, and strategy. The “reading list” consists today of 13 books, 7 movies, and a list of resources to further an individual’s growth. The idea to use other mediums for reaching members is not new, but the Air Force is the only service currently doing so. Recognizing the ability for people to learn through different methods, the Air Force provides Internet

⁷⁷ Jill Laster, “AF Asks Airmen to Rate Their Own Performance,” *Air Force Times*, 18 March 2012, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/03/air-force-airmen-to-rate-their-own-performance-031812w/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

⁷⁸ Headquarter Air Force, “CSAF Professional Reading Program,” *Official website of the United States Air Force*, <http://www.af.mil/information/csafreading/index.asp> (accessed April 27, 2012).

resources and movies to help develop a common understanding of the service. Nonetheless, the full potential of self-study is overlooked by the service. Self-study provides an inexpensive opportunity to reach the highest levels of Bloom's taxonomy and shape future airmen.

The Air Force's continuum of learning is a relatively new and comprehensive effort to incorporate education, training, and experience into officer development. The Squadron Officer College is at the leading edge of the effort since it has developed several novel concepts focused on leadership. The Air Command and Staff College has developed an innovative method for educating its students on the challenges of leadership.

In application, the Squadron Officer College steps forward again, with some novel tools to provide junior officers leadership development opportunities. The Air Force's current coaching program to help young officers learn the basics of leadership on the job, however, does not measure up to the Navy's.

The leadership experiences of Air Force officers vary from occupation to occupation. These differences have made other developmental programs even more important. Thus, the Air Force mentorship program has met the needs of numerous officers throughout their career. Institutionally, this program plays a vital role in leadership development. It has allowed relationships to form and trust to build between officers of differing backgrounds and experiences.

Self-development in the Air Force is probably one of the weakest among the services. It is not recognized as an institutional part of the

continuum of learning. AFDD 1-1 states, “Force development is a function of both individual and Air Force institutional responsibility.”⁷⁹ “All Airmen have a responsibility,” the manual continues, “to take advantage of and enhance their education and training, while the institution is responsible for providing the opportunity for each Airman to do so.”⁸⁰ Clearly placing the onus on the individual for development, it would be in the best interest of the institution to provide more robust tools to guide the development of its future leaders.

The purpose of this section was to measure the Air Force’s commitment to leadership development. Although the institution’s commitment is not as strong as the other services, it is moving in the right direction. The continuum is still relatively new in its development and its effectiveness has yet to be revealed. Only time can tell, however, and improvement can be made. Generally, the Air Force is dedicated to the development of their future leaders, but can incorporate some new ideas to make it better. However, to understand the Air Force completely, we embark on one last phase of the journey. We must investigate Air Force culture as a whole.

AIR FORCE CULTURE.

The last step in this chapter is to examine Air Force culture. Once again, we will use Builder’s structure as a practical tool for analyzing Air Force culture. Like Chapters 2 and 3, we must understand the organizational culture as a whole, before we can compare the espoused values—in the Air Force’s history of doctrine—with the behavior—as

⁷⁹ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2011), 38.

⁸⁰ Air Force, *AFDD 1-1: Leadership and Force Development*, (2011), 38.

observed in the continuum of learning. In *The Masks of War*, Builder wrote “the airplane has, from its inception, been an expression of the miracles of technology...then it is to be expected that the fountain of technology will be worshiped by fliers and the Air Force.”⁸¹ Builder’s assessment of Air Force culture was made nearly 30 years ago prior to some significant world events. Does the Air Force still worship at the altar of “technology,” or has it changed? This section looks to reveal the answer.

Using a modified version of Builder’s approach, the analysis focuses on three categories: 1) service capabilities to perform their mission, 2) institutional associations, and 3) “service legitimacy and relevancy” to national security. After synthesizing the information from the three categories, this section will reveal the Air Force’s “altar” and begin to comprehend its influence on leadership development.

Service capabilities begin to unveil the service’s topmost interests. A look inside can disclose some of the Air Force’s basic values. These capabilities drive to the heart of the organization and what they deem as indispensable. No matter the mission, this fundamental capability is what the Air Force insists it must maintain and, as Kier reminds us in chapter 1, can prove extremely difficult to change.

The Air Force is not much better than the Navy with their passion for advanced aircraft. However, there is a nuanced difference between the Air Force and the Navy. The Air Force is much more comfortable reducing the number of aircraft or squadrons, as long as the capabilities to perform the nation’s mission remain the same. This hinges on

⁸¹ Builder, *Masks of War*, 19.

technological superiority. This is best exemplified in the Air Force's constant pursuit of modifications to the existing fleet of aircraft. To maintain the edge, or increase capabilities, the Air Force will hang targeting pods, jammers, or sensors on aircraft. It continues to internally upgrade avionics, change electronic buses, or add data-links, to provide precision attack or enhance situational awareness. As an example, the Air Force expects to spend \$1.9 billion in upgrades/modification to its newest fighter, the F-22, over the next ten-years.⁸² Alongside its allies, the US Air Force must remain confident in its ability to maintain air superiority with the most capable aircraft in the world.

As service capabilities provide the view from the institution, institutional associations are meant to take a member view. A look at institutional associations is meant to provide an understanding of how a member relates to the organization - their sense of belonging. As we have seen, some institutions instill a stronger sense of belonging in their members. If a continuum of institutional belonging was presented, the Air Force would likely fall near the end. As this study shows, where this sense of belonging lies correlates to the power of their underlying assumptions. Perceptive individuals can begin to understand some of these institutional ties during common, casual conversations.

For anyone who has interacted with airmen, it comes as no surprise that service members are likely to distinguish themselves by the aircraft they work with. You might catch glimpses of license plates that

⁸² U.S. Department of Defense, *Aircraft Investment Plan Fiscal Years (FY) 2011-2040*, annual long-term plan to accompany FY11 budget (Washington, DC, 2010).

say “BUFFDVR” or stickers on cars in parking lots with outlines of the aircraft they maintain. When asked, Airmen will likely tell you their occupation, “I’m a PJ,” or “Missileer ... in the Air Force.” Some might be a tad lengthier, such as “I’m a program manager on the F-35.” Regardless, most individual associations revolve around the occupation they hold, with their institutional Air Force association being an antecedent, not a precedent.

Much like the Navy, an Airmen’s association with their specialty has not united the service, but instead created stronger ties to the numerous sub-cultures at the expense of the institution itself. This has caused several Airmen to analyze the various sub-cultures to understand their effects on the institution itself. Published in 1998, Colonel Mike Worden’s book is one such example, as he investigated the gradual decline of bomber generals in senior leadership positions throughout the Air Force.⁸³ The rise of fighter generals was attributed to the lack of foresight to ensure bomber airmen received adequate education and experience. To illustrate the Air Force’s cultural divide further, Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Col) Laura Lenderman’s investigation into the rise of Air Mobility generals used a similar approach. Published ten years later, her analysis asserted that mobility generals were poised to take the lead of the service.⁸⁴ Her reference to General Norton Schwartz and his selection for the Chief of Staff position validates her assertion. Of note,

⁸³ Mike Worden, *Rise of the Fighter Generals: The Problems of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1982* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Defense Dept., Air University, 1998).

⁸⁴ Laura L. Lenderman, *The Rise of Air Mobility and Its Generals* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Press, 2008), 75-76.

the Air Force sub-cultures are not as cleanly delineated as they are in the Navy. As the Navy has only three distinct sub-cultures that dominate leadership positions, the Air Force does not. Compounded by the increasing complexity of Air Force capabilities in Air, Cyber, and Space domains, one has trouble distinguishing where an Airmen's institutional loyalties lie. Do they lie in their occupation – such as maintenance, or pilot; their command – combat, or mobility forces; or something else? Regardless, it is apparent that most airmen's associations lie somewhere other than “the” Air Force. This lack of unity may have some explanatory power as it forsakes the greater institutional identity.

To understand how these loyalties play out, we must look at the USAF institutional insecurities. Institutional insecurities, through the lens of a service's interests and concerns about legitimacy and relevancy, explain service behavior. Legitimacy refers to a service's legal independence from the others, while relevancy refers to the service's ability to meet a country's national security need. Insecurities either help explain political jockeying for greater portions of the budget pie and/or land-grabs for new missions and capabilities. For example, if a service were secure in its legitimacy, but not its relevancy, the expected behavior might be expressed in an institutional interest to prove its worth in a modern conflict, or hypothesize about future conflicts.

The Air Force's insecurities originate from its controversial beginning. Since the advent of the airplane, theorists quickly found its utility in war. Speculating about its true capabilities, zealots overestimated and oversold airpower. Nonetheless, airpower has proven its relevance for national security. At home, or abroad, airpower provides a crucial component for success. However, the perception is that legitimacy continues to plague the service.

The service and its advocates fought hard to gain independence before and after World War II. However, independence was never fully achieved. The Navy retained their air force and the Army retained aviation for organic support. Thus, the Air Force continues to fight encroachments into what it believes is “its territory.” Whether the territory includes space assets, remotely piloted vehicles, or fixed-wing aircraft, the service has trouble staking its ground. The subsequent quest to delineate Air Force “territory” might help explain its compulsion to be “distinct and different” from the other services. This pursuit for “distinct and different” is represented in the service’s artifacts, such as the most recent change to the field utilities. Despite several services’ uniform development efforts, the Air Force wanted something “distinctive.”⁸⁵ Its motivation likely has little to do with functionality and more to do with public recognition of airmen contributions to national security. Considering that news articles and blogs continue to discuss and sometimes question the legitimacy of the Air Force today, the Air Force may have felt a need to highlight its contributions, despite any legal status.

In 1992, as the politicians investigated methods to reduce redundancy, Senator Sam Nunn, reiterated by Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, said that the US was “the only military in the world with four air forces.”⁸⁶ Amplified by a *New York Times* opinion article published in

⁸⁵ Air Force Personnel Center, “Dress and Appearance Standards: Frequently Asked Questions,” Air Force Personnel Center

Online, <http://www.afpc.af.mil/dress/index.asp> (accessed April 24, 2012).

⁸⁶ Sen. Sam Nunn, Senate Floor, 2 July 1992, quoted in “Do We Need Four Military Forces?” (10 Jan 1993), America’s Defense Monitor show 617 transcript. (accessed 23 May 2012). <http://www.cdi.org/adm/617/>

November of 1992, his statement would spur a controversy questioning of Air Force legitimacy until 1993.⁸⁷ Only after the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, defended the service and justified its existence publically would this controversy end.⁸⁸ Although this happened nearly 20 years ago, the most recent concerns developed over the Air Force's role in the counter-insurgency operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Compelled to respond, *Air Force Magazine* revived Senator Nunn's comments to address the issue of an independent force in 2007.⁸⁹ The issue came to the forefront once again in another opinion article published by the *New York Times* in 2009 by former Marine and Harvard's Kennedy School of Government fellow, Paul Kane. In his article Kane called for Defense Department reform, but enflamed Air Force leaders when his first recommendation was that "the Air Force should be eliminated, and its personnel and equipment integrated into the Army, Navy and Marine Corps."⁹⁰ "The Air Force," he continued "is increasingly a redundancy in structure and spending."⁹¹ He then proceeded to add to the flames when he said, "more than half of airmen and women were overweight and 12 percent were obese."⁹² His article elicited a storm of responses from airmen, to include the Chief of Staff.

⁸⁷ "Who Needs Four Air Forces?" *New York Times* (30 November 1992), <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/30/opinion/who-needs-four-air-forces.html> (accessed May 23, 2012).

⁸⁸ *Air Force Magazine*, Colin Powell's "one Air Force", September 2007, 112. <http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2007/September%202007/0907keeper.pdf> (accessed May 23, 2012).

⁸⁹ *Air Force Magazine*, Colin Powell's "one Air Force", 112.

⁹⁰ Paul Kane, "Up, up and Out," *New York Times*, April 20, 2009.

⁹¹ Kane, "Up, up and Out."

⁹² Kane, "Up, up and Out."

These examples show an unrelenting pattern that would motivate any service to address issues of legitimacy. It could result in an institutional paranoia that might explain the Air Force's historically recent desires to establish executive agency rights over the Space and Cyberspace domains.

In this fast paced, highly technical world, the Air Force is constantly striving to find the next best gadget as a solution. Reflecting the values of the organization, Airmen take pride in their specialty and weapons system. However, Schein cautioned that these loyalties to weapon systems create a strong force inside the Air Force and on capital hill, a force that has the potential to "manage" leaders. As the youngest service with its penchant for the latest technology, the Air Force has established a strong sense of relevance in its members. However, the service's own insecurities regarding legitimacy trickle down to its members in the form of artifacts. This pursuit to distinguish themselves from the other services manifests itself in "distinct and different" uniforms, doctrine, and strategies. The Air Force is clearly a technocracy dominated by technicians and specialists and concerned about its legitimacy.

After 30 years, it is no surprise the Air Force's altar remains unchanged. By virtue of the service's creation, the service relies on technology. Kier would assert that there is no reason to expect it to change anytime soon. This study does not propose changing culture unless it is detrimental to the organization. However, organizations must find ways to incorporate the strengths of a culture to maximize its potential.

CONCLUSION.

The Air Force's fondness for technology is evident throughout its history, whether through the analysis of doctrine, or look at the resources devoted to leadership development. The Air Force's dedication

to leadership development was apparent early on. *Air Force Leadership*, in its early stages was a comprehensive, relevant, and current doctrine. However, as the service entered the 60s, the service's penchant for the latest "technology" drew it toward a managerial style of leadership. Despite the Air Force's lead in psychology and sociology going into the 60s, their efforts to incorporate current and relevant leadership theory steered the service toward a resource-based philosophy. This was complicated in the late 70s and 80s by the rise of Bass' transactional theory that amplified the managerial aspects of the institution. Those effects were further compounded by business developments in the fields of leadership and human resources during the 80s and 90s, as the Air Force adopted Total Quality Management. Finally, the recognition to divorce the Air Force from its managerial heritage drove leaders to develop and implement new leadership doctrine. However, after nearly 10 years, the damage remains. The institution needs more time to observe the effects of the most recent changes to its espoused values, however, the latest subtle changes in AFDD 1-1 could prove detrimental to any progress made thus far if allowed to drift again, like it did in 1966.

As we look at resources, recent trends indicate a true dedication to proper leadership development. The institution is poised well in education and application. The developments at the Squadron Officer College lead the service. The College has also incorporated the latest technology into some of its curriculum in the second life leadership series. Air Command and Staff College takes a different, but useful approach to leadership development. However, no progress has been felt in regards to experience and self-study. The experiences of Air Force officers today have largely gone unchanged in my 10 years of service. The Chief of Staff's reading list still consists of approximately 12 books every year that also reflect its attraction to technology. In fact, the latest list includes a futuristic look at society. An excerpt from an Air Force

review of the book claims, “the most compelling thing about the book is the fact that most of the developments [the author] discusses can be directly extrapolated from existing technologies.”⁹³

The intent here is not to criticize the effects of the culture, but to understand it and become aware of its power. As an institution, remnants of the Air Force’s managerial culture manifest themselves in artifacts today. Ironically, in a military service renowned for quality of life considerations, the Air Force had sacrificed the value placed on its people during the 70s and the people responded accordingly. The effects of these developments are apparent today, as evidence in their institutional associations. There are weak institutional ties, as Airmen relate closer to their machines than the organization. Since institutional loyalty is weak, the Air Force, as an institution, is highly susceptible to characteristics like careerism, the “zero-defect” philosophy, and anti-intellectualism. Individual airmen now look out for themselves, instead of the betterment of the institution. As a result, the organization risks succumbing to Schein’s caution – an organizational culture capable of managing its leaders. The potential of these risks make the recommendations from the synthesis of the service’s approaches in the next chapter more important than ever.

⁹³ Headquarter Air Force, “Overview, The Physics of the Future, How Science Will Shape Human Destiny and Our Daily Lives by the Year 2100,” *Official website of the United States Air Force*, <http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-111212-022.pdf>, (accessed April 27, 2012).

CHAPTER 5

The Service Comparisons

The Officer Corps is the heart and soul of any military organization. It must be the reservoir of character and integrity, the fountainhead of professional competence, and the dynamo of leadership.

- General Matthew B. Ridgeway

General Ridgeway's words underscore the importance of leadership development. The essence of this quote emphasizes the importance of developing officers who are capable of setting the correct tone for the organization. Officers of the highest caliber are key to any military. Their influence extends to every aspect of a military mission. Because the officer corps both influences and is influenced by their military organizational culture, it is important to develop officers who can adeptly capitalize on the best of their organization's values while overcoming the worst. Simply put, it remains essential that military leaders—now and in the future—understand their organization's culture and how it affects their members.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the ways in which culture specifically affects each service of the U.S. armed forces and, more importantly, to understand “why” each service approaches leadership development differently, all in the hopes of finding those critical factors which make the development of the type of elite officers described above. As we have discovered, a culture defined by institutional values and beliefs must be congruent with larger organizational goals. Thus, it is imperative that each service not only devote the necessary resources to developing these leaders properly, but also ensures they receive the proper guidance about where the organization is headed. The services must pledge to the parents of this great nation that they will provide

their children with the best leaders possible and that they will develop these officers to possess the necessary qualities of good leadership.

Part of building the best leadership development program possible requires an understanding of many alternative perspectives. Several benchmarks by the services have been mentioned throughout this study and this chapter seeks to compile them into a series of recommendations. It is a fundamental point of this thesis that an important consideration in implementing these suggestions is culture. As Schein suggested, culture shapes an organization's reaction to change; thus, any officer development program adopted must take into account the organization's values and beliefs in mind. Kotter outlined eight steps for organizational change and reviewing these eight steps might be useful before embarking on any implementation plan. As this study saw with the Army beret scandal, some changes just need to outlast the resistance, while others, like Admiral Zumwalt's attempt in the 70s, required adoption by a guiding coalition. Change is possible, but a careful plan is required.

While this chapter will not provide a road map to create new service cultures, it rather will provide recommendations to create a systematic leadership development approach. However, because the findings of this study demonstrate a causal relationship between culture and leadership development, culture must be taken into account. The study will briefly review culture one last time to explain the meaning behind the altars of each service, illuminate their roles in espoused values, and resource application for leadership development. The study will then proceed to compare the doctrine of each service; the education, application, experience, and self-study; and provide recommendations along the way for a comprehensive and systematic leadership development program. Each service possesses different strengths and weaknesses, and leaders who understand their organizations can use

this knowledge to their advantage. Thus, the recommendations made are general suggestions for a leadership development program that can maximize the leadership potential that currently exists within the Air Force. The recommendations will not dive into the details of exactly how to implement these programs, but instead leave that to the institution.

SERVICE CULTURE.

The norms, values, and beliefs embraced by the people of an organization define culture. They create perceptions that shape the way members view the world around them. Officers must not only understand the dynamics of their organization's culture, they must also keep in mind how their subordinates also are affected and affected by this culture. To be effective leaders, officers must be aware of this complex web of interactions so that he may lead successfully.

The purpose of investigating culture was to accomplish two objectives. First, to validate, or refine Carl Builder's assessment of the services' underlying assumptions. Using Builder's framework for analysis, it provided a useful tool for dissecting service culture and understanding what its underlying assumptions were. The elements used to frame the analysis were: service capabilities, institutional associations, and legitimacy and relevancy. Although the analysis revalidated Builder's assessment and revealed roughly the same "altars" for worship, some clarification is needed to amplify what is meant by these simple one-word monikers. The second and most important reason was to use the up-dated Builder framework to provide a possible explanation behind "why" each service approaches leadership development in their respective way. Partial explanations exist at the conclusion of each chapter, but the intent of this chapter is to gain additional insights through the comparisons of each service's values and resources.

The methodology for understanding service culture required analyzing service capabilities, institutional associations, and legitimacy and relevancy. First, organizational capabilities—Edgar H. Schein reminds us—demonstrate “how leaders allocate resources.” The emphasis the services place on a certain resource reveals how each views their people. In turn, institutional associations reveal how people view their institution. It measures the strength of their institutional loyalties and identifies fractures, as some loyalties lean more toward sub-cultures. Finally, legitimacy (a service’s lawful right to exist as an independent organization apart from the others) and relevancy (a service’s capabilities or missions as they apply to national security) explore each service’s securities as well as their insecurities, and began to reveal an explanation of each service’s behavior. Through utilizing these three lenses, this study searched for the basic foundational worldviews of each service and maintains that a distinct and unique correlation exists between these altars and their leadership approaches. Ultimately, understanding these relationships will enable the services to alter their culture in any particular way to improve leadership development.

The Army’s culture rests upon a strong sense of duty to the nation. The term “duty” expresses much more than a mere “devotion,” it conveys a deep sense of obligation. It is a calling to do *whatever* is necessary to accomplish the task. To maintain this commitment, the Army possesses a tremendous allegiance to its greatest investment, its people. In turn, soldiers have a strong loyalty to their institution. This mutually reinforcing bond permits the institution to adapt and respond to institutional crises, such as social upheaval or war and maintain its “duty” to the nation it serves. It also fosters trust and openness to new methods and ideas that have a proven functional value. However, to capitalize on these strengths, the Army must have adaptable, responsive, and open leaders to lead the charge. One of the primary mechanisms the

Army uses to promote adaptability and responsiveness is through its doctrine. This may explain the importance the Army places on doctrine. Doctrine is the mechanism for change. It communicates the institutional vision and provides the general direction for its members. Secure in both legitimacy and relevancy, the Army therefore is the most phlegmatic of the services. It is comfortable with adjusting its force posture to accommodate the needs of the nation and its leaders. Thus, duty fuels the Army and its member's willingness and enthusiasm to do what is asked.

The Navy's sense of tradition is more evident than the other services. Whether investigating the traditions of the early development of midshipmen in 1845, Admiral Zumwalt's commendable attempt to change the leadership development philosophy within the service, or in the institution's use of experience as the primary leadership educator, tradition is the heart of the Navy. As a part of that tradition, the Navy has always had an affinity for its capital ships. To the Navy, capital ships *were, are, and will always be* the measure of a nation's strength, power, and capability. While a source of pride, capital ships are also the source of insecurities about relevancy. The Navy's inability to prove relevancy threatens the very essence of who they are. As a measure of international prestige, the Navy will fight for their capital ships and advocate relevancy to keep them safe. Institutional loyalty to these ships is inherent in its members as well. Command at sea represents the definitive measure of an officer's ability. Command of a capital ship represents excellence and is an exclusive club available only to the best and brightest of the service. It is coveted and highly sought. Although sub-cultures exist within the service, traditions, like command at sea, unite them all.

Tradition provides the Navy stability, comfort, and international commonality among seafaring nations. Tradition allows the Navy to do

without doctrine. Less reliant on doctrine, the Navy's doctrine is codified orally. Unfortunately, the drawback to this is that changing doctrine, or anything within the service, equates to changing tradition. In the Navy, change is not a fast process and will likely face tremendous resistance. The ability to change tradition takes decades and will not occur unless the members sense an institutional crisis. The leadership crisis which occurred in the late 1950s is one such example. Until the Navy felt a pressing need for change, any efforts otherwise to incorporate leadership development was futile. Thus, Admiral Zumwalt's noble efforts to affect a comprehensive leadership development program were ignored. Instead, the congressional inquiry of the incidents on the *USS Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation* created the urgency required to get the institution on board. As a result, change within the Navy is difficult and untimely; however, it has served the US Navy well throughout history.

The Air Force's attraction to technology has dominated the service's decisions since its inception. The institution's loyalties lie with the best airplanes and increased capabilities and not necessarily with its people. It does not view personnel in the same light as the Army or Navy. Although quality of life in the Air Force is said to be the best in DoD, the treatment of its people is not representative of the same sentiment. Akin to a piece of equipment, Airmen are viewed as merely another resource and prioritized accordingly. To be fair, the other services view their members as resources too; however, they are more interested in the development of the human element. As a result, the Army and Navy place greater importance on developing their people than the Air Force. For the Air Force, the next generation of technology is vital to its legitimacy. More anxious about remaining an independent service, the Air Force looks to the next greatest technology to accentuate its relevancy in any future conflict. Thus, the institution's priorities have a lasting impact on its members, which has caused its people to align more closely

with the gadgets, in place of the institution. Individual associations with certain aircraft, or equipment, define who they are, not the institution.

The term technology only represents a penchant for gaining the best and brightest toys. In actuality, technology, which fuels the USAF culture, represents an affinity for something more. It represents a fascination with the latest theory, concept, idea, gadget, or system. This permits the service to remain flexible to changes in mission, stay relevant and effective against nearly any future threat. Unfortunately, this also creates problems when the institution seeks to provide guidance that unites the service. As a result, doctrine is not well read, understood, or adopted within the service. Unlike the Navy, the Air Force cannot rely on oral traditions, or doctrine, to incite change.

The side-by-side comparison of service culture sheds some light on the differences between the services. The value an institution places on its people is directly correlated to member loyalty. The Army leads the services with the most respect for its people and garners the most loyalty in return. The Navy places second on the scale. With an emphasis on capital ships, its members still maintain a loyalty to various sub-cultures. However, there are fewer institutional fractures in the Navy than there are in the Air Force. The Navy is fractured among three dominant communities: aviation, surface warfare, and submarine. Although many perceive the Air Force's fractures to lie among the bomber, fighter, and heavy communities, it goes much further. Divisions, for instance, exist between F-22, F-16, F-15 (C and E models), and A-10 pilots within the fighter community. This does not address other communities and potential occupationally aligned fractures as well. Consequently, the Air Force places last, with a highly fractured culture that is devoted to the latest weapon systems.

The services' insecurities about relevancy and legitimacy are observable in their behavior. The Army is the most secure in both and

reflects its laissez faire attitude toward force structure changes. The Navy's insecurity about relevancy is evident in everything from its commercial advertisements, congressional hearings, and procurements. This is because a threat to relevancy is a threat to its capital fleet. Thus, the Navy is quick to argue against any threats to legitimacy and find a cause, which makes it relevant once more. The Air Force, since its inception, remains insecure about its independence. Despite the legal authorities in place, the institution continues to possess an institutional fear that affects its culture.

Each culture has its strengths and weaknesses. Leaders who understand their organizations can use its strengths to their advantage, while protecting their weaknesses from attack, internally or externally. The comparison of each service, and the explanation of each altar, will aid in illuminating some of the services' behaviors regarding leadership development in the rest of this chapter.

ESPOUSED VALUES.

Schein asserted that organizational culture is represented in three layers: the shallowest layer lies with the artifacts, the next is the espoused values, and the deepest is basic underlying assumptions. The first two layers may provide some insight into the less visible and deepest layer, but are not always consistent with the values the organization possesses. As a result, Schein called for a comparison with institutional actions to validate the values professed by the organization. Two of Schein's greatest critics, Pedersen and Sorenson, contended that a systematic approach was required to understand culture fully, not Schein's linear approach. The interactions of artifacts, espoused values, and basic underlying assumptions weave a complex web of interactions, not one of linearity. Thus, this study has examined artifacts, investigated espoused values, and revealed the services' basic underlying assumptions. This study not only dissected the individual parts of each

service culture, but also attempted to weave it back together to show the interrelationship between the various elements.

This thesis examined doctrine and professional literature to determine the espoused values of each service. The use of a historical analysis traced the origins of procedures and revealed what leaders paid attention to. These are two of Schein's embedding mechanisms—the visible artifacts that aid in measuring culture—highlighted in chapter one. They help determine the value, or level of commitment, an organization places on certain espoused beliefs. The patterns that arose during the analysis of doctrine disclosed each institution's preference toward leadership development.

In the analysis of Navy "doctrine" this study found three main themes: tradition, experience, and on-the-job application. In addition to tradition's role as a value, it also facilitates the role of doctrine in the Navy. In the Navy, leadership "doctrine" is not the typical doctrine found in the other services. Navy doctrine is an oral one that relies on decades and sometimes centuries of oral history passed down from generation to generation. This oral "doctrine" enables the Navy to continue to meet the needs of the service through proven methods of leadership development.

Tradition is what places experiential learning on such a high pedestal for the Navy. Experience was historically the primary teacher for all things Navy in the service. Although other forms of development have entered the picture, experience continues to play the primary role. Motivated by the issuance of General Order 21, Admiral Zumwalt's efforts to institute a more comprehensive leadership development program launched the Navy on a course for a more robust system. What Admiral Zumwalt began has evolved from his initial efforts into the LMET, NAVLEAD, and now the Continuum of Leadership. Unlike the Air Force, Zumwalt's effort kept the Navy on a positive course toward a broad leadership development program. Although his initial efforts met

resistance, due to the institutional perception that leadership was not a problem, his efforts would be carried forward by his successors.

Threatened by a congressional inquiry on the incidents of the *USS Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation* in 1972, the institutional demeanor changed and unified the need for action among naval officers. Despite Admiral Holloway's direction alleviating Commanding Officer's from the responsibility to conduct a leadership program at sea, the institution had taken command. Instead of relying on institutional direction, tradition insisted that they do. Although formal guidance eased the burden placed on the CO, by way of tradition, the institution maintained the practice through *Command at Sea*. *Command at Sea* called upon COs to fulfill their leadership obligations to their subordinates and conduct the requisite training for the betterment of the institution. Tradition intervened to emphasize experience as the most significant role in the development of naval leaders.

Centuries of tradition also created an on-the-job program in the Navy that survives to this day. Navy Chiefs are some of the most powerful people aboard a ship and are the primary educators for junior officers. Wise officers of all ranks heed a Chief's advice. Thus, it is natural that young officers learn everything they can from their Chiefs. Chiefs understand their role clearly and although they wield significant power and influence, they understand the burden of accountability rests upon the officer. A mutual respect develops between Chiefs and officers. The Chief understands the role of the officer as the decision-maker with the authority, responsibility, and accountability for the performance of the unit. Likewise, officers respect the influence, experience, and expertise of the Chief in their unit. Set by tradition, this culture fosters one of the most effective on-the-job programs out there.

This study's analysis on the Army illuminated three themes throughout the evolution of leadership doctrine: it was responsive; it

traced the rise of a comprehensive leadership development program; and it remained relevant. Doctrine demonstrated that the Army values its responsiveness to institutional and national crises. Through doctrine, the Army motivated organizational change to respond to leadership deficiencies during Korea, racial segregation problems, drugs abuse, the Balkan conflicts, and most recently the potential threat of “hybrid” warfare in its latest revision. The institutional response to each of these demonstrates the Army’s desire to perform their duty and prepare their people for the challenges ahead.

Throughout the course of doctrine development, the Army increased its emphasis on developing leaders at every level of command. The first noticeable post-WWII initiative began in 1953 with the creation of the small-unit manual. During the Korean War, the Army recognized a need to develop leaders in the field. This conscious effort to develop leaders began the quest for bigger, better, and more comprehensive development programs. Doctrine would then incorporate new media to reach the soldiers, and incorporate more leadership theory as the service transitioned to an all-volunteer force. Eventually, a system for feedback, self-development, and mentorship would find their way into doctrine during the subsequent decades. The evolution of the Army’s current leadership development program through doctrine has arguably created the most comprehensive and systematic approach to leadership development among the services.

The most important aspect of the analysis highlights the Army’s desire to maintain current and relevant doctrine throughout its history. Since the beginning, the Army has sought relevant theories like the seeds of situational leadership theory in 1950s, increasing the role of followership during the 60s, transformational leadership during the 80s, and strategic leadership today. The incorporation of current and relevant theory demonstrates the institution’s desire to provide their people the

most effective guidance available. However, the Army's doctrine does not always incorporate the newest and most up-to-date theories. The Army tends to wait until the next release of the manual before incorporation of the most relevant theories become obvious to the student of leadership. This is likely because of its institutionally calm demeanor that it does not get caught up in the excitement of the most recent fad, and prefers to wait for a proven method to emerge.

Nonetheless, the Army demonstrates a penchant to ensure their doctrine is consistent and relevant. The evolution of leadership doctrine illuminated the need for consistency in their doctrine. During the 1980s, the Army learned an important lesson regarding the division of leadership doctrine. The Army possessed four different doctrines that evolved independent from one another. As a result, each one had a slightly different definition of leadership, its role, and the expectations of leaders. Learning their lesson, the Army united them for the first time in 1999 into one comprehensive document. Since, the Army's doctrine has worked to eliminate inconsistent themes that could cause confusion in the force. In an institution reliant on doctrine for change, the Army's values have facilitated the development of a comprehensive, current, consistent, and relevant leadership doctrine.

The analysis of Air Force leadership doctrine tells a story of a troubled past: its desire for the latest theory, the rise of a management emphasis, and the eventual return of leadership development. After independence, the USAF possessed a leadership doctrine that led the other services, in part, by incorporating the latest developments in the fields of psychology and sociology. In many ways, the doctrine of 1948, with its sibling in 1963, resembles the Army's doctrine of today. However, that is where the similarities end. The subsequent literature described the service's penchant for the newest developments in theory that eventually led the service astray. In a quest to increase profit,

industry latched on to the most recent development in management, and the Air Force followed. Motivated by profit, business turned their focus to management principles to gain efficiency. Consequently, the rising interest in innovative management principles diminished Air Force interest in leadership advances. This gradual transition led the service to adopt a management philosophy that would witness leadership's disappearance altogether. In its place, the Air Force provided a managerial focused training program for the next 40 years. As a result, the emphasis on human psychology and sociology would take a backseat to the efficient management of resources.

Despite academic attempts to steer the service in another direction, the pervasive management philosophy dominated the Air Force for quite some time. Air University began publishing AU-2 in 1976, and AU-24 in 1983 as a conscious attempt to resist the management focus and set the course straight. Instead, the service continued to adopt management philosophies like Total Quality Management into the 1990s. The late 1990s and early 2000s eventually saw leadership return with a strong emphasis.

In 1998, the Air Force witnessed the creation of the Air and Space Basic Course, a new course designed to provide new lieutenants a "common and unifying indoctrination experience."¹ This also coincided with General Ryan's call for new leadership doctrine. Published in 2004, AFDD 1-1 established guidance for the development of future leaders

¹ Shannon H. Brown, PhD, "The Sources of Leadership Doctrine in the Air Force," *Air and Space Power Journal* (Winter 2002): 43, <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/win02/Win02.pdf> (accessed April 26, 2012).

within the service. It represented an institutional renewal of leadership development that was needed for over 40 years. Today, the document continues to evolve. This doctrine not only represents the service's dedication to leadership development, but it also was a manifestation of the service's values.

Although the Air Force's leadership doctrine is leadership focused and seems to be headed in the right direction, the service's 40-year focus on management will not be easy to overcome. Thus, from analyzing and evaluating the three services' culture, it is possible to offer several observations concerning "best practices" of leadership development. .

Recommendations:

1. The Army sets the example regarding leadership concepts. *The Air Force should incorporate more leadership theory and concepts into its doctrine to provide a useful set of expectations for its leaders.*
However, the Air Force must temper its penchant to use the newest ideas and adopt the latest theories with caution. A careful examination of the theories must ensure the theory is relevant to the Air Force's mission and is not a passing fad.
2. Using the Army's example, a dedicated leadership manual provides clarity and reduces confusion. *The Air Force should separate its leadership doctrine from force development.* The use of both terms creates confusion among the authors, and readers. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the new document increases the emphasis on force development at the expense of leadership development. In light of the institution's management culture, this could prove disastrous in preparing the service's future leaders.
3. As the Army has proven, it takes time to develop a comprehensive and robust doctrine. Consequently, *the Air Force must continue to focus on improving its leadership doctrine and ensure the doctrine is consistent.* Doctrine must be consistent with the values of the

institution, and consistent within itself. Chapter 4 discusses the confusion caused over the references to varying degrees of competencies and the mention of distinct differences. These two concepts are not congruent, either all leaders need to possess the same competencies to some degree, or they are unique and require entirely new skills.

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES.

The intent behind a continuum of learning is to create a system to create habits for lifelong learning by exploiting the synergy between the various elements of learning, consisting of education, application, experience, and self-study. Although the continuum provided a tool for analysis, this section seeks to illustrate the holistic approach by illustrating the utility of combining the elements. This section, therefore, will demonstrate how these four elements may be used in concert to create a system of learning. Unlike the evolution of culture, which is nonlinear, effective learning is linear. Before being thrust into a leadership environment, for instance, one must possess some foundational knowledge provided by education, have applied this education in a controlled environment, and supplemented the rest with self-study. This cycle may be repeated again for increasingly higher levels of responsibility, but each cycle remains linear.

The use of Bloom's taxonomy not only provided a common lexicon for understanding, but also facilitated the analysis of each element of the continuum to assess their maximum potential. This section will use Bloom's taxonomy to illuminate the value of each element and show how each contributes to a holistic learning experience.

Education

Education provides the conceptual foundation for every other element in the continuum of learning. Education provides the concepts,

theories, and knowledge necessary to be effective in the “real” world. Each service views education through different lenses, and this section is devoted to summarizing the various approaches, highlighting the differences, and thereby finding the most effective type of professional military education for developing the next generation of leaders.

In both the Army and Navy, O-1s are immediately exposed to more leadership education as soon as they enter the service. In line with duty, the Army’s institutional concern to prepare soldiers with the necessary tools to perform their jobs partially explains the approach in the basic course that focuses on developing occupational expertise, while simultaneously teaching them leadership theory. The Navy approach is similar, but reflects its penchant for tradition. If new officers do not attend the curriculum at their career field specific course, they will attend the Division Officer’s course enroute to their first sea tour. This one-week course provides the basics of leadership and expects sailors to hone their skills on-the-job. The Air Force, however, has scrapped the lieutenant’s course to save money and passed those responsibilities to the captain’s course. Unfortunately, the elimination of a Lieutenant course places a tremendous burden on the other elements of a leadership development program and reduces the institutional influence to steer the development of future officers at its earliest opportunity.

All courses taught at the O-3 level use approximately 40 curriculum hours in a seminar type of environment to discuss theory to a similar degree, but they differ in their distribution of those hours. Across the services, they focus on comprehension, application, and dip into analysis, evaluation, and synthesis in their seminar discussions. The general concept is to present theory, then investigate a variety of scenarios, and leverage discussion to exploit various student experiences to analyze, evaluate, and synthesize the information. The Army does this as a part of their 20-week course focused on expanding the student’s

theoretical knowledge, while emphasizing their experiences for further development. In preparation for their duty as a company level commander, or battalion or brigade level staff officer, the Army's course is focused on imparting the skills necessary to be effective. The Navy's one-week Department Head course focuses on the intricacies of leading several divisions. Like the Army, the Navy course also uses the experiences of its students to encourage learning, but begins to take on a managerial feel as they prepare for their staff duties on a ship. Once again, the Navy lays the conceptual foundation in the course and uses operational experience in the fleet to solidify what they have learned. The Air Force's Squadron Officer School is now the first "in resident" education for airmen. The entire eight-week course is devoted to leadership development and education. Although the 44-hours of curriculum entitled leadership is conducted in one block, the sections also address leadership issues throughout the entirety of its curriculum.

With the exception of the specific content and the distribution of the hours within the curriculum, the courses are nearly identical. While the Navy's course is a one-week training style block of instruction, the Air Force and Army leadership curriculum are distributed throughout the overarching course. The latter facilitates time for reflection and synthesis of the information provided. It permits students to ask questions as they proceed through the rest of the course and encounter situations that create cognitive dissonance. The time permitted for reflection and introspection aids students in reaching Bloom's highest levels.

At O-4, leadership taught at every "in resident" Intermediate Level Education focuses on developing the highest cognitive levels of Bloom's taxonomy. Conducted in graduate-level seminar style formats, all three services focus on student led discussions to achieve analysis, evaluation, and synthesis. The faculties expect all students to come to class

prepared to discuss the material, instead of merely receiving instruction. That is where the similarities stop. Each yearlong course has placed a different emphasis on leadership development. Each service looks at content differently, and provides a different mixture of hours and distribution.

A look at the Army's values suggests the service uses leadership as a core course that runs throughout the school year, building and enhancing existing curriculum. The Navy places the leadership block as a sub-course to the larger National Security Affairs curriculum, where the focus is devoted elsewhere. Congruent with tradition, the Navy emphasizes an experiential-based leadership philosophy focused on the fleet. The Air Force falls in the middle. It places leadership on par with the other courses during the first half of the year, and devotes a solid two weeks to investigate the contemporary challenges of leadership during the last. Ironically, the Air Force's curriculum runs counter to its values as an institution. One would expect the Air Force's affinity for the "latest and greatest" to create a curriculum that teaches the most current theories, or presents ideas in the most technologically advanced ways, but it does not. Instead, it takes a different approach, a historical view of leadership.

The content of both the Army and Navy curriculum centers on providing leadership theory aided by case studies for analysis and evaluation. They discuss a variety of concepts from learning organizations, officership, organizational culture, and leadership topics like situational leadership, transformational leadership, and various leadership styles. The Air Force, on the other hand, uses its approach to identify prominent leadership challenges throughout history. Although it does draw on some theory, the amount is minimal in comparison with the other services. The second course offered by the Air Force does not draw on leadership concepts either; the course focuses on provoking the

students into deep intellectual discussions about contemporary problems. The distinction between the Air Force philosophy and its sister services is a desire to provide tools for leadership instead of recognizing leadership challenges. Both approaches provide useful insight for learning leadership, but the Air Force's has the potential to handicap graduates by not providing them the tools that a theoretical approach can. A solution in the middle captures the best of both worlds. A careful balance between history and theory can impart the necessary knowledge to provide graduates both the requisite tools of theory and cognitive ability to recognize the challenges as future leaders.

The hours devoted to leadership differ widely between the services. Navy curriculum is a 25-hour block conducted in 8 weeks molded around its parent National Security Affairs curriculum. The Army conducts 49 hours as its core curriculum, augmenting other courses throughout the entirety of the year. The Air Force has over 80 hours devoted to leadership development, distributed throughout the first half of the year, and conducted in a block the last two weeks of the year. If quantity of leadership education was the appropriate metric for leadership development, then the Air Force would take the prize. However, quantity and quality must both be considered in developing a leadership education program.

In comparison to the other services, the Air Force gets a mixed review. Its decision to eliminate the Lieutenants course surrenders the opportunity to influence the service's future leaders during their most formative years. The revival of leadership at SOS has created a robust program with the potential to become the model for the other services. As the first "in resident" education these officers receive, however, many of their institutional perceptions have already begun to take root. The USAF ILE curriculum takes a refreshingly different approach, but its lack of theory creates an imbalance. From an examination of the Leadership

Development Resources of all three services, 3 additional recommendations are offered to improve the USAF's educational component of leadership development.

Recommendations:

4. *The Army and Navy have identified the need to develop their newest leaders early, and the Air Force should follow suit.* The elimination of the Air and Space Basic Course reduces the Air Force's capacity to provide relevant institutional guidance for its future leaders. Although this poses one of the most expensive recommendations at a fiscally constrained time, it could yield the greatest long-term institutional rewards if implemented developed properly.
5. The Army and Navy use theory to lay the foundation for providing tools to their future leaders. Additionally, both services develop courses that build upon one another as officers progress through their career. The Air Force does neither.
 - a. Although the Air Force provides a novel approach to leadership challenges in ILE, the students lack exposure to theory. Thus, *the Air Force should incorporate more leadership theory into its curriculum to enhance student leadership education at ILE.*
 - b. It is unfair to criticize the Air Force for a lack of a building-block approach when the SOS curriculum is in its first year. However, the Air Force needs to oversee the change and agree on how leadership education should be handled from a systematic view. *The Air Force should be sure to balance the approaches of SOS and ILE to capitalize on the benefits of both theory and history throughout the education system.*
6. The Air Force definitely provides a lot of leadership to its students; however, if the intent of the continuum of learning is to build a habit of lifelong learning, than the Army has it right. The distribution of leadership education plays the greatest role here. The distribution of

hours facilitates reflection on concepts and application in the other curriculum. Periodic classes provide an opportunity to monitor student progress throughout the year and create an expectation that builds a habit of studying leadership, meeting the intent. Overall, this facilitates an appreciation for the subject and encourages students to continue to pursue leadership development on their own. Thus, *the Air Force should look to distribute leadership education throughout the entirety of the year in a format conducive to building the habits of lifelong learning.*

Application

Application uses the knowledge gained through education to analyze the environment and test the concepts in a benign setting that facilitates a new leaders ability to practice and refine their skills without the fear of drastic consequences. Coaching, Officer Professional Development, Officer's mess, and the Leadership Development Program are some of the programs the services use to create this setting. Although each service has their own programs, coaching is common to all of them.

Coaching is an important aspect to leadership development. It provides a young officer the opportunity to learn from those with years of experience. Informal coaching from superiors occurs in a similar manner across all of the services. However, the differences lie in how coaching occurs from the enlisted. Whether Army, Navy, or Air Force, all officers use some form of bottom-up coaching from enlisted personnel to achieve their maximum effectiveness as a leader. With the exception of operational career fields, the Air Force uses coaching in a similar manner to the other services. Young Pilots, navigators, and space professionals, however, lack the same leadership development opportunities that are afforded their peers because of unit composition. Most operational units in the Air Force do not consist of the enlisted personnel necessary to

enhance and coach officers on leadership. Additionally, the enlisted in a unit typically have their own chain of command and many report directly to the commander, making coaching of young officers difficult. The Army, however, strikes a careful balance between coaching from the bottom and the other elements of leadership development. Unit composition in the Army provides nearly every officer the opportunity to lead enlisted and receive the coveted feedback through coaching they require to hone their skills. The Navy, as expected, places a greater emphasis on experience relying more on coaching from their enlisted than any other service. It is a tradition for nearly every officer to have a Chief who can coach and mentor their officer throughout their assignment. Coaching is only one aspect of application and each service has developed a variety of programs to assist young leaders in practicing their new knowledge.

The Army mandates an Officer Professional Development program (OPD) at the unit level. Each commander is responsible for developing his subordinates as they see fit. The institution, however, provides curriculum for the commander's use to ensure the young leaders receive a minimum standard of instruction. Designed to build upon the leadership education received in formal education, this program enhances an officer's learning. The Army mandates a once-a-month session dedicated to discussing officership topics, like leadership. This program provides an opportunity for the commanders to assess the strength's and weaknesses of his subordinates and understand the capabilities of his unit. Some commanders use the meeting to discuss administration, while others develop complex scenarios for discussion to aid in leadership development.

The Navy has a similar program conducted by the Commanding Officer in the officer's mess. Similar to the Army, this program is provides the CO the latitude to determine the program's content.

Outside of tradition, however, which plays a large role, the Navy no longer provides a minimum standard of instruction. Nonetheless, the officer meetings provide young naval officers the opportunity to refine their knowledge and skills based on the CO's priorities.

The Air Force leans on an online course for its leadership development. Recently, the service developed a Leadership Development Program (LDP) certified as professional continuing education. With no previous education to build upon, other than pre-commissioning, this program now represents an airman's first exposure to Air Force leadership development. The program consists of four online courses available to second lieutenants and above to teach officers about organizational change, officer development, flight command, and expeditionary leadership. Although the course is offered to all officers, the course topics focus on O-3 and below. Faculty conduct the program in much the same manner as in an institution, with the students applying their knowledge to various scenarios presented throughout the curriculum. Using technology to its advantage, the Air Force has also created a leadership specific distance-learning course, called Course 20 that focuses on application in a virtual environment. This innovative course uses examples from history to place students in the context of the situation and discusses a variety of leadership lessons along the way. This is akin to a staff-ride an Army student might experience in one of their programs.

The Army and Navy both use a similar approach to officer development through unit level sessions that discuss leadership challenges and scenarios. These sessions build on previous education to provide opportunities for commanders and subordinates alike to learn from one another. On the other hand, the Air Force relies on computer-based education to enhance the knowledge, and comprehension of junior officers while providing opportunities for analysis and evaluation of

historical events. Again, a survey of the three services' approach to the application component of leadership development lead to several recommendations.

Recommendations:

7. *The Air Force should adopt a unit-level officer development program similar to the Army and Navy programs that enhance communication between the commander and his subordinates.* Especially with the elimination of the Air and Space Basic Course, this recommendation provides a relatively inexpensive avenue for inculcating the institutional values most important to the service. A formal officer development program has tremendous potential to shape the future of the Air Force.
8. *The Air Force should expand the existing leadership specific continuing education programs to cover the gaps in institutional education beyond the O-3 level.* A program that remains up-to-date on Air Force changes and positions could ensure officers remained in touch with the service's values and current in the most relevant leadership concepts through a continuing education requirement. Many professions outside of the military have a continuing education requirement to ensure they remain current and relevant.

Experience

Experience may be the best teacher, but it relies on the foundations set by education and application to create effective and autonomous leaders. Each service views the role experience plays in the development of its leaders differently. This section begins with a comparison of mentorship across the services and then turns to the differences between the services regarding the various opportunities to lead. The section also summarizes those opportunities afforded officers in each service and compares them at the end. All recommendations are general suggestions for a systematic development program.

Mentorship plays a large role in experience-based leadership development, and each service views it slightly differently. However, as Dr. Ted Thomas said, the services “may approach the functions [of mentorship] differently, but the desired end results are not that different.”² The Army views mentorship as a voluntary action by both participants that seeks to affect the personal and professional development of the protégé. The Navy takes a more direct approach by assigning mentors, while the Air Force, in practice, is laissez faire and haphazard. Depending on the base, or the Commander, the Air Force might assign mentors or let relationships develop on their own. In all cases, the focus is on developing the less experienced officer to reach his greatest potential. Although each service takes a different approach, this study has found that no program has a markedly significant edge over another. The greatest lesson is that a mentor is a vital resource in developing good leaders. In the middle, the Air Force could afford to take a more proactive and structured stance on mentorship to foster the development of this critical relationship. Mentorship enhances the experiences young officers gain.

For the Army, the service understands the importance of experience and makes every effort to provide its officers opportunities to lead early and often. A new lieutenant, returning from the basic course is expected to lead a platoon equivalent of soldiers and prepare them for combat. Alongside the senior enlisted advisor, young officers gain

² Dr. Ted Thomas and Jim Thomas, “Mentoring, Coaching, and Counseling: Toward A Common Understanding,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College), http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/repository/dcl_Mentoring.pdf (accessed 31 March 2012).

experience beyond their years of service. The emphasis and methods are similar at the company level as soldiers progress. As Majors, the Army requires their officers to have two years of leadership experience as a battalion S3, or XO to be competitive for promotion. This crawl, walk, and run approach provides soldiers numerous opportunities to gain practical experience in leadership before becoming a battalion commander. Nonetheless, this experience is backed by a comprehensive foundation set by education, application, and self-study. Thus, it is no surprise that the Army places great importance on experience, but balances it with the other elements of the continuum.

The Navy is similar to the Army. Ensigns assigned to a ship are expected to lead a division equivalent of sailors and prepare them for operations at sea. Chiefs are their primary confidants for leadership matters and with an abundance of real-world experiences; they shape naval officers to be trustworthy leaders. Combined with the experiences gained in their first and second tour at sea, their learning goes beyond their years of service. After several sea and one shore tour, Lieutenants and Lieutenant Commanders refine their skills as Department Heads of a ship. Like a Company in the Army, the scope of responsibility increases as a Department Head oversees several divisions. Less reliant on their Chief's advice at this point, tradition still provides an enlisted advisor for the junior officers. Following a tour, or two, as a Department Head and a staff tour, the Navy expects many Lieutenant Commanders to assume the responsibilities of second in command of a ship. The Navy's approach is heavily reliant on an officer's experience and albeit to a lesser degree, it is still supported by education, application, and self-study.

The Air Force breaks the mold, by dividing the opportunities afforded its officers by occupational specialty. Security forces, maintenance, communications, and civil engineers are thrust early into

leadership positions of large groups of airmen. Though responsible for a smaller group of individuals, personnel, finance, and services officers find themselves leading airmen almost immediately as well. Like every other service, alongside these Air Force leaders is their enlisted advisor capable of providing useful leadership advice when necessary. However, the operational career fields are markedly different. Pilots, navigators, and space professionals, to name a few, are not exposed to leadership until captain, or even lieutenant colonel; and when they are, they lack the enlisted advisors to impart their knowledge. Unlike a company commander in the Army, a captain flight commander is a commander in title only. The position lacks the official authority of command and creates an interesting dynamic as he leads his peers. Like the captain of a sports team, his leadership relies heavily on credibility, personal relationships, and sometimes manipulation. To many operators, leadership “in the air” defines their concept of leadership. They perceive the leadership exhibited in the air to be the same “leadership” required on the ground. As a result, this promotes a “commandership” philosophy. This philosophy lacks a consideration for the human dimension of leadership. It forsakes the idea behind self-motivation and morale, relying instead upon the authority placed upon them to enforce their demands. Although some may stumble across better leadership concepts, many lack the foundational knowledge and end up using a transactional-based leadership style to achieve results.³ In many cases, the officer is unfamiliar with various leadership concepts and lacks a mentor, coach, or advisor to help. Thus, the challenge of leadership at

³ Transactional leadership is Bernard Bass’ theory developed in the late 1970s that promotes rewards and punishments for compliance.

this level is the trial and error method of learning leadership many use. This would not be significant if, like the Army and Navy, the career fields exposed to leadership early in their careers were the future leaders of the service. In the Air Force, however, the operational career fields dominate the most senior positions in the service, and determine the future of the US Air Force.

The Army and Navy provide future senior leaders of their service the earliest opportunities to lead, the Air Force does not. Combined with education, application, and experience the Army and Navy create effective autonomous leaders with experience beyond their years. The Air Force relies, instead, on natural talent to shine through and provides leadership development as an afterthought. Ironically, it was an Air Force officer, who said, “I think it’s important that leadership opportunities be forced to as low a commissioned level as possible. That’s a good time to start looking at a guy. For heaven’s sake! What can you put in his ER besides the fact that the guy is a great stick, he does well on instruments, is a good gunner, and he talked to the Kiwanis club once a quarter downtown.”⁴ The advice to provide junior officers early experiences by General Hoyt Vandenberg in the late 40s has gone largely unheeded by the Air Force since. The Air Force should provide its future senior leaders every opportunity to learn, practice, and garner experience as early as possible. This single element of a systematic leadership development model plays the greatest role. Experience may be the best teacher, but it should not do it alone. Thus, two

⁴ General Hoyt S Vandenberg quoted in Air Force, *AFDD 1-1* (2011), 28.

recommendations emerge from a cross-service study of experiential learning:

Recommendations:

9. *The Air Force should promote the benefits of mentorship regularly and encourage junior officers to step outside their comfort zones to find a mentor they respect and admire. Additionally, it should encourage senior leaders to find junior officers (and not necessarily subordinates) as protégés.* Doing so will enhance officer development and foster an environment of camaraderie. Many young officers do not possess the courage to seek out a mentor. Instead, they sit idly by hoping and waiting for an officer to ask them. A mandatory program is not necessary, but promotion of the program is.
10. As it pertains to leadership opportunities, the study recommends two possible courses of action for consideration. The first emphasizes garnering experience for the operational career fields, while the second emphasizes breaking a glass ceiling. Leading people is an exciting endeavor. It provides a sense of pride and accomplishment when a leader can do something for their people to make them more effective personally, professionally, or emotionally. It improves morale and typically increases mission effectiveness.
 - a. *If the Air Force continues to select operators for its highest positions, then it should consider providing legitimate opportunities for leadership at younger ranks.* Some examples might include opportunities in career fields that do not require a certification or long-term specialized training, like civil engineering, contracting, or medicine. Instead, it could focus on careers where leadership and management are the primary skills like maintenance, logistics, or services. Some might argue that this would forsake the operational expertise the operators attain, but consider that naval flight officers perform many of the duties I suggested as a function of their job.

Most, if not all, Air Force operators do not fly and go home, but remain behind to fulfill their responsibilities in their daily jobs in the squadron. This is no different. The differences lie in the scope of their responsibility, the leadership experiences attained, and where they went to perform those duties.

b. Alternatively, the service should consider providing non-operators with vast leadership experience the opportunities to gain operational experience and set them up for the highest positions in the Air Force.

This may mean providing maintenance officers the opportunities to lead operations groups. Personnel officers might pursue career-broadening opportunities in an Operational Support Squadron.

There are number of creative ways to allow these proven leaders the opportunity to gain the operational expertise required of a senior leader and the Air Force could benefit from all of them.

Self-study

This study broke self-study, or self-development, into two parts. The first discusses the various self-assessment tools each service has for their members. It recognizes a need to diagnose individual strengths, weaknesses, and identify areas for development. The second are the tools available for improvement. In this part, the study chose to focus on the reading lists in each service. Reading lists were chosen, because a comprehensive and effective list has the potential to reach all levels of Bloom's taxonomy. Reading enables the service to focus its young members on developing a sense of heritage, pride, and values while also reinforcing the conceptual foundations learned in education. As members progress through their careers, the material may become more complicated or specialized to accommodate their level of responsibility. They may focus on the challenges of increased responsibility, problem-solving, or decision-making. Reading a variety of perspectives of the same events can aid in analysis and evaluation, facilitating the creation

of mental agile soldiers, sailors, or airmen. In one service's case, a book club style of development sessions can foster Bloom's synthesis. Self-study, if developed properly, can be one of the most effective and least expensive tools available for any developmental program. This section will begin with a comparison of the self-assessment programs across each service and then look at each service's reading programs. Although time precluded this study from conducting a full analysis of Marine Corps culture and programs, the research did provide a unique reading program worth mentioning. Consequently, the section will summarize the various programs and compare them at the end.

No service performs individual assessment the same. However, the Army and Navy have the most similarities. While the Army's participation is mandatory, the Navy's is not and the use of the program is evident in these two approaches. Nonetheless, both services use an online survey for multi-source feedback. The program is designed to assess image congruency by comparing an individual's self-image, or who he thinks he is, with the image his peers and supervisors possess. After comparing the three assessments, the program presents the subject an analysis that explains the differences. One of the benefits of both programs is the anonymity involved. Both programs survey a number of individuals, eliminating the ability to identify disparaging perceptions. Additionally, the officer's supervisor is not aware of the results of the survey; only that one was conducted. The timing of the assessment is crucial as well. Removed from the performance report cycle provides the subject the opportunity to improve, showing supervisors their self-motivation. In either case, it alleviates any potential fears that translation of the assessment results may find their way onto performance reports.

Although it is still in testing phase, the intent behind the Air Force program is different. The Airman Comprehensive Assessment is

designed to facilitate better counseling, or feedback, sessions between subordinates and their supervisor. The program is supposed to “create a conduit for more broad and open communication between airmen and their supervisors.”⁵ It does not focus on analyzing the individual to provide recommendations for improvement, but instead focuses on developing a healthy subordinate to supervisor relationship. Thus, the Air Force does not currently possess a tool for airman to use as an individual multi-source assessment. This makes self-study more difficult, because individuals only have the feedback from their direct supervisor to create any development plan.

To complement self-assessment, the Army has two institutional reading lists for self-development. The first list, associated with the multi-source assessment, centers on developing key focus areas outlined in the survey. This list is specifically tailored to an individual’s results. The program uses the results from the assessment to recommend a variety of books that foster development in the requisite areas. The second is the Chief of Staff’s list provided to the Army on an annual basis. Both lists are highly useful and do provide some overlap. The intent of the Chief’s program is to foster professional development by introducing soldiers to books that might broaden their thinking, and encourage further inquiry. The Chief’s list is organized thematically along four categories: the Army profession, the force of decisive action,

⁵ Jill Laster, “AF Asks Airmen to Rate Their Own Performance,” *Air Force Times*, 18 March 2012, <http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2012/03/air-force-airmen-to-rate-their-own-performance-031812w/> (accessed May 3, 2012).

broadening leaders, and the strategic environment. It is a thorough list capable of reaching across the spectrum of Bloom's taxonomy.

For self-development, the Navy has only one list. Like the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations reading list is also a comprehensive list capable of reaching all levels of Bloom's taxonomy, but the Navy has gone one step further. The service organized their books thematically, and by responsibility. For example, a Navy lieutenant expecting his first Department Head tour may sort the books to find recommended books on leadership, recommendations for Department Head responsibilities, or both. The Navy does a good job of providing books that are independent of the other levels of responsibility, and builds on previous readings.

The Marine Corps has more of a reading program than a list. The list consists of over 100 books organized by rank. The Marines have consciously made an effort to overlap some books by level. Some requirements for a lieutenant at a platoon overlap with the required reading of his sergeant. The intent is to create commonality between officer and noncommissioned officers.⁶ The Marine Corps is the only service that requires its members to read the commandant's choice and a minimum of one book in their respective category per year. To hold marines accountable, accomplishment of this requirement is noted in their performance evaluations.⁷ However, this is not the only unique

⁶ General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center, "United States Marine Corps Professional Reading List," Marine Corps University, 11 July 2011, <http://www.marines.mil/unit/tecom/mcu/grc/library/Documents/MarineCorpsReadingList2011.pdf>, (accessed March 3, 2012).

⁷ General James F. Amos, "ALMAR 027-11, Revision of the Professional Reading Program List," Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 8 July 2011, <http://www.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/ALMAR027-11.aspx>, (accessed March 3, 2012).

aspect to the Marine Corps' reading program. The Marine Corps also has a book discussion program that is conducted at the units.⁸ The Lejeune Leadership Institute at Marine Corps University maintains a website with guides on how to lead a book discussion. The service also provides a sample set of questions and discussion topics for several books on the list to guide a discussion.⁹ Despite the similarities to the other services' programs, the Marine Corps program is a good example of a well-developed self-study program.

The Air Force reading list is less comprehensive than any of the other services, and incorporates movies and web-based resources. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force reading list consists of 13 books, 7 movies, and several web resources. The use of a variety of media ensures the service reaches its members through their interest. Airmen less inclined to read a book can still understand the institution's history or values through a movie or web-resource. The intent of the list, however, is different than the other services and reflects some of its culture. As stated in Chapter four, the Chief's program does not seek to develop airman, but instead looks "to help each of [airman] become better, more effective advocates of air and space power."¹⁰ The institutional need to

⁸ Maj S. D. Griffin, "Read a Book, Get Ahead," *Leatherneck* magazine, December 2007, 42-44,

<http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/LLeadership/LLI%20Documnets/Read%20a%20book%20Get%20Ahead.pdf>, (accessed 3 March 2012).

⁹ "Professional Programs Branch, Lejeune Leadership Institute," Marine Corps University, <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/LLeadership/default.aspx> (accessed March 3, 2012).

¹⁰ Headquarter Air Force, "CSAF Professional Reading Program," *Official website of the United States Air Force*, <http://www.af.mil/information/csafreading/index.asp> (accessed April 27, 2012).

advocate for air and space power highlights its insecurities regarding legitimacy. A century after the wright brothers flew, the Air Force still questions its own legitimacy and feels a need to advocate for its use.

Self-study is an excellent tool to develop a habit of lifelong learning as officers transition between stations, training, or education. In comparing the two steps of self-study, the Army and Navy provide sufficient resources and guidance to conduct self-development. The Marines set the bar high in their robust reading program. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Air Force provides neither a self-assessment tool, nor a reading list designed for self-development. The proper implementation of any comprehensive of self-study program could yield tremendous institutional benefits and should be used appropriately. To achieve the maximum benefit from a self-study program, the following recommendations are offered:

Recommendations:

11. *The Air Force adopts the Army multi-source assessment system and requires airman to conduct these assessments by regulation.* By following the Army's lead, this could achieve the goals of the current experimental program by enhancing the subordinate/supervisor relationship and provide a useful tool to improve the professional development of airman. Integrated with a thorough reading list, the service could benefit with a more mentally agile force.

¹⁰ Headquarter Air Force, "CSAF Professional Reading Program," *Official website of the United States Air Force*, <http://www.af.mil/information/csafreading/index.asp> (accessed April 27, 2012).

12. *The Air Force should develop a comprehensive reading list organized thematically and by rank to encourage intellectual flexibility at the earliest opportunity.* Although Air Force culture might resist requiring one book a year, it would not overtax airman and could ensure certain institutionally important messages are received. Eventually, the program should expand to incorporate book discussions at the unit level to foster learning at Bloom's highest levels. If an officer professional development program is adopted (recommendation 7), book discussions provide an excellent starting point to discuss important unit themes like leadership.

The continuum of learning is not only a useful analytical tool, but it is also a comprehensive learning system designed to provide a breadth and depth of learning opportunities to students throughout their life. Education provides the foundational knowledge for application. Application, in turn, provides a safe environment to test concepts and ideas before embarking on real-world enterprises. Operational experience refines the students' understanding of the environment through the knowledge derived from education and the practical experiences gained in application. It enables analysis, evaluation, and synthesis of the information to occur real-time. Since leaders are not always in a position of leadership, self-study can achieve each one of these levels independently.

The Air Force continuum of learning has clearly identified three main components, but forsakes self-study. Unfortunately, this creates a lost opportunity to shape airman into the members they desire. At the very least, the Air Force should consider providing airmen the tools they need to succeed by adopting some inexpensive tools for self-development.

CONCLUSION.

This study used culture to track each service's approach for leadership development. Taken from the Army perspective, duty explains the past 60 years of doctrine, the values placed within doctrine, and the dedicated resources for leadership development. Tradition has dominated the Navy's experienced-based emphasis on naval officer development. It explains the institution's emphasis on on-the-job training and enlisted advisors. The Air Force's penchant for the newest ideas, concepts, or gadgets explains the service's departure from leadership in the 70s and the subsequent rise of management as a dominant developmental philosophy. It also explains the technologically focused methods of development in use today at Squadron Officer College. The culture of an organization is both an asset and liability. The strengths culture provides can provide security, comfort, predictability, or relevancy. However, it can also resist change, stifle innovation, or pull the organization in directions with long-term consequence the leaders did not intend. Like Pedersen and Sorenson cautioned, culture is complex.

Understanding this complex construct illuminates distinct service behavior and facilitates a better understanding of the organization to include how it acts and reacts to various events. Not only has this study provided evidence of culture's influence on the elements of leadership development, but it has also offered evidence of the elements' effect on culture. Regardless, leaders must make every effort to understand their organization, and culture is an important component to that understanding.

As the study began, doctrine was distinct and different from the continuum of learning. This facilitated an analysis of doctrine that revealed historical evidence of cultural longevity. However, this study has found doctrine is an important component of the continuum that

many neglect. Doctrine shapes the continuum in a complex web of interconnected nodes. Figure 8 represents the author's interpretation of the continuum of learning for leadership development.




Figure 8: Continuum of Learning, revised

Source: Author's Original Work

In contrast to the diagram provided in the introduction of this study, this diagram represents a continuous cycle that includes doctrine's influence on the various elements. Taken from this perspective, leadership development is a systematic process that requires all of the elements to function properly. Although the continuum begins at the top and runs clockwise - building on each previous step - this study has demonstrated that there are complex interactions that cannot be represented simply in this diagram. In order to adopt a systematic approach to leadership development, a solid grasp of the intricacies of the diagram above is required.

If the Air Force is to take leadership development seriously, then the service must adopt a robust, comprehensive, and holistic leadership development program quickly. The Captains and Lieutenants in the military today will be 4-star general officers in 2030-2050, and it is

imperative that we prepare them for the challenges ahead. With a decline in youth fit for military service, leadership development of the ones we have is more critical. Early exposure to leadership provides our future senior leaders the opportunity to practice and refine their skills before their decisions have strategic implications. Leadership is the nucleus of any organization and we need to take the immediate development of our future senior leaders seriously.



CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

Spurred by the events of 2006 and 2007 that found naval officers at the helm of 3 Combatant Commands previously dominated by ground elements, this study embarked on a journey to reveal certain answers. Why were Naval officers chosen over Air Force officers? Although Captain Roger Barnett asserted that a Navy culture of strategic thinking led to the appointment of these fine officers, this study proposed a different cause. Personal experiences with a caustic leader motivated me to reject Barnett's assertion and investigate a different one - leadership development. This assertion was compounded by personal experiences at Army Command and General Staff College that accentuated the differences between officers of the various services. The time at CGSC also illuminated a personal deficiency in leadership education, which raised even more questions. Was it something the other Air Force officers felt? Was the emphasis on leadership a part of "standard" Army education? Numerous conversations with colleagues from around the services provided the answers: yes. Why was leadership development different between the services, and specifically, why were Air Force leaders different? As the study investigated the answer to each one, a set of new questions arose. What causes these differences? Was it culture? What were the implications of the different approaches? Thus, this study was born. As the questions grew, so did the research.

Nevertheless, the main purpose of this thesis was to unveil the leadership differences between mid-level leaders among the services. The study proposed that the answers, to many of these questions, lie not in the development of officers O-5 and beyond, but instead lie in the formative years of a young officer's career, O-4 and below. Along the journey, the study hoped to uncover the most beneficial elements of

leadership development to help the Air Force construct the best program in the Department of Defense. A leadership development program to be proud of, one of such a caliber that it would set the Air Force up to be an icon among the world's best militaries.

The study began with its inquiry to find the answers by first investigating organizational culture, using Schein, Kier, English, Pedersen and Sorenson to discover its influence over institutional behavior. However, before the study could progress, it had to explicate the distinctions between organizational culture and service culture. Through Builder, the study had to find the answers to what characteristics were unique to each service culture and how did they play out in their behavior. Chapter 1 answered both of these.

Culture holds the answers to many of these questions. Culture not only influences the resources used within the services, but how they are used and which ones institutions gravitated toward. It also revealed elements of organizational culture in 60-year-old doctrine. Culture not only shapes the guidance provided to the members, but also shapes the use of institutional resources dedicated to leadership development. The discovery of basic underlying assumptions revealed what the values were and determined the institutions' flexibility to change. For the Army, duty represented doing what was necessary to prepare leaders for the future, encouraging a responsive system for adaptation to the environment. Tradition, for the Navy, provided tremendous resistance to change. Culture explained the reason behind the different leadership development approaches, but did not address the specific differences.

This meant a more detailed analysis of each element was required. Using Bloom's taxonomy, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 investigated the Army, Navy, and Air Force leadership development programs. The study revealed differences in every aspect of leadership development: doctrine, education, application, experience, and self-study. More importantly, the

analysis provided insight into some best practices and revealed which service had the most comprehensive leadership program. The study discovered the Army to have the most comprehensive program with the Navy in close second. Unfortunately, the Air Force program placed a distant third.

Although no program is perfect, the Army's left little room for improvement. The Army's program balances all elements of leadership development well: doctrine, education, application, experience, and self-study. The Army's program uses doctrine to unify and guide the service in its leadership pursuits. Leadership education is a core concern for the service and reflects the institution's desires to create a habit of learning. The Army seeks to provide young leaders every opportunity to "practice" leadership in benign environments at formal institutions and during field exercises. The experiences afforded Army officers provide a building block approach that entrusts leaders with increasing responsibility as they progress. It also relies on mentorship from above and below to ensure they learn the appropriate lessons. Lastly, the Army provides useful self-study tools to identify personal strengths and weaknesses to guide officers in professional improvement. With a well-balanced approach, the Army programs could be improved with minor changes.

The Navy's program could benefit from a systematic approach to leadership development. Although the Navy uses all of the elements, the weaknesses lie in its tremendous dependence on experience. The Navy lacks direction in a doctrine that unifies leadership guidance to its members. A clear message to its people might facilitate a COs leadership development program at sea, and provide leverage for an increased emphasis on leadership education and application. The "just-in-time" education philosophy currently adopted does not foster a habit of life long learning, but encourages its reliance on experience. Despite these weaknesses, naval tradition places experience at the forefront, and

remains the Navy's greatest strength. Experience, as the best teacher, permits the service to groom young leaders in spite of these deficiencies. The Navy's self-study program is tailored for its members and provides a useful tool to develop sailors as they climb the institutional ladder.

Unfortunately, the Air Force's leadership program was left wanting. The Air Force's program uses most of the elements of leadership development, but does not capitalize on its potential. The revival of leadership doctrine for the service has placed the service on a course for excellence, but it does not provide sufficient guidance and recent revisions create inconsistencies that may threaten progress. Additionally, the Air Force dedicates the most resources to education, but forsakes early leadership education for new members and lacks synchronization between the O-3 and O-4 levels. The service has turned to a revolutionary concept for leadership application by using virtual environments. Experiences within the service are divided between operators and non-operators. Consequently, operators do not attain early leadership experience and do not maximize their development as they progress to the most senior posts. Alternatively, the service's leaders with the greatest leadership experiences lack the operational expertise to rise to the top-most positions. Lastly, the Air Force does not recognize self-study as an important element for institutional concern. It places the burden on the individual and forgoes the opportunity to shape its members through a comprehensive self-study program.

Having reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of the three services leadership-development programs, it is time to make the Air Force's leadership development program *the* model. In total, the US Air Force can benefit from adopting the 12 recommendations listed in Chapter 5. In general, they consist of continuing to improve doctrine, providing leadership education for all levels, and aligning these recommendations with institutional goals, incorporating a unit level

professional development program, and development of self-study tools. Although they are tailored for use by the Air Force, these recommendations remain useful in the development of any robust, systematic leadership development program to help maximize the existing leadership potential within the service.

This leaves one last question begging to be answered: why were naval officers chosen for those top positions in 2006, and why did the ground components enjoy such a long reign? Although we may never know the “exact” reason, the study maintains that the leadership development experience during the officer’s formative years shaped the leaders they became in 2006. The decisions 30 years prior had strategic consequences.

In 2006, of all nine combatant commanders and three Chiefs of Staff, only one was commissioned before 1970 – Admiral William Fallon, class of 1967. The mean commissioning date of the remaining 11 is 1971. To understand the significance of these dates, we must understand the state of affairs within each service as the vast majority of these officers were entering service. In 1971, President Nixon signed a law that ended the conscript service.¹ Consequently, all of the services were preparing to transition to an all-volunteer force. The Army anticipated the change by expanding existing sections on discipline, motivation, and stress. It also incorporated fresh leadership concepts like leadership styles, and exploring the leader/follower dynamic. Most

¹ Bernard Rostker, *I Want You!: the Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006), 4, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9195.pdf (accessed 3 May 2012).

importantly, the Army recognized leadership development as the cornerstone to the development of future leaders.

Motivated by the troubling brig population, the Navy investigated various leadership training concepts. Admiral Zumwalt, chosen for the Chief's of Naval Operations job because of his view on leadership, expanded the Leadership and Management Training program to 10-days. LMT was a program that would eventually become the Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET) program in the late 1970s. Although Zumwalt never had the opportunity to measure the effectiveness of his program, he laid the foundation for a leadership development program that grew. Punctuated by the events on the *USS Kitty Hawk* and *Constellation* in 1972, his successor continued to build upon Zumwalt's program. As these events unified the institution for action, *Command at Sea* called for Commanding Officers to continue to develop naval officers, beginning with leadership training.

Meanwhile, the Air Force faced a different kind of crisis. Air Force leadership doctrine at the time had transitioned to Air Training Command for oversight. The training philosophy took a bivariate approach that shifted focus to increasing administration efficiency, or management, over leadership. In 1973, the Air Force abandoned leadership doctrine altogether and transitioned to a managerial mindset. Although a leadership pamphlet was introduced in 1985, this mindset continued into the 1990s before General Ryan ordered the development of leadership doctrine. The observations of several lieutenant colonels, like Larson, Schneider, and Diebolt, describe their frustrations with the leadership philosophy of the service during this period. They illuminate the emergence of certain trends, such as a decreased priority of human capital, an increased management focus, and expressed their general concern for the future of the institution. However, many of the junior

officers entering service would not know any better; they remained subject to the current program rather than understanding its limitations.

So, during the formative years of these young officers, the Army expanded leadership doctrine and development to incorporate more concepts in the human element of psychology and sociology. Whether Army, Navy, or Air Force, most officers new to the service only knew the new development programs outlined by their service. The Navy turned to the human aspect as well, continuing to increase leadership development efforts as it addressed the institutional crisis. And, the Air Force abandoned leadership development in favor of management. As the Army and Navy focused more on the human dimension of leadership, the Air Force turned toward resource management and forsook the human dimension. From 1970 to 1990, the Air Force produced managers, not leaders.

The consequences of these decisions had ramifications nearly 33 years later. The leadership development experiences during these formative years set the foundations for the rest of their careers. As the Army and Navy continued to devote time and money to develop their leaders, the Air Force devoted their resources to developing managers. All of these officers grew and developed under these new programs and believed management was “leadership,” forgoing the interpersonal relations required for good leadership.

There is no wonder the Air Force did not garner the responsibilities of combatant commander in 2006. It should also be clear as to why the ground components enjoyed such a long reign. The Navy’s increased emphasis on leadership development yielded institutional dividends 30 years later. There is no doubt that there were many excellent Air Force officers. However, they were left to develop their skills without the assistance of the institution. This meant the right person, had to be at the right place at the right time. This left too much to serendipity.

This 2006 sample underscores the importance of leadership development today. Leadership development should take a long view. Not the same long view professed by Planning, Programming, and Budgeting professionals defined by a 20-year outlook, but longer. Leadership development takes 30 years to reach strategic heights, which equates to the average time in grade of most general officers. If the Air Force is committed to developing the best future leaders, and preparing the service for conflicts in 2030 to 2050, then it must keep this timeframe in mind. Due to the way the Air Force currently operates and the leadership opportunities afforded junior officers, the consequences of the budget decisions today will not begin to realize the strategic consequences until 2025 and beyond. The earliest opportunity to measure the effects of cancelling the Air and Space Basic Course (ASBC) will be when those same lieutenants who were denied the opportunity to attend begin to lead squadrons at 13-14 years time in grade.

It is no surprise the foundation of organizational success lies in an organization's leaders. However, if the US Air Force is truly devoted to maintaining its lead as the world's premier air force, then the service must look at leadership development from a systematic and holistic perspective, to include education, application, experience, and a life-long program of self-study. Furthermore, if the character of warfare is truly changing, then the Air Force needs to begin developing airmen capable of leading the service in an increasingly complex environment today. The service should start now to embrace new and innovative ways of instilling leadership concepts into our nation's future leaders. The Air Force can and must do better than what it does today. There is no reason the Air Force cannot be an icon for leadership development and any time spent developing our leaders will pay great dividends in 30 years to come.

Acronyms

AFDD – Air Force Doctrine Document
AFM – Air Force Manual
AFP – Air Force Pamphlet
AFPD – Air Force Policy Directive
AFR – Air Force Regulation
AFSOUTH – US Air Forces Southern
ASBC – Air and Space Basic Course
AR – Army Regulation
ARSOUTH – US Army South
AWOL – Absent Without Leave
BOLC – Basic Officer Leader Course
BRAC – Base Realignment and Closure Committee
CENTCOM – US Central Command
CGSC – Army Command and General Staff College
CO – Commanding Officer
COCOM – Combatant Command
COIN – Counter Insurgency
CNAS – Center for New American Security
CNO – Chief of Naval Operations
DIVO – US Navy Division Officer
DIVOLC – Division Officer Leadership Course
DH – US Navy Department Head
DHLC – Department Head Leadership Course
FM – US Army Field Manual
ICBM – Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDP – Individual Development Plan
IED – Improvised Explosive Device
ILE – Intermediate Level Education

ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
LCDR – US Navy Lieutenant Commander
LDP – Leadership Development Program
LMET – Leadership and Management Education and Training program
LMPAG – US Air Force Leadership and Management
 Planning Advisory Group
LMT – Leadership and Management Training program
LRC – Leadership Reaction Course
MRAP – Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle
MSAF – Multi-source Assessment and Feedback
NAVLEAD – Naval Leadership Development program
NCO – Noncommissioned Officer
NFOTS – Navy Flag Officer Training Symposium
OPD – Officer Professional Development program
OJT – On-the-Job Training
PACOM – US Pacific Command
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
S3 – US Army Operations Officer
SNCO – Senior Noncommissioned Officer
SOCOM – US Special Operations Command
SOC – Squadron Officer College
SOS – Squadron Officer School
SOUTHCOM – US Southern Command
TSP – Training Support Package
TQM – Total Quality Management
XO – Executive Officer (US Army or Navy)

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